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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that belong to the realm of Applied Microe-
conomics. The first two chapters are empirical projects that assess the role of time
for human capital development of immigrants in the U.S.. The third one is a theory
project that studies how managerial career concerns and experimentation influence
risk-taking behaviours.
Chapter 1 studies how age at arrival in the U.S. affects the skill development
of young immigrants in the U.S.. Using the within family variation across siblings
entered in the U.S. at different ages, I document a cognitive / non-cognitive trade-
off induced by age at arrival. As for cognitive skills, the effect of age at arrival is
negative, in particular for the ability to learn English. The effect on cognitive skills
is reflected in immigrants’ educational achievements. However, age at arrival plays
a positive role for illicit behaviours. Children of immigrants arrived later tend to
show less problematic behaviours than their siblings arrived earlier, also controlling
for their English ability. Through an indirect accounting exercise, I estimate the
negative effect of age at arrival on the labor market performance of immigrant
adults. I conclude the paper showing that more educated parents anticipate the
arrival of their children in the U.S..
Chapter 2, co-authored with Leonardo Felli, Carola Frege and Yona Rubinstein,
studies the intergenerational assimilation of immigrants in the U.S.. In our study,
we observe the outcomes of several immigrant generations. Moreover, we link im-
migrant mothers and their children, thus observing the outcomes of two immigrant
generations belonging to the same cohort. Controlling for the selection into migra-
tion and return migration, we document that it takes two immigrant generations to
exhaust the full potential of cognitive and educational assimilation, while it might
take longer for other social outcomes, such as the attitude towards problematic
behaviour and the likelihood of having children.
Chapter 3, co-authored with Francesco Sannino, studies the effect of managerial
career concerns and experimentation on risk-taking. We model an economy where
managers create value through their ability to learn at an intermediate stage about
the intrinsic profitability of a risky investment. Managers are heterogeneous in their
ability to extract information from experiments, and care about their reputation.
Their incentive to take on risk is distorted by career concerns, and can result in
under or over risk-taking. When, following the experiment, better managers discard
risky projects more often than bad ones we observe over risk-taking. Our result is in
contrast with Holmstro¨m (1999) where managers’ ability affects the project’s success
rate, and career concerns can only produce inefficiently low risk-taking. We show
that the inefficiency is reduced in one extension of the model, where the market can
also observe the outcome of similar projects. The novel implication is that markets
more plagued by career concerns distortions are those where managers engage in
more idiosyncratic activities.
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Chapter 1
Do not Put Off Until Tomorrow
What You Can Do Today: Age at
Arrival and Immigrants’ Human
Capital
1.1 Introduction
The number of immigrants and children of immigrants in most of the richest coun-
tries is rising. With the increase in international mobility, individuals that face
different incentives and additional barriers in the accumulation of skills are more
and more important in determining these nations’ stock of human capital and their
relative advantages compared with each other. Children of immigrants, relocating
around the critical periods for the full development of their personalities, play a
particular role in this process. Although they do not choose to become immigrants,
they have to adapt their human capital investment process to the new educational
environment and, on average, they bear the cost of migration for longer.
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Is age at arrival an important factor in explaining the pre-labour market out-
comes of children of immigrants in the U.S.? Is a late arrival unambiguously bad?
These are the issues that I take up in this paper. In trying to answer these questions,
I make use of the NLSY79 dasaset, that allows me to shed light on the differential
role of age at arrival in shaping several dimensions of individuals’ personality, often
considered unobservable. In the pages that follow I show that age at arrival has, in
general, a negative effect on the educational achievement of children of immigrants,
that is also reflected in the performance in standardized cognitive tests. It has,
however, a positive effect on the likelihood of not being involved in anti-social and
illicit activities. I also provide indirect evidence that the net effect of this trade-off
is tilted toward a preference for arriving earlier.
From an econometric perspective, assessing the impact of age at arrival on hu-
man capital accumulation poses the challenges associated with the endogeneity of
the former. There are several reasons for why age at arrival should not be consid-
ered as good as randomly assigned. First, certain households’ characteristics can
influence the timing of the migration. For example, some parents might understand
better than others the problems induced by switching from the schooling system or
the institutional environment of the home country to the American ones, and thus
they might be tempted to move to the U.S. as soon as possible. Similarly, families
that have the capabilities to mitigate the cost of a relocation or that have less chil-
dren are likely those with the material resources to pick the timing of migration from
a larger opportunity set. Moreover, while immigrant parents relocating to a new
country for labour related reasons are often able to choose the timing of the migra-
tion, other people leaving their home countries for other reasons, such as refugees,
are not. Because some or all these factors are also relevant in the individuals’ hu-
man capital production function, ordinary least squares capture, in part, spurious
correlations between the outcomes and age at arrival. One of the advantages of the
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NLSY79 is that it offers the possibility of observing immigrants whose age at arrival
is different, but that are instead similar along the other dimensions that affect their
human capital. Specifically, to assess the role of age at arrival on the human capital
development of immigrants, I use family fixed effects and I exploit the variation in
age at arrival across different siblings within the same household.
Another advantage of the data I use is the richness of individuals’ information
I can observe. A part from the numbers of years of education, I am able to study
immigrants’ performance in standardized cognitive tests across several subject ar-
eas1, as well as to understand their social behaviour. I find that an extra year in
the home country reduces the number of years of education by 0.14 to 0.2, with the
critical period around the age of 10. As for cognitive skills, my results indicate that
the degree to which a late arrival is detrimental is subject-specific. In particular,
the effect is stronger for the knowledge of English language, and milder in case of
mathematics. Furthermore, my results indicate that reducing the age at arrival by
one year increases the amount of illicit, risk-taking, and problematic behaviours by
about 0.05 to 0.15 of a standard deviation. Despite this apparent trade-off in the de-
velopment of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, I then provide suggestive evidence
that an earlier arrival is preferable compared to a later one, as it leads to better
labour-market outcomes. I also show that parents with higher education bring their
children earlier.
Researchers have hinted at several possibilities for explaining the role of age
at arrival in the assimilation process of children of immigrants. The inability in
acquiring language proficiency after a certain threshold age2, tied to the importance
of verbal ability in acquiring non-linguistic skills or in attaining success in school, is
1Other papers proposed the performance in these tests as important predictors of labour market
outcomes. See, for example Heckman et al. (2006).
2This hypothesis builds on the psychological literature on the critical period hypothesis. The
seminal paper in this literature is Lenneberg (1967), whereas, more specifically, Johnson and
Newport (1989) studies the critical period for learning a second language.
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conceivably an important one. Although I lack the exogenous variation in English
knowledge to run the ideal experiment and to assess its causal effect as a channel
through which age at arrival has an impact on non-verbal outcomes, when I use
verbal ability as an additional controller in my regressions of schooling and cognitive
skills on age at arrival, the estimates reduce substantially. I rule out, instead, any
role of linguistic knowledge in determining the relation between age at arrival and
the likelihood of being involved in illicit behaviours.
Relation to the literature. This paper contributes to the debate on the role of
age at arrival on the immigrants’ human capital formation and their socio-economic
performance. Several papers study the effect of age at migration on academic
achievements; examples are Gonzalez (2003), Bleakley and Chin (2004), Van Ours
and Veenman (2006), Ohinata and van Ours (2012), Bo¨hlmark (2008), Basu (2016)
and Lemmermann and Riphahn (2017). While the studies based on U.S. data (Gon-
zalez (2003) and Bleakley and Chin (2004)) do not account for the endogeneity of
age at arrival (with the exception of Basu (2016)) and use the number of years of
education as the main outcome of interest, I use family fixed effects and a broader
set of measures of cognitive skills. From a methodological perspective, my paper
is similar to those based on Swedish and German data (Bo¨hlmark (2008) for Swe-
den and Lemmermann and Riphahn (2017) for Germany). In this respect, my paper
adds to these studies because the characteristics of the host country and its selection
of immigrants are different3 and because I also consider some non-cognitive skills.
My paper also speaks to the literature on the importance of verbal knowledge
for educational and economic achievements. Bleakley and Chin (2004) show that
English ability is an important predictor in wage regressions of immigrants and the
3For example, the estimates for the effect of age at arrival on years of education in Lemmermann
and Riphahn (2017) are about one third of those in Gonzalez (2003) and Bleakley and Chin (2004),
which are closer to my estimates. This may suggest that the age of arrival effect on educational
achievements is heterogeneous across countries.
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effect is mainly due to its role in affecting immigrants’ education. Isphording et al.
(2016) finds that increasing linguistic ability by one standard deviation increases
the math performance in standardized tests by 0.6 of a standard deviation. Aucejo
et al. (2016) conclude that linguistic ability is more important than math skills in
determining university enrolment and that teenage years are particularly important
for developing skills. In my paper I find a strong negative effect of age at arrival on
the ability to learn English. In the context of this literature, my result implies that
reducing children of immigrants’ age at arrival, by increasing their English ability,
should be beneficial for the development of their non-linguistic skills and for their
labor market outcomes. This result is in contrast to Lemmermann and Riphahn
(2017), that using German data find that linguistic knowledge is not a relevant
channel through which age at arrival affects educational achievements.
More broadly, my paper is related to the studies documenting gaps between
first generation immigrants and natives (see for example Chiswick and DebBurman
(2004) and Algan et al. (2010)), as well as to the literature on the cognitive and non-
cognitive skill formation of young individuals and on early childhood intervention
(see Cunha and Heckman (2007) and Cunha et al. (2010)). As such, my study
indicates that providing incentives to immigrant parents to anticipate their arrival
in the host country would reduce the cognitive barriers their children face in investing
in human capital, thus reducing the gap between them and the children of native
parents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the econo-
metric issue and the solution used in this study. Section 1.3 describes the data.
Section 1.4 presents the main results. Section 1.5 studies the possible mechanism of
the main effects, addresses the policy trade-off induced by age at arrival and stud-
ies the parental selection. Section 1.6 reports some robustness checks. Section 1.7
concludes.
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1.2 Empirical strategy
In order to guide the empirical analysis, I start by developing a simple conceptual
framework that describes different determinants of immigrant children’s age at ar-
rival. A toy model formalizing the discussion can be found in the Appendix. I then
show why in my empirical model the endogeneity of age at arrival makes the esti-
mation problematic and how I can address this problem using family fixed effects
and the NLSY79 data.
Conceptual framework
The sample in my study consists of immigrant children arrived in the U.S. when
they were teenagers or younger. Presumably, for most of them, the decision on
when to arrive was their parents’ choice. For simplicitly, let us think of the economy
as a two-period world. In the first period, immigrant parents choose when to move
to the U.S.. In the second one, immigrant children observe their age at arrival
and choose their investment in human capital, accordingly. The cross-sectional
empirical relation between the investment in human capital and age at arrival is the
combination of an age at arrival effect and a selection one, that arises because of
common factors affecting both parents’ and children’s optimal decisions.
To understand where the age at arrival effect comes from, suppose, for the mo-
ment, that the selection effect is null. Immigrant children set the level of investment
in human capital so that the marginal benefit they get from it equals its marginal
cost, conditionally on age at arrival in the U.S.. Assuming that children’s problem
is concave and, hence, the solution is interior, the sign of the age at arrival effect
is determined by how the marginal cost of human capital, relative to its marginal
benefit, changes with age at arrival. For example, the literature suggests that age at
arrival might increase the cost of investing in U.S.-specific skills, through its effect on
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linguistic proficiency (see the seminal paper Lenneberg (1967) on the critical period
hypothesis to acquire linguistic proficiency). On the other hand, certain aspects of
the new local environment might as well be detrimental for the future individual’s
success. In this case, a higher age at arrival could be beneficial for children of im-
migrants, by increasing the likelihood of retaining certain positive cultural traits
typical of their home countries.
The selection effect, instead, suggests that age at arrival in the U.S. is likely not
as good as randomly assigned. Immigrant children that arrived earlier may be sys-
tematically different from those arrived when they were older, in terms of attitudes
towards skills accumulation or costs in acquiring them. There are several reasons
that support this possibility. Parents select the timing of migration, and hence the
age at arrival of their children, depending on their own preferences, abilities or ma-
terial resources. Furthermore, some families might be forced to leave their home
countries without the possibility to select the best timing. Those family character-
istics might, in turn, be correlated with some determinants of children’s investment
in skills.
Consider parental preferences and abilities, first. Some parents could value their
children’s U.S.-specific skills more or anticipate the age at arrival effect better than
others. They could then choose the optimal timing of arrival in the U.S. to help their
children get those skills. As preferences, beliefs and norms determining both parents
and children’s behaviours are, at least partly, transmitted by genes or through per-
sonal interactions (see Bisin and Verdier (2011)), these characteristics would likely
be correlated with some determinants of their children’s investment in human capi-
tal. Material resources could play an important role, too. Certain families may be
able to reduce the impact of age at migration by selecting wealthier neighbourhoods
or exclusive schools for their children. These families are also likely those that can
pick the timing of migration from a larger opportunity set. A similar possibility is
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that larger family size, whose effect on achievements is negative (see, for example,
Black et al. (2005)), increases the cost of arriving earlier4. In general, individuals
arrived earlier are not necessarily those more willing to invest in U.S.-specific human
capital. Immigrants enter in the U.S. for different purposes and some immigrant cat-
egories, particularly refugees or asylees, are less likely to freely choose the timing of
migration. Simultaneously, some of them may be more easily eligible for permanent
residence or naturalization (see, for example, Woodrow-Lafield et al. (2004)) or less
likely than others to migrate back to their origin countries, and thus possibly more
willing to invest in U.S-specific human capital.
Econometric model
The objective of my study is to estimate the coefficient βa in the regression
yit = cons+ βaait + βxXit + it
where yit is a measure of skills of individual t living in household i, while ait represents
his age at arrival in the U.S.. Xit is a set of characteristics that may vary at the
individual level and affect the skill accumulation, and it is an idiosyncratic error
term.
In the previous subsection I explained some reasons for why ait and the shock
it might be correlated. If these concerns are valid, ordinary least squares estimates
that make use of the whole cross-sectional variation in age at arrival would provide
biased estimates of the causal effect of age at arrival on skill accumulation, βa. In
this subsection I explore what I can do, as an empirical researcher, using fixed effect
regressions and the NLSY79 dataset.
4For example, grandparents’ help in the home country may be an increasing function of the
number of grandchildren. However, as they do not relocate to the U.S., it would drop to zero after
migration.
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In an ideal experiment I would randomly select immigrant children in the sample
and force them to enter the U.S. at different ages. In this way, there would be no
systematic link between the age at arrival in the U.S., ait, and the realization of
the shock it. As such an experiment is impossible, I use a model with family fixed
effects,
yit = cons+ βaait + βxXit +
it︷ ︸︸ ︷
γi + γit
where I assume that the shock it has two components: γi is a fixed family compo-
nent, whereas γit is the idiosyncratic individual component.
The critical assumption to estimate consistently the causal effect of age at arrival,
βa, using this fixed effect specification is that γi is the only reason for the correlation
between it and ait. That is, conditional on having the same parents, age at arrival in
the U.S. is as good as randomly assigned for pairs of siblings. Two additional pitfalls
of this strategy might nonetheless affect the consistency of the family fixed effects
estimator. First, if immigrant children, rather than their parents, can choose or,
at least, can influence their age at migration, their decision may be correlated with
some determinants of their human capital production function. In order to address
this concern, I only focus on individuals that arrived at the age of 17 or younger.
Second, immigrant parents may treat differentially different children. For example,
they might prefer one child over the others. In some cases, they may allow the year
of migration to vary across children within the same household, depending on some
characteristic that are child-specific, but unobservable to the econometrician. For
about 1/6 of the immigrant children in my sample, the year of arrival in the U.S.
does not match the one of their siblings. I therefore run the regressions for both
the whole sample and the sample restricted to siblings arrived in the same calendar
year. Furthermore, even if the year of arrival is the same, parents can still choose it
to maximize the achievements of only a specific subset of their children. To partially
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address this concern, I always control for sex and, when specified, for a birth order
indicator.
When I use the outcomes in standardized tests to measure the cognitive skill
accumulation of children of immigrants, as well as when I consider attitudes toward
illicit behaviours, I also face an additional problem. The concern, in this case, is the
perfect collinearity between age at arrival and age at the time of the interview. In
the NLSY79, indeed, individuals take the cognitive tests or answer to behavioural
questions in the same year, but at different ages. Potentially, both these two com-
ponents have an effect in determining the outcomes. To solve this problem, when
the outcome variable of the regression is the performance in cognitive tests, or the
attitude towards illicit behaviours, I add natives to my sample. By assuming iden-
tical cohort effects for natives and immigrants, the variation across native siblings
identifies the age effect, while, once the cohort effect is partialled out, the residual
variation across immigrant siblings identifies the age at arrival effect on the outcome
of interest.
To conclude this section, I also want to stress that measurement error in age at
arrival is likely to occur in this study. As some individuals are asked several years
later about the year in which they entered in the U.S., some of them could report
it wrongly. The fixed effect estimates exacerbate this problem. If the conditions for
the classical measurement error apply to my analysis, my estimates would be biased
toward 05. It is important to notice, however, that restricting the sample to siblings
arrived in the same calendar year should make the measurement error less severe.
5See Angrist and Pischke (2008).
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1.3 Data
Data sources and variables of interest
In my study I use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and
the U.S. Census.
The NLSY79, that is the basis for the main part of this study, is a survey ad-
ministered by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to 12,686 individuals living in the
U.S.. The survey participants were born during the period 1957 through 1964 and
have been interviewed annually since 1979 through 1994 and, since then, on a bien-
nial basis. The NLSY79 has been intensively used in the labor literature, because
it offers detailed information on several socioeconomic outcomes of a representative
sample of the youth population in the U.S.. From the NLSY79, I obtain the indi-
viduals’ number of years of education, the outcomes in standardized cognitive tests
and an index of illicit behaviours, as well as information on age at arrival in the U.S.
and family structure.
To measure the development of cognitive skills, in addition to educational achieve-
ments, I use the results in several sections of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (ASVAB) test. The ASVAB is the test administered by the U.S. Military
Entrance Processing Command to assess the cognitive skills of people that want to
join the army. NLSY79 respondents took the ASVAB test because the U.S. Depart-
ments of Defense and Military Services wanted to update the norms of the ASVAB,
using nationally representative samples of young people. Each participant in the
NLSY79 took the test in 1980, although results are missing for the 6% of the origi-
nal 1979 sample. In this study, I focus on the performance in the three mathematics
and in the two English sections of the ASVAB. The sum of the scores in two math-
ematics sections, the arithmetic reasoning and the mathematics knowledge sections
and in two English sections, the word knowledge and the paragraph comprehen-
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sion ones, determines the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT has
been often used in the literature as a proxy of IQ (see, for example, Cameron and
Heckman (1998), Cameron and Heckman (2001), and Heckman et al. (2006)). In
the arithmetic reasoning part, candidates face math word problems and the goal of
these questions is to assess their ability to apply mathematics in solving real world
problems6. The mathematics knowledge section covers basic high school mathemat-
ics, including questions on algebra and geometry. The numerical operation part of
the test is a speed test in performing simple mathematical computations. In the
word knowledge section candidates must pick the best synonym of a given word in
a sentence7. In the paragraph comprehension one, candidates are evaluated on their
ability to understand brief reading passages8. My measures of linguistic knowledge
differs substantially from other measures used in the immigration literature, that are
often self-reported and expressed as categorical variables with few potential values.
In my analysis, I standardize the cognitive skill measures to have a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one in the NLSY79 population.
The index of illicit behaviours is useful to obtain a glance at the development
of a particular sociability trait of immigrants in the U.S., that is often a motive of
debate, although difficult to measure. I construct an index which is computed using
questions from the 1980 survey, and measuring the degree to which an individual
engages in aggressive, risk-taking, and illicit behaviors. Each survey participant
was asked to answer to twenty questions: seventeen are about delinquency and
6For example, candidates must solve the problem: “One in every 9 people in a town vote for
party A. All others vote for party B. How many people vote for party B in a town of 810?”
7As an example, candidates must choose the most appropriate synonym of unblemished in
the sentence “The employee was proud of her unblemished reputation,” out of impaired, flawless,
sporadic, unorthodox.
8For example, respondents must read the passage “The Mississippi River is key to New Orleans’
flavor and pizzazz. The seafood, the steamboat cruise, the swamp tours, and the history-it’s all
there. And the jazz? There are those who would swear that the uncanny beat of the music comes
from the intrepid rhythm of the Mississippi’s waters.” Then they have to pick the element that
mainly affects the atmosphere and reputation of New Orleans between jazz music, its unique food,
the Mississippi River, the history of its swamp.
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three relates to problems with the police. To be more specific, the topics of these
questions include property damaging, fighting with classmates, shoplifting, robbery,
drug use, drugs dealing, charges or conviction by the police with an illegal activity.
Following Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), I assign for each question a value of one
if the person engaged in that activity and zero otherwise, I add these values and
divide by twenty. I then standardize the index, which is available for about 90% of
the sample, to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in the NLSY79
population.
Importantly, immigrants in the NLSY79 were asked about their year of arrival in
the U.S. in two survey years, in 1983 and in 1990. In the main part of the analysis,
if both answers are non missing but are different, I use the average of the two as
year of arrival in the U.S.. If one of the two is missing, I only use the remaining one.
To study the relation between age at arrival of immigrants in the U.S. and their
parents’ characteristics, I also use the U.S. Census data 1970-2000. These represent
random samples of the American population and the sample size is consistently
larger than in the NLSY79. It is important to notice that for Census years 1970
to 1990, the year of arrival (and, therefore, also the constructed age at arrival) is
reported in intervals. In Census 2000, instead, people were asked about the exact
year of entry in the U.S..
NLSY79 sample selection and summary statistics
In the NLSY79, I restrict the sample to individuals born abroad with both parents
and the paternal grandfather9 born abroad. I further limit the analysis to those
arrived in the host country when they were seventeen years old or younger, the
sometimes called 1.5 immigrant generation. First, these individuals likely did not
9The only grandparent with available information on country of birth in the NLSY79 is the
paternal grandfather.
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choose to migrate to the U.S.. For them, it is less likely that personality traits
are part of the decision to become an immigrant, and, in particular, to arrive at a
specific age in the U.S., rather than a consequence of that. Importantly, this choice
also allows me to focus on people for which human capital investments in the host
country are in part a matter of choice. Most U.S. states, in fact, have compulsory
schooling laws requiring to attend school until at least the age of sixteen.
There are 537 individuals in the NLSY79 that satisfy these sampling require-
ments. For 256 of them, that live in 113 distinct households, I can identify at least
one sibling in the survey. However, only 213 of them, corresponding to 94 families,
declare a year of arrival that matches the one indicated by their sibling(s).
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics of the main variables of interest for
natives and immigrants in the NLSY79. As for immigrants, I report the summary
statistics for the whole sample and for the sample of siblings. As expected, immi-
grants have worse educational achievements and get lower scores in cognitive tests.
The gap in schooling between the average American and the average first generation
immigrant is about 0.5 years. The gap in cognitive skills ranges between 0.3 and 0.8
of a standard deviation, depending on the subject. Perhaps not surprisingly, it is
smaller for mathematics and larger for English ability. Interestingly, first generation
immigrants behave better than natives, by about 0.35 of a standard deviation. The
average age at arrival in the U.S. for first generation immigrants in the NLSY79 is
just below the age of 10.
1.4 Results
Graphical analysis
Figure 1-1, which uses the whole immigrant sample in the NLSY79, offers the pos-
sibility of a first glance at much of the subsequent results.
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There is a strong negative correlation between age at arrival and educational
outcomes. An extra unit in age at arrival corresponds to a decrease in completed
education by 1/4 of a year. The mode in education for most ages of arrival is 12
years. However, for people that arrived at the age of 4 or later it is not uncommon
to attend school for less than 10 years, and for individuals arrived after the age of 9
it is quite frequent to complete no more than 6 years of education10. Furthermore,
although there are individuals achieving the highest grades for almost any age at
arrival, the relative frequency decreases with age at migration.
The results in educational achievements also reflect those in performance in cog-
nitive tests. One extra unit in age at arrival decreases the performance in mathe-
matics tests by 0.077 of a standard deviation, while it reduces the performance in
English tests by 0.103 of a standard deviation. For both measures, the lowest scores
are obtained by individuals arrived at the age of 10 or later. However, although the
relative frequency appears decreasing with age at arrival, there are individuals able
to perform better than the average individual in the NLSY79 even among immigrant
children arrived after the age of 10.
In terms of probability of being involved in illicit activities, instead, age at arrival
plays a positive role. The relation between the two is negative, meaning that the
later an immigrant enters in the host country the less he acts illicitly. In particular,
the correlation is driven by the almost complete absence of individuals that, arriving
after the age of 11, behave more than a standard deviation worse than the mean
individual in the NLSY79. It is also evident from the picture that the share of
individuals that behave perfectly is an increasing function of age at arrival.
Similar patterns emerge when I use the sample consisting of immigrant siblings,
reported in Figure 1-2. Apart from illicit behaviours, however, the correlation be-
10Some of these people were, potentially, drop out in their home countries since some years
before their migration to the U.S.. This correlation, therefore, mixes two effects: the probability
of becoming a drop out after the migration to the U.S., and the probability of not re-enrolling in
school in the U.S. after dropping out in the home country.
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tween the various outcomes and age at arrival are, in this case, reduced by 20% to
40%. It is also worth mentioning that the correlation between years of education
and age at arrival is similar in the NLSY79 and in the Census dataset, as shown in
Table 1.2. In the Census one extra unit in age at arrival is associated to a reduc-
tion in educational achievement by between 0.19 and 0.23 of a year, compared to a
reduction between 0.14 and 0.26 in the NLSY79.
Main regression results
In Tables 1.3 to 1.9 I show the results of age at arrival on the accumulation of skills
using the econometric model described before.
First, in Table 1.3 the results on educational achievements are reported. The
OLS estimate in column 1 suggests that an extra year in age at arrival lowers the
educational achievement by 0.14 years of schooling. In column 3, the result of the
model including family fixed effects is identical. It is possible that my estimates are
affected by the systematic parental preference for children born first. The estimated
parameter, however, remains quite similar with the inclusion of controls for the birth
order of individuals, as shown in column 5. In the latter case, however, the precision
of the estimate reduces and the significance disappears. When I estimate a more
flexible model with age at arrival defined through five categorical variables, whose
results are reported in even columns, the fixed effects model suggests a critical age
around 10. That is, individuals arrived around the age of 10 suffer a gap of about 0.9
years in completed education in comparison to their siblings arrived when they were
0 to 5, while for those arrived between the age 15 and 17 the gap reaches 1.6 years.
In this case, the result is robust to the inclusion of birth order controls. Restricting
the sample to siblings arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year does not alter
much the qualitative insights. The results reported in columns 7 to 12 indicate that
the point estimates increase slightly.
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As for cognitive skills, the results are in Tables 1.4 to 1.811. Similarly to edu-
cational achievement, age at arrival has a negative effect on cognitive skills. The
results of the linear models estimated with OLS regressions or with family fixed
effects without controls for birth order, reported in columns 1 and 3, show that an
extra year in age at entry in the U.S. lowers the measured outcomes by 0.02 to 0.07
of a standard deviation. Importantly, the effect is lower and non significantly differ-
ent from zero for cognitive mathematical achievements, whereas it is stronger and
significant for English knowledge. As for English knowledge, the effect on paragraph
comprehensions is more important than the one on word knowledge. These conclu-
sions are unaffected by the inclusion of birth order controls, as shown in columns 5.
When I use a more flexible model with categorical ages at arrival and individuals
arrived between the age of 0 and 5 as benchmark group, the gap, increasing in age
at arrival, is significant for immigrants arrived after the age of 11. Also in this
case the effect is stronger for paragraph comprehension, reaching, in the specifica-
tion with all the controls, a difference of more than 1 standard deviation between
individuals arrived around the age of 16 and those arrived before the age of 6. As
for mathematics, it is instead lower and often very noisy, although significant for
individuals arrived around the age of 13 in different specifications for each outcome.
Once again, the results on both English knowledge and mathematics proficiency do
not change much when I restrict the sample to siblings arrived in the same calendar
year.
The results on illicit behaviour are shown in Table 1.9. The linear model es-
timated with OLS in column 1 shows that anticipating the arrival in the U.S. by
one year reduces the probability of being involved in illicit activities by a statisti-
cally significant 0.05 of a standard deviation. Although the estimates of the fixed
11Notice that in these tables, as well as in the table on illicit behaviours, the number of obser-
vations is much higher, because I use also native siblings in the sample to identify the effect of age
on the different outcomes.
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effects models in columns 3 and 5 are not significantly different from zero, the point
estimates are larger, reaching the level of 0.09 with the full set of controls. The
more flexible model using family fixed effects, whose results are shown in columns
4 and 6, suggests that individuals arrived around the age of 7 show substantially
better behaviours than those arrived before the age of 6, by about 0.5 of a standard
deviation less problematic. Without controls for birth order, however, the results
are similar to the ones obtained with OLS, but not significant. With the inclusion of
birth order controls, instead, the difference in attitude toward behavioural problems
becomes significant for individuals arrived around the age of 8 and around the age of
16. Restricting the sample to siblings arrived in the same year makes the estimates
bigger in absolute terms and more often significant.
1.5 Further considerations
In this section I add further considerations to the the main results. I first check if
age at arrival has an effect on education, skills accumulation and illicit behaviours
through its effect on English proficiency. I then use an accounting exercise to es-
timate the effect of the trade-off between cognitive skills and illicit behaviours on
labour market outcomes. Third, I study parental selection in age at arrival.
Possible mechanism
One possibility for my results is that with its negative effect on linguistic ability, age
at arrival increases the costs or limits the potential to invest in the development of
human capital. Although English ability is an endogenous variable in this context,
I re-estimate the main regressions controlling for word knowledge and paragraph
comprehension. The results are shown in Tables 1.10 and 1.11. First, in general,
word knowledge and paragraph comprehension are strongly correlated with the edu-
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cational and cognitive outcomes, while only paragraph comprehension is marginally
correlated with attitudes toward illicit behaviours. Second, the point estimates of
the age-at-arrival effect on education and accumulation of cognitive skills reduce
substantially, whereas the estimates on illicit behaviours are almost identical to
those in the main specification reported in Table 1.9. This means that, differently
from Lemmermann and Riphahn (2017), I cannot reject the possibility that verbal
ability is one of the channels through which age at arrival affects the development
of cognitive skills. Instead, it does not seem to play any role in explaining the effect
on illicit behaviours.
An accounting exercise
Overall, my estimates in Section 1.4 suggest that age at arrival is detrimental for
educational achievements and for the accumulation of cognitive skills. It reduces,
however, the attitude toward illicit behaviours. This implies a potential trade-off in
designing migration policies aimed at attracting young children of immigrants.
To address this potential trade-off, I quantify the effect of an extra-year in the
home country on labor market outcomes of immigrants in the U.S.. The small sample
size, together with the attrition in the participation to the NLSY79 survey, prevents
me to directly estimate the effect of age at arrival on labour market outcomes. I then
proceed in two steps. In the first one, I estimate the following Mincerian equation
yt = cons+ βeet + βcct + βiit + γ1expt + γ2exp
2
t + γXXt + t
where yt represents the labour market outcome of interest of individual t, such as the
likelihood of being employed and the wage. et stays for educational achievements,
ct indicates a full set of linguistic and mathematical cognitive skills, it stays for a
measure of illicit behaviours, while expt is the potential working experience of the
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individual. In the set of controls Xt, I include gender and ethnicity. In the second
step, I use the estimates of βe, βc and βi, together with the estimates of the previous
section, to approximate the labour market impact of an extra unit in age at arrival,
as follows,
d̂ y
d a
= β̂e
d̂ e
d a
+ β̂c
d̂ c
d a
+ β̂i
d̂ i
d a
The various β̂ are the estimates from the first step of my accounting exercise, re-
ported in Table A.22, while d̂ e
d a
, d̂ c
d a
and d̂ i
d a
are the partial effects of age at arrival on
education achievements, cognitive skills and illicit behaviour, respectively, estimated
in Section 1.4.
The results of this exercise indicate that an extra unit in age at arrival reduces
the probability of being employed by less than 0.003, while, conditional on being
employed, the likelihood of being employed full time by 0.0025. Both the hourly
wage and the yearly earnings decrease by about 0.02 as age at arrival increases by one
unit. The results are very similar when I use the much larger sample of American in
estimating the Mincerian equation. The only difference is the estimated likelihood
of being employed full time, close to zero in this case.
In any case, it is important to notice that if policymakers interpret immigrants’
assimilation as looking like an American the trade-off is non-existent. As Table 1.1
shows, indeed, first generation immigrants tend to behave better than natives and
my results suggest that by arriving earlier immigrant children would be more similar
to the average American individual along all the human capital dimensions.
Parental selection
I now look at the parental selection in age at arrival. If parents care similarly to
the human capital development of their children and the net age at arrival effect is
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negative, those that possess the material or intellectual resources to move earlier to
the U.S. should do so.
The results are shown in Table 1.12. Using the whole immigrant sample in
the NLSY79, an extra year in mother’s education is associated to a reduction in
age at arrival by more than 0.1 units, while the effect of father’s education is a
reduction by 0.03. I obtain similar results focusing on families with two or more
siblings arrived in the U.S. as children of immigrants. In this case, the effect of
father’s education increases in absolute value, being associated to a reduction of
0.17 units in age at arrival. The coefficients are, however, not statistically different
from zero. Interestingly, when I also control for family income, I find that the
correlation between parental education and age at arrival is basically unchanged,
while family income has no role in explaining the age at arrival of children in the
U.S.. Since in the NLSY79 I observe family income only in the 1979, I re-estimate
in column 4 the same model focusing on immigrants not yet in working age in 1979,
and my conclusion does not change. In this case, however, the effect of maternal
education on age at arrival of children is smaller in absolute terms.
The findings in this section suggest that parents move to the U.S. taking into
account the age at arrival of their children. The selection effect in theory might be
driven by material resources allowing to choose the timing of migration from a larger
opportunity set, or by parental intellectual ability to anticipate the age at arrival
effect on children’ cognitive and non-cognitive development. Although my exercise
is limited, my findings suggest that the second element is likely more important than
material resources.
To validate the results on parental selection, I also use the Census data, that
provide a much larger sample of immigrant children. When I use the Census data,
the estimates are qualitatively similar, but the larger sample size reduces the stan-
dard errors and the results becomes significant. In this case I find that mother’s
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education decreases the age at arrival by around 0.12 units, while father’s education
by 0.07. These estimates are robust to the inclusion of cohort of arrival fixed effects
and to the exclusion of Census years 1970 to 1990, when age at arrival was defined
by intervals.
Heterogenity
In the following paragraphs I explore the extent of heterogeneity in the age at
arrival effect, depending on the country of origin of immigrant children. Due to
the small sample size most of the heterogeneity effects that I describe below are
not statistically different from 0. Nonetheless, I believe it is useful to report these
results.
In Tables A.14 to A.17, I interact age at arrival with an indicator for immigrants
of Mexican origin. In the immigrant siblings sample of the NLSY79 there are 108
individuals arriving from Mexico and 148 arriving from other countries. In Tables
A.18 to A.21, instead, I interact age at arrival with an indicator for immigrants ar-
riving from countries where English is an official language. Unfortunately, however,
there are only 28 immigrant individuals in the immigrant siblings sample that arrive
from countries where English is an official language, thus one should be cautions in
drawing conclusions on this exercise.
I consider Tables A.14 to A.17 first. Overall my findings suggest that for Mexi-
cans the trade-off induced by an early arrival in the U.S. is milder and that for this
group the negative effect of age at arrival on cognitive skills and education is larger.
In Table A.14, it is possible to observe that the effect of an extra year in the home
country is about one third bigger in absolute value for Mexicans (-0.12+(-0.08) vs -
0.12). A similar conclusion emerges from Table A.15 and Table A.16, on English and
mathematics knowledge. For example, for paragraph comprehension, an extra year
in age at arrival in the U.S. reduces outcomes of Mexicans by 0.12 to 0.13 standard
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deviations, while the reduction for immigrants from other countries is 0.08 to 0.12.
As for illicit behaviors, age at arrival has a larger role for individuals arrived from
other countries, while smaller for Mexicans. Thus, for them the trade-off induced
by age at arrival is milder.
In Tables A.18 to A.21 I study, instead, the heterogeneity based on the language
spoken in the origin country of immigrants. It is important to notice that, given
the small sample of individuals coming from countries where English is an official
language, the estimates are very noisy and they might be misleading. Particularly
when using the empirical model with categorical variables for age at arrival, it is
possible, indeed, that the estimates are induced by very few individuals. Further-
more, because of cultural and institutional differences across countries, this exercise
should not be considered as the solution for disentangling the linguistic component
of the age at arrival effect. First, the effect of age at arrival on schooling, in Table
A.18, seems stronger in absolute terms for individuals that speak English in their
origin countries. In terms of the effect of age at arrival on linguistic achievements,
perhaps surprisingly, there is no big difference between the two groups. For immi-
grants that speak English in their origin countries, instead, arriving later in the U.S.
has no or very limited role in affecting their mathematical scores. To conclude, in
Table A.21 I find no differences between the two groups in terms of the effect of age
at arrival on social behaviors.
1.6 Robustness checks
In this subsection I check the robustness of the main results performing several
tests. First, I check if the presence of both parents in the households affects the
estimates. Second, I exclude from the analysis on schooling outcomes immigrant
children arrived in the U.S. as dropouts. Third, I control for time trend in the
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American educational system. Forth, I run the regressions using a subsample of
individuals arrived at the age of 13 or younger.
Presence of both parents in households
The presence of both parents in households is likely correlated with both the de-
velopment of personality traits of young individuals, as well as with age at arrival.
In particular, within families, children arrived when they are younger are also those
more likely to suffer the absence of one parent (or both) for a longer period of time.
This may be due, for example, to parental separation or death.
To address this concern, in Tables A.1 to A.7 I repeat the analysis controlling
for the presence of both parents in the household. Both the magnitude and the
significance of the estimates of this exercise are almost identical to those described
in the main section.
Excluding immigrants arriving as dropouts
The results on schooling, reported in Table 1.3, might mix two effects. On the one
hand, age at arrival might increase the likelihood of leaving school after arriving
in the U.S., on the other hand it might reduce the likelihood of re-enrolling after
arriving in the U.S. as a dropout.
To possibly separate these two effects, I exclude from the analysis the immigrant
children that do not attend U.S. schools. The results are reported in Table A.8.
The estimates using the model where age at arrival enters linearly in the regression
are marginally smaller than the ones using the whole sample. Furthermore, using
the more flexible model, with age at arrival expressed in terms of a categorical
variable, the coefficient on individuals arrived between the ages 15 to 17 reduces
by about 0.5 years in absolute terms. This indicates that the large difference in
educational achievements between immigrants arrived before the age of 6 and those
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arrived between the ages 15 and 17 are partly driven by the high likelihood of not
re-enrolling in school after becoming dropouts in the home countries. Nonetheless,
for individuals attending at least one year of formal education in the U.S., an arrival
around the age of 16 still accounts for a reduction of 1.15 to 1.8 years of completed
education, compared to individuals arrived before the age of 6.
Controlling for time trends in the education system
A possibility for the results on schooling, reported in Table 1.3, is that the age at
arrival variable captures time trends in the American educational systems. For ex-
ample, individuals that arrived younger in the U.S. attended school in more recent
years. Thus, if the American educational system evolved in the period under con-
sideration, my estimates could be biased even when considering the within family
variation.
First, given that the individuals used in my study are all born within a window of
7 years, it is quite unlikely that major changes in the American schooling system dif-
ferentially affected their educational outcomes. However, I additionally re-estimate
my model using a pooled sample of immigrants and natives, controlling for a time
trend. As long as changes in the schooling systems have the same impact on im-
migrants and natives, this empirical strategy addresses the concern. In particular,
the age at arrival effect is estimated via the within immigrant family variation in
age at arrival in the U.S., while the time trends in the American educational system
is controlled for using the within family variation in year of birth across siblings in
native families. I report the result of this robustness test in Table A.9. I conclude
from this Table that the main result on schooling is robust to time trends in the
American schooling system12.
12This empirical strategy, however, is not useful if improvements in the American educational
system impact in a different way immigrants and natives.
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Excluding immigrants arrived after the age of 14
One concern of my empirical setting is that children of immigrants can affect the
parental decision on the timing of migration. Children in their teenage years, in
particular, might be those more likely to influence their parents.
To address this concern, I exclude from my analysis individuals arrived after
the age of 14. I only report, in Tables A.10 to A.13, results for the linear model.
The coefficients of the more flexible model, with age at arrival defined as categorical
variable, are indeed unaffected by this sampling strategy. The magnitudes of the
estimated coefficients are very similar to those described in the main section. In
general, the coefficients are a bit larger in absolute value, although reducing the
sample size increases the standard errors, too. Therefore, most of the coefficients,
in these cases, turn out to be insignificant.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I studied the effect of age at arrival on the development of children
of immigrants’ personalities. As the number of immigrants is rising in most of
the richest economies, they are becoming increasingly important in shaping the
human capital of the average individual in these economies. Young immigrants are a
peculiar category in that they do not choose to become immigrants, but they might
face more severe challenges and bring additional benefits to their host countries.
Indeed, relative to their parents, they need to switch to a new educational system
and, on average, they stay in the host countries for longer.
Compared to other studies, I used several measures to capture the multifaceted
aspect of human capital. I observed immigrants’ cognitive development through
their educational achievements and their performance in standardized tests. More-
over, I also studied their attitude in being involved in problematic and anti-social
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behaviours. Using the variation in age at arrival across siblings living in the same
household, I showed that age at arrival has a negative effect on schooling and cogni-
tive outcomes, but it also reduces the likelihood of being involved in illicit activities.
In other words, the earlier an immigrant enters in the U.S., the more similar he
becomes to the average American, along several human capital dimensions often
used in the literature. This suggests the presence of a policy trade-off in targeting
immigrant families arriving with their children, as, perhaps contrary to a popular
belief, Americans in the NLSY79 tend to behave more illicitly than first generation
immigrants. I also showed through indirect estimates that the net effect of age at
arrival on labour market outcomes is negative.
As for cognitive skills, the effect is stronger for linguistic ability, and milder for
mathematics. I also documented that linguistic ability might be a relevant channel
through which age at arrival affects the cognitive achievements, but it is unlikely to
be an important one for the effect of age at arrival on illicit activities. From a policy
perspective, providing linguistic support to immigrants might then be beneficial to
reduce their barriers in the accumulation of cognitive skills, retaining some positive
aspects of being a foreign-born individual.
I concluded my analysis looking at the parental selection in age at arrival. In
both the NLSY79 and Census data, more educated parents are those lowering the
age at arrival of their children. In light of my estimates for the effect of age at
arrival on cognitive skills accumulation, this finding has important implications for
policies aiming at reducing the achievement gaps between children of poor and rich
families. Children raising in poor families might find the support for enhancing their
educational attainments particularly beneficial when born in immigrant households.
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Figure 1-1: The correlation between different outcomes and age at arrival in the
U.S.
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These Figures depict the correlation between different immigrants’ achievements, measured
on the Y-axis, and their age at arrival in the U.S., measured on the X-axis. At the top of
each panel, the coefficients and the standard errors of the linear regressions between the two
variables are shown. The dimension of the blue circles depends on the frequency of individuals
with the same outcome - age at arrival profile. The sample consists of the immigrant population
in the NLSY79 arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or earlier. The linguistic measure is the
sum of the achievements in the word knowledge and paragraph comprehension sections of the
ASVAB test, while the mathematical measure is the sum of the achievements in the arithmetic
reasoning, numerical operation and high-school mathematics sections of the ASVAB. Each
variable, but the educational achievement, has been standardized to have a mean of 0 and a
standard deviation of 1 in the NLSY79 population.
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Figure 1-2: The correlation between different outcomes and age at arrival in the
U.S.
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These Figures depict the correlations between different immigrants’ achievements, measured
on the Y-axis, and their age at arrival in the U.S., measured on the X-axis. At the top of
each panel, the coefficients and the standard errors of the linear regressions between the two
variables are shown. The dimension of the blue circles depends on the frequency of individuals
with the same outcome - age at arrival profile. The sample consists of the immigrant population
in the NLSY79 arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or earlier, with at least one brother or sister
in the sample. The linguistic measure is the sum of the achievements in the word knowledge
and paragraph comprehension sections of the ASVAB test, while the mathematical measure is
the sum of the achievements in the arithmetic reasoning, numerical operation and high-school
mathematics sections of the ASVAB. Each variable, but the educational achievement, has been
standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 in the NLSY79 population.
45
Table 1.1: Summary statistics; NLSY79
Sample Native 1st Generation
Whole Siblings
Years of Schooling 13.50 13.06 13.05
Word Knowledge -0.02 -0.75 -0.79
Paragraph Comprehension -0.01 -0.70 -0.70
Arithmetic Reasoning -0.02 -0.48 -0.45
Numerical Operations -0.02 -0.34 -0.32
Mathematics Knowledge -0.03 -0.38 -0.32
Illicit Behaviours 0.00 -0.35 -0.40
Age At Arrival 9.90 9.71
Individuals 10059 537 256
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Table 1.2: The correlation between educational achievement and age at arrival; NLSY79 and Census
Dataset NLSY79 Census
Sample Whole Siblings All Years, Whole All Years, NLSY Years of Birth 2000, Whole 2000, NLSY Years of Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age At Arrival -0.26∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.23∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 537 256 614800 141314 304626 70205
The Table above reports the results of regressions of years of education on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. As for NLSY data, Whole refers to
immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, while Siblings refers to immigrant individuals with at least one brother or sister in
the same sample. As for Census data, Whole refers to immigrant individuals in prime age, arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger. NLSY Years of
Birth refers to immigrant individuals in prime age arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, and belonging to the same cohorts of immigrants in the
NLSY79. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.3: The effect of age at arrival on years of education; ordinary least squares and family fixed effects regressions
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age At Arrival -0.14∗∗ -0.14∗∗ -0.15 -0.17∗∗ -0.16∗∗ -0.20
(0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13)
Age At Arrival 6-8 0.60 0.12 0.12 0.57 -0.31 -0.37
(0.91) (0.45) (0.50) (1.05) (0.47) (0.52)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.22 -0.92∗ -0.91∗ -0.24 -1.41∗∗ -1.51∗∗
(0.61) (0.49) (0.54) (0.78) (0.63) (0.72)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.77 -1.33∗∗ -1.31∗ -0.99 -1.76∗∗ -1.97∗∗
(0.57) (0.58) (0.78) (0.68) (0.71) (0.97)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -2.27∗∗ -1.69∗∗ -1.66∗ -2.66∗∗ -2.09∗∗ -2.37∗∗
(0.88) (0.72) (0.98) (1.01) (0.82) (1.18)
Family F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
N 256 256 256 256 256 256 213 213 213 213 213 213
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of years of education on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the
results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in
the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator and, when specified, for family fixed effects and a birth order control. In the first six
columns the sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In
columns seven to twelve the sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the
sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.4: The effect of age at arrival on word knowledge; ordinary least squares and family fixed effects regressions
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age At Arrival -0.06∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.05∗ -0.05∗ -0.05∗ -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.17 -0.17 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.12
(0.12) (0.11) (0.14) (0.12) (0.10) (0.16)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.50∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.47∗ -0.48∗∗ -0.48∗∗∗ -0.49∗∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.25) (0.19) (0.18) (0.25)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.60∗∗ -0.60∗∗ -0.53 -0.51∗∗ -0.51∗∗ -0.51
(0.25) (0.25) (0.33) (0.25) (0.25) (0.35)
Family F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476
50
The Table above reports the results of regressions of word knowledge on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results
of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the
U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator and, when specified, for family fixed effects and a birth order control. All these controls are
interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the
immigrant sample of the first six columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample.
In columns seven to twelve the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least
one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 1.5: The effect of age at arrival on paragraph comprehension; ordinary least squares and family fixed effects regressions
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age At Arrival -0.07∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06)
Age At Arrival 6-8 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.08 0.08 -0.06
(0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.17 -0.17 -0.29 -0.17 -0.17 -0.37
(0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.22) (0.21) (0.25)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.67∗∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -1.00∗∗∗ -0.68∗∗ -0.68∗∗ -1.15∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.23) (0.28) (0.27) (0.26) (0.34)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.80∗∗∗ -0.80∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗ -0.85∗∗∗ -1.45∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.29) (0.37) (0.32) (0.32) (0.42)
Family F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of paragraph comprehension on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results
of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In
each specification I control for a sex indicator and, when specified, for family fixed effects and a birth order control. All these controls are interacted with
a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of
the first six columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns seven to twelve
the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the
additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family
level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.6: The effect of age at arrival on arithmetic reasoning; ordinary least squares and family fixed effects regressions
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age At Arrival -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.10 -0.10 -0.19 -0.04 -0.04 -0.16
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.18)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.22 -0.03 -0.03 -0.21
(0.19) (0.16) (0.22) (0.24) (0.20) (0.29)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.21 -0.21 -0.53∗∗ -0.14 -0.14 -0.58∗
(0.29) (0.25) (0.26) (0.32) (0.27) (0.33)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.19 -0.19 -0.60 -0.15 -0.15 -0.70
(0.31) (0.29) (0.40) (0.35) (0.31) (0.49)
Family F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of arithmetic reasoning on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report
the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age
at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator and, when specified, for family fixed effects and a birth order control.
All these controls are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column consists of native
and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first six columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger,
with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns seven to twelve the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the
U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S.
in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗,
∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.7: The effect of age at arrival on numerical operations; ordinary seast squares and family fixed effects regressions
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age At Arrival -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.16 -0.16 -0.19
(0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.31)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.21 -0.21 -0.26
(0.30) (0.31) (0.32) (0.35) (0.36) (0.40)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.50 -0.50 -0.54 -0.70∗ -0.70∗ -0.83
(0.34) (0.36) (0.42) (0.39) (0.42) (0.52)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.37 -0.37 -0.41 -0.44 -0.44 -0.60
(0.50) (0.54) (0.62) (0.54) (0.58) (0.70)
Family F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of numerical operations ability on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns
I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals
of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator and, when specified, for family fixed effects and a birth order
control. All these controls are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column consists of
native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first six columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or
younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns seven to twelve the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived
in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived
in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in
parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.8: The effect of age at arrival on mathematics knowledge; ordinary least squares and family fixed effects regressions
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age At Arrival -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.27 -0.27 -0.25
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.27 -0.27 -0.25 -0.19 -0.19 -0.14
(0.18) (0.19) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.27)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.48∗∗ -0.48∗∗ -0.49 -0.42 -0.42 -0.39
(0.22) (0.23) (0.30) (0.26) (0.27) (0.35)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.40 -0.40 -0.38 -0.34 -0.34 -0.27
(0.26) (0.26) (0.36) (0.29) (0.30) (0.42)
Family F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of mathematics knowledge on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I
report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals
of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator and, when specified, for family fixed effects and a birth order
control. All these controls are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column consists of
native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first six columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or
younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns seven to twelve the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived
in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the
U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
59
Table 1.9: The effect of age at arrival on illicit behaviours; ordinary least squares and family fixed effects regressions
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age At Arrival -0.05∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.09 -0.05∗∗∗ -0.08 -0.15
(0.01) (0.06) (0.08) (0.01) (0.07) (0.11)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.34∗∗ -0.49 -0.54 -0.32 -0.55 -0.66
(0.17) (0.37) (0.37) (0.20) (0.47) (0.48)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.36∗∗∗ -0.73 -0.83∗ -0.32∗∗ -0.97 -1.22∗
(0.13) (0.48) (0.50) (0.16) (0.62) (0.66)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.54∗∗∗ -0.55 -0.75 -0.58∗∗∗ -0.89 -1.32∗∗
(0.14) (0.46) (0.50) (0.15) (0.56) (0.64)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.71∗∗∗ -0.65 -0.93∗ -0.71∗∗∗ -0.98∗ -1.58∗∗
(0.13) (0.47) (0.54) (0.15) (0.57) (0.70)
Family F.E. No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes
N 4158 4158 4158 4158 4158 4158 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126 4126
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of illicit behaviours on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results
of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the
U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator and, when specified, for family fixed effects and a birth order control. All these controls are
interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the
immigrant sample of the first six columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample.
In columns seven to twelve the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least
one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 1.10: The effect of age at arrival on several outcomes controlling for english ability; whole sample
Schooling Arithmetic Num. Operations Maths Knowledge Illicit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Age At Arrival -0.11 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.10
(0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.09)
Age At Arrival 6-8 0.03 -0.20 -0.05 -0.24 -0.54
(0.49) (0.15) (0.28) (0.17) (0.38)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.79 -0.09 0.05 -0.12 -0.89∗
(0.54) (0.22) (0.33) (0.21) (0.52)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.74 -0.08 -0.14 -0.07 -0.88∗
(0.79) (0.24) (0.42) (0.30) (0.50)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -1.07 -0.06 0.07 0.12 -1.06∗
(0.94) (0.37) (0.61) (0.35) (0.55)
Word Know. 0.41∗ 0.43∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.06
(0.23) (0.25) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Parag. Comp. 0.58∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗
(0.21) (0.22) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 236 236 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4511 4028 4028
The Table above reports the results of regressions of several outcomes on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I
report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for
intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order control.
All these controls are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in the first two columns
consists of immigrant siblings, while the sample in each other column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant
sample I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the
10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.11: The effect of age at arrival on several outcomes controlling for english ability; same year of arrival sample
Schooling Arithmetic Num. Operations Maths Knowledge Illicit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Age At Arrival -0.18 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.15
(0.11) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.43 -0.12 -0.16 -0.22 -0.68
(0.52) (0.17) (0.32) (0.20) (0.48)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -1.38∗∗ -0.06 -0.13 0.00 -1.24∗
(0.65) (0.30) (0.43) (0.28) (0.67)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -1.36 -0.08 -0.39 0.08 -1.30∗∗
(0.91) (0.31) (0.55) (0.37) (0.65)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -1.73 -0.11 -0.07 0.27 -1.57∗∗
(1.09) (0.46) (0.72) (0.43) (0.71)
Word Know. 0.43 0.44 0.34∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.06
(0.29) (0.32) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Parag. Comp. 0.56∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗
(0.23) (0.24) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 201 201 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476 4476 3998 3998
The Table above reports the results of regressions of several outcomes on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I
report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for
intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order control.
All these controls are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in the first two columns
consists of immigrant siblings, while the sample in each other column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant
sample I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year, at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the
sample. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 1.12: The parental selection in age at arrival
Dataset NLSY79 Census
Sample Whole Siblings All Years 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother’s Education -0.14 -0.13 -0.15 -0.03 -0.11∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.20) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Father’s Education -0.03 -0.17 -0.18 -0.13 -0.06∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.16) (0.16) (0.21) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Family Income 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Cohort of Arrival F.E. No No No No No Yes No Yes
N 537 256 256 148 335202 335202 142921 142921
The Table above reports the results of regressions of immigrants’ age at arrival on parental education. As
for NLSY data, Whole refers to immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, while
Siblings refers to immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger with at least one brother
or sister in the same sample. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Chapter 2
The Immigrant American Dream
2.1 Introduction
The concept of the American Dream – as described by James Truslow Adams (1931)
– refers to a country where life should be better and richer and fuller for everyone,
with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement regardless of social
class or circumstances of birth. According to Truslow Adams (1931): “the economic
motive was unquestionably powerful, often dominant, in the minds of those who
took part in the great migration, but mixed with this was also frequently present
the hope of a better and freer life, a life in which a man might think as he would and
develop as he willed.” It is these motives and the incentives that are associated with
the extremely risky decision to pack everything up and move to a different country
where everything, often including the language, is new that have been identified
as the key factor at the origin of the U.S. social and economic success. Although
potentially highly controversial, there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that similar
motives are at the foundation of the most recent flows of immigration to the U.S..
There is also no reason to doubt that results would be similar and that all flaws of
migration would contribute and boost the U.S. social and economic success.
In this paper we ask whether the immigrant American dream is fulfilled and
how many generations it takes to achieve it. We also ask what this means for the
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American society and its economy in terms of boosting its overall level of education,
economic success and social spirit. Using a random sample of the American youth
population in the 1980s, we show that first generation immigrants suffer educational
and cognitive skill gaps, but behave less illicitly than the local population. Second
and, even more so, third generation immigrants outperform the local population in
terms of educational and cognitive achievements. We also document that immigrants
tend to have less children than Americans. Furthermore, following the different
immigrant cohorts over time, we show that it takes two generations to complete
the educational and cognitive immigrant assimilation, while it might take longer for
other social skills.
For this study we use the NLSY79, where we can observe a broad set of measures
of cognitive and social skills for a random sample of individuals in the U.S., who
were between the age of 14 and 21 in 1979. For these individuals we know whether
themselves, their parents or their paternal grandfather were born in the U.S.. This
allows us to identify them as first, second or third generation immigrants. By
comparing their accomplishments to the ones of individuals who were born in the
U.S. (and their parents and grand-parents were born in the U.S.), we can show
whether the first, second or third generation immigrants under or over perform
relative to the U.S. population.
The cross-sectional intergenerational dynamics does not, however, provide a re-
liable estimate of the true intergenerational immigrant assimilation. First, different
immigrant cohorts might be characterized by different potential outcomes, or by
different assimilation trajectories. Second, even if the selection into migration is
constant over time, the selection of return migrants is not necessarily random. Us-
ing the NLSY79, we can address both concerns. In the NLSY79, indeed, we also
observe the educational, cognitive and social outcomes of children of female indi-
viduals. That is, for each immigrant cohort, we effectively observe two immigrant
generations. Taking the difference between children and mother’s outcomes, we thus
measure to what extent the intergenerational human capital dynamics of immigrants
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differs relative to the intergenerational dynamics of natives. Our findings suggest
that the process of immigrant educational and cognitive assimilation exhausts in two
generations. For other social outcomes, for example the attitude towards pregnancy,
it takes longer.
We also check the heterogeneity of our results based on first generation immigrant
mothers’ age at arrival and on the origin country of parents of second generation
immigrant mothers. We show that the earlier a first generation immigrant mother
enters the U.S., the more similar the intergenerational dynamics is to the dynamics
of native child-mother pairs. Furthermore, for second generation immigrant moth-
ers, when both maternal parents are immigrants, the child-mother intergenerational
dynamics looks more similar to the dynamics of child-mother pairs with the mother
being first generation immigrant. As the majority of immigrants in the U.S. are
from Mexico, we also check that Mexican families drive only part of our results.
Using principal component analysis we provide suggestive evidence that the im-
migrant catch up along several human capital dimensions might be driven by a
multifaceted and complex phenomenon. Acquiring proficiency in the local language
might, for example, be important for immigrant assimilation in the U.S., but it is
unlikely to be the only relevant factor. Moreover, our estimates of the U.S. intergen-
erational immigrant assimilation are consistent with deterioration in the selection
of immigrants between the late 1800s /early 1900s and 1980s.
Our paper is related to the large economic literature on the integration of immi-
grants and their offspring in several host countries. Notable examples are Chiswick
(1977), Borjas (1993), Trejo (1997), Riphahn (2003), Chiswick and DebBurman
(2004), Algan et al. (2010), Dustmann et al. (2012). We add to this literature for
three main reasons. First, instead of focusing on the educational and labor market
performance of immigrants in the U.S., we use a broader set of pre-labor market out-
comes. On the one hand, these outcomes, such as the performance in standardized
cognitive tests and the attitude towards illicit behaviours, are often treated as unob-
servable in the immigration literature. On the other, these measures are less likely
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to be affected by selection into and discrimination on the labor market. Second,
while most studies observe the immigrant outcomes up to the second generation, we
are able to track the immigrant performance up to the fourth generation1. Third,
to the best of our knowledge our study is the first to observe the same immigrant
cohort across different immigrant generations. From a methodological perspective,
our work is similar to Borjas (1985), although this study focuses on first generation
immigrants and cannot tackle return migration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the dataset,
the main variables of interest and the sampling strategy. Section 2.3 explains the
econometric problem and how to use the NLSY79 to address the issue. Section 2.4
reports the main results. Section 2.5 provides suggestive evidence on the complexity
of immigrant assimilation and on the evolution of the U.S. immigrant selection.
Section 2.6 checks the robustness of the results. Section 2.7 concludes the paper.
2.2 Data and sample selection
For our analysis we use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79)
and the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults. The NLSY79 is a representative
survey of 12686 individuals living in the U.S., who were 14 to 21-year-old at the
time of their first survey, in 1979. The survey has been conducted annually until
1994, and then biannually. Importantly, starting from 1986, information on children
of women in the NLSY79 has been collected in the NLSY79 Chilren and Young
Adults. In each calendar year the participants to the two surveys have responded
to a comprehensive set of questions that offer a picture of their cognitive and non-
cognitive development, social attitudes, labour market outcomes and parenting.
In both datasets we collect information on schooling achievements, performance
in standardized cognitive tests, problematic behaviours, family structure and par-
enting. Even if some information on children does not harmonize perfectly with
1That is, for children of third generation immigrant mothers in the original NLSY79 dataset.
70
the one collected for their mothers, the two surveys supposedly convey similar phe-
nomena. For example, to measure the development of cognitive skills, people in the
NLSY79 took the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test in
1979. The ASVAB is the test administered by the U.S. Military Entrance Process-
ing Command to assess the cognitive skills of people that want to join the army.
The 10 sections of the ASVAB test are: general science, arithmetic reasoning, word
knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mathematics knowledge, electronics informa-
tion, automotive and shop information, mechanical comprehension, coding speed,
numerical operations. In the NLSY79 Chilren and Young Adults, instead, the The
Peabody Individual Achievement Test (PIAT) is used. As explained in the guide to
the data2, the ”PIAT is a wide-range measure of academic achievement for children
aged five and over. It is among the most widely used brief assessment of academic
achievement with high test-retest reliability and concurrent validity”. In particular,
the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults includes three sections of the full PIAT:
the mathematics, reading recognition, and reading comprehension assessments. In
our analysis we thus assume that the ASVAB and the PIAT are similarly useful in
summarizing the mathematics and English knowledge of children and teenagers.
Our study benefits from the two NLS datasets for several reasons. Both sources
provide different measures of cognitive and social assimilation of immigrants that are
not available in other datasets, for example the performance in standardized tests or
the tendency to undertake problematic, illicit and anti-social behaviours. Individuals
are observed since they are children or teenagers. We can thus study the development
of early-life skills, rather than focusing on measures that might reflect complex
underlying factors, possibly different across immigrant generations. For example,
labor market outcomes might reflect selection into and discrimination on the labor
market, as well as social assimilation in the local environment. These factors should,
however, be less important in the determination of the performance in a mathematics
2The link to the guide is: https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy79-children/
topical-guide/assessments/piat-mathematics.
71
test taken at the age of 18. The combination of the NLSY79 and the NLSY79
Children and Young Adults datasets is crucial. Linking the outcomes of mothers
and their children, we can make inference on the process of immigrants’ assimilation,
avoiding the problems associated to the use of cross-sectional or repeated cross-
sectional data. We discuss the last point in detail in the empirical section of the
paper.
We characterize the immigration status of individuals in the two surveys starting
from the NLSY79 dataset. In the NLSY79 we use information on individuals’ coun-
try of birth, his parental countries of birth and his paternal grandfather’s country
of birth3. To be more specific, we define a person as native American if he is born
in the U.S. from two parents born in the U.S., and if his paternal grandfather is also
born in the U.S.. An individual is first generation immigrant if the country of origin
of himself, his parents and his paternal grandfather is not the U.S.. He is second
generation immigrant if he is born in the U.S., but either his mother or his father4
or both are born abroad. He is third generation immigrant if his and his parents’
country of origin is the U.S., whereas his paternal grandfather’s is not the U.S..
To avoid that certain individual characteristics might be the causes, rather than
the consequences of immigration, we drop first generation immigrants arrived in the
U.S. after the age of 17. Out of a total of 12686 individuals in the NLSY79, we focus
on the 12325 that fall into one of the categories described above. 10059 individuals
are classified as natives, 537 as first generation, 756 as second generation and 973
as third generation immigrants. Depending on their mothers’ immigration status,
we define accordingly the status of their children. In total, out of the original 11521
individuals in the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults dataset we use 10223 indi-
viduals. 8341 are children of natives, 522 children of first generation, 635 children
of second generation and 725 children of third generation immigrant mothers.
To measure the cognitive development of individuals in the NLSY79 dataset we
3We do not observe the country of origin of the other grandparents.
4If only the father is born abroad we also require his paternal grandfather to be born abroad.
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rely on information on their education and on the results in the English and math-
ematics sections of the ASVAB test. As for English, we use the combined word
knowledge - paragraph comprehension age-adjusted scores provided by the NLS,
whereas for mathematics we use the combined arithmetic reasoning - mathematics
knowledge age-adjusted scores. In terms of social assimilation, we focus on be-
havioral problems and some measures of family structure. We construct an illicit
activity index, that is a proxy for engaging in illicit activities when surveyed in the
1980. The index is based on 23 questions; to obtain the index, we add the different
indicators for being involved in the particular behavior described in the question and
we divide by the number of questions. Higher scores are thus associated to more
severe behavioral problems. We also use information on the presence of both parents
in the household when the respondent was 14 year-old. For female respondents, we
collect information on parenting. In particular, we observe the number of children
they have, as well as the ages at which they gave birth.
To measure the cognitive development of individuals in the NLSY79 Children
and Young Adults dataset we use the age-adjusted results in the mathematics, read-
ing recognition, and reading comprehension sections of the PIAT assessment. To
describe their attitudes towards problematic behaviours we use the Behaviour Prob-
lem Index (BPI). All other measures, including the ones on schooling outcomes and
parenting, are identical to the ones for their mothers in the NLSY79.
2.3 Econometric model
We assume that the outcome of an individual t belonging to a group i is determined
by the following equation:
Yit = β0 +
∑
g>0
γg1{Git ≥ g}+ βXit +
uit︷ ︸︸ ︷
θi + it (2.1)
where Git is the immigrant generation of the individual, Xit is a set of factors that
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can vary at the individual level, and uit represents a shock. The shock term is
the sum of a group-specific component, θi and an idiosyncratic term it. The sum∑
g γg1{Git ≥ g} describes the intergenerational assimilation process of individual t
and his ancestors in the U.S.. Conditionally on the term Xit and the group-specific
component θi, β0 can then be interpreted as the average outcome of individuals born
in the U.S. from ancestors that are also U.S. citizens, whereas each γg represents the
speed of assimilation from one immigrant generation to the next. In other words, we
are assuming that the outcome of an immigrant of generation g not only depends on
his ability to take advantage of the American resources relative to natives, γg, but
also on the process of assimilation of his ancestors in the host country, measured by
γg−1, γg−2, ..., γ1.
The purpose of our study is to estimate the parameters describing the intergen-
erational assimilation of immigrants relative to natives, up to the fourth generation.
Specifically, we want to estimate γ1, γ2, γ3 and γ4 in equation 2.1. The estimation of
our model is a challenging task. Ideally, one would like to follow the same individual
across different immigrant generations. This is, of course, impossible.
There are several potential sources that contribute to the correlation between
Git and uit. First, even when the idiosyncratic term it is not correlated with Git,
there might still be an omitted variable problem due to the unobservable θi. The
vector θi represents the fixed unobserved components that vary at the group level.
Different waves of immigration might be characterized by individuals with different
potential outcomes. The differential outcomes achieved by individuals belonging to
different immigrant generations might then reflect, on top of the true effect of inter-
generational assimilation, the differential selection into the various cohorts. Adding
controls as proxies for things such as country of origin, family structure and even
parental education would probably be not a panacea5. Another concern in estimat-
ing equation 2.1 using cross-sectional data is that also the assimilation process could
5First, the effects of θi may be not fully controlled for using such variables. Second, some
controls such as parental educational could be a noisy estimate of the true factors, because of the
differential quality of institutions across countries.
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be cohort specific. That is, immigrants entering the U.S. in different periods could,
in principle, exhibit different assimilation trajectories.
A candidate solution to tackle both problems is to follow the same immigrant
cohort across different Census years. However, this strategy might still result in
biased estimates because of the non-random selection of return migrants. Suppose,
for example, that immigrant individuals characterized by adverse traits to succeed
in the U.S. economy leave the host country after some time. Using repeated cross-
sections, one would then compare the outcome of the average immigrants to the
outcome of (the children of) only the best among them.
Figure 2-1 depicts the analysis that we could perform using the NLSY79 or
any cross-sectional dataset. It represents the potential outcomes of three different
cohorts of immigrants in the U.S.. In the NLSY79, we only observe the outcome
of cohort 1 during its first period in the U.S., the outcome of cohort 2 during its
second and the outcome of cohort 3 during its third. If we try to infer what will
be the second period outcome for cohort 1 by looking at the current outcome of
cohort 2, we would add to the true treatment effect for the assimilation into the
U.S. society, a noise reflecting the initial starting point, a possibly different speed
of assimilation and the selection of return migrants. Only if the covariates that
we can use in the NLSY79, such as country of origin, gender, ethnicity, and family
structure, completely offset the noise, then we would get unbiased estimates of the
true treatment effect. If not, the intergenerational assimilation estimate would be
biased, as showed in Figure 2-3. In Figure 2-1, for example, we have assumed that
the quality of immigrant cohorts deteriorates over time, and thus the estimates of
γ1 and γ2 would be too large, as depicted in Figure 2-3.
Combining the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults and the NLSY79 datasets,
we can take one step ahead in the estimation of equation 2.1. Specifically, we select
the measures of individuals’ human capital development that are harmonized in the
two datasets and we study the within family variation in measured achievement. We
thus define θi as a fixed family component. Consider equation 2.1 for an individual
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t in the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults that is an immigrant of generation g
and his mother, t − 1, in the NLSY79, immigrant of generation g − 1. By taking
the difference between the equations describing their outcomes, and allowing the
constant β0 to vary between the NLSY79 and the NLSY79 Children and Young
Adults datasets, we get
yit = Yit−Yi(t−1) = βchild0 −βmother0 +
∑
g
γg1{Git = g}+βXit−βXi(t−1)+(it−i(t−1))
(2.2)
Using this specification, we can interpret βchild0 − βmother0 as the average difference
in achievement between a child and her native mother. γg is, then, the difference
between the outcome of an immigrant child of generation g relative to his mother’
performance, relative to a native child-mother counterpart. This parameter mea-
sures the speed of intergenerational assimilation for an immigrant of generation g.
Assuming that it and i(t−1) are not correlated with Git, we can estimate equation
2.2 using OLS. We use the following empirical model:
yit = δ0 + γ2 ∗ Cit2 + γ3 ∗ Cit3 + γ4 ∗ Cit4 + bXit + eit (2.3)
where yit is the difference between the outcome of a child and the outcome of his
mother, Citg are dummies taking the value of one if the child t is an immigrant of
generation g, Xit are controls that vary at the individual level, while the error term
eit captures child-mother pairs’ idiosyncratic shocks.
Combining the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults and the NLSY79, we can
therefore make an attempt to isolate the treatment effect of assimilation into the
American society. The combination of the Children of NLSY79 and the NLSY79
dataset is crucial, as it allows to follow the same immigrant family over time. We
observe the outcomes of two different immigrant generations belonging to the same
family. The cost of our empirical strategy, however, is that we can only estimate
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consistently γ2, γ3, and γ4, but not γ1. Figure 2-2 depicts the analysis using the
combined datasets. Compared to what we could do in Figure 2-1, here we can take
into account the bias of estimating the effect of intergenerational assimilation using
cross-sectional or repeated cross-sectional data. The resulting estimates are the light
blue arrows depicted in Figure 2-3.
The reliability of our empirical strategy holds also when the assimilation of dif-
ferent immigrant cohorts follows different trajectories or when the selection into
motherhood is not constant across immigrant generations. In these cases our es-
timates should be interpreted as average treatment effects on treated individuals.
Knowing the extent to which the assimilation process is cohort specific or character-
izing the selection into motherhood for each immigrant cohort would be, however,
important in evaluating the external validity of our estimates.
2.4 Results
Summary statistics
Table 2.1 provides the summary statistics of the variables we use in the NLSY79.
Several patterns emerge in this table. First generation immigrants suffer an edu-
cational and cognitive gap compared to natives, but they seem less prone to illicit
behaviors. They get 0.5 years less in completed education, while the gaps in math-
ematics and English are 0.4 and 0.6 of a standard deviation, respectively. Their
behaviours are 0.35 of a standard deviation less problematic than those of natives.
Furthermore, the results in the cross-section are compatible with immigrant hu-
man capital assimilation. Second generation immigrants obtain about 0.4 years
of education more and get similar results in cognitive tests, compared to natives.
The third generation outperforms other individuals also in cognitive tests, achieving
scores higher than those of natives by 0.35 of a standard deviation. In terms of
behaviours, second generation immigrants behave as illicitly as natives, while third
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generation immigrants slightly worse. The presence of both parents in the house-
hold is similarly likely across immigrant generations. The patterns are alike when
we restrict attention to mothers in the NLSY79, reported in Table B.9. For them, it
is interesting to notice that first generation immigrants have about 0.2 to 0.3 more
children than native and higher generation immigrant mothers. Furthermore, sec-
ond and third generation immigrant mothers have the first child 2 years later than
native and first generation immigrant mothers.
In the NLSY79 Children and Young Adults we can observe what happens one
generation ahead. Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics. There is no gap in
educational achievement between children of first generation immigrant mothers
and children of native mothers. Also the gap in cognitive skills is smaller than
the gap one generation back, being only 0 to 0.1 of a standard deviation for English
knowledge and 0.2 for mathematics. Higher order immigrant generations outperform
natives in all cognitive tests. In terms of behaviours, children of immigrant mothers
behave slightly better than children of native mothers. The gap in behavioural
problems between children of first generation immigrant mothers and children of
native mothers is about 0.15 of a standard deviation, or half the gap one generation
back. In this dataset, the presence of both parents is a bit more likely in immigrant
households. As for parenting, children of first generation immigrant mothers have
less children than their native counterparts.
Is the dynamics that we observe in the (repeated) cross-section the result of
immigrant assimilation across generations? In the next section we use our empirical
model to shed some lights on this question.
Main results and heterogeneity
Main results
In Tables 2.3 to 2.7 we show the main results of our analysis. In Table 2.3 we focus
on educational achievements. The point estimates for intergenerational assimilation
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in education between a first generation immigrant mother and her child range from
1.56 to 1.6 extra years, relative to a native counterpart. While the difference in
completed years of education between children and their native mothers is about
0.5 years, the gap is about four times larger for a child-mother pair, when the mother
is first generation immigrant. It is, instead, not statistically different from 0.5 for
child-mother pairs of higher order immigrant generations. The result is robust to
the inclusion of several controls, as shown in columns 1 to 3. Furthermore, while the
higher educational achievement of children relative to their native mothers is due
to a 9 percentage points higher probability of getting a college degree, the result on
intergenerational assimilation of children of first generation immigrant mothers is
driven by the higher propensity of getting the high school diploma. They are, indeed,
about 25 percentage points more likely to complete the high school relative to their
mothers, compared to a native child-mother pair. As for higher education, they are
6 percentage points to 9 percentage points more likely than their mothers to get a
college degree, relative to a native counterpart, but the estimates are not significantly
different from 0. Also for these measures, adding controls to the regression does not
affect the estimates on intergenerational assimilation.
In Table 2.4 we show the results on cognitive skills. In both the NLSY79 and
the NLSY79 Children And Young Adults datasets we have measures on mathemat-
ics and English proficiency. For all these skills, the average native child performs
better than his mother. For example, the score in standardized tests obtained by
the average child is higher than the score obtained by his native mother by 0.37 of
a standard deviation in mathematics and 0.23 to 0.45 in English. The outperfor-
mance is even higher for children of first generation immigrant mothers, while, in
general, not different from the natives for higher order immigrant generations. In
mathematical tests, the child of a first generation immigrant mother obtains a score
that is 0.29 of a standard deviation higher than his mother’s score, relative to the
difference between the scores of a native mother and her child. As for English knowl-
edge, it is between 0.65 and 0.76 of a standard deviation higher than his mother’s
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score, compared to the native counterfactual. The difference between the result on
paragraph comprehension and word knowledge is negligible, with the assimilation
in terms of word knowledge being larger by 0.1 of a standard deviation. When we
add controls for the ethnicity of the child-mother pair, age of mother at birth, age of
the child, and number of older siblings, the magnitude of the estimated coefficients
reduce by about 1
3
, and the results on mathematics become indistinguishable from
0 in statistical sense.
When we look at the assimilation in terms of attitudes towards antisocial be-
haviours, in Table 2.5, things are different. First, children in native families have
more problematic behaviours than their mothers. The estimated difference is about
0.6 of a standard deviation. Children of first generation immigrant mothers have
even worse behaviours compared to their mothers, relative to their native child-
mother counterpart. The difference, however, is not significantly different. The
children of second and third generation immigrant mothers, instead, behave worse
than their mothers, but less so compared to natives. The difference is not significant
for children of second generation immigrant mothers, while it is significant and ro-
bust to the inclusion of controls for children of third generation immigrant mothers.
In particular, the attitude towards antisocial behaviours is 0.23 of a standard devi-
ation less pronounced for children of third generation immigrant mothers, relative
to their mothers, compared to a native child-mother pair.
Are the results on schooling, cognitive skills and problematic behaviours driven
by differences in family structures? To address this possibility we study how the
likelihood of living in two-parent families varies between mothers and children, across
different immigrant generations. In Table 2.6 we report the results. The average
child in the NLSY79 Children And Young Adults is 5% less likely than his mother
to grown up with both parents in the household during his childhood and teenage
years. For children of first and third generation immigrant mothers, this difference
is substantially smaller in magnitude. However, the difference is not statistically
significant. Although there are several potential inputs at the family level that
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may vary across immigration status and affect the accumulation of skills, our result
suggests that the presence of both parents in the household is plausibly not the most
important factor. Aside from statistical significance, if the presence of both parents
were a key factor for the assimilation in the U.S. society, we would have had similar
results in the speed of skill and behavioural assimilation for children of first and
third generation immigrant mothers. However, the estimated coefficients described
in the previous tables are different across these two groups, for almost all outcome
variables and regression specifications.
We then consider some measures of social assimilation. We focus on fertility
outcomes and, in particular, on number of children, and, for females, age at first
birth and probability of becoming a teenage mother. The results are displayed in
Table 2.7. Children of native mothers have on average about 1.6 children less than
their mothers. The gap is larger in magnitude, often significantly, for immigrant
children. Relative to a native child-mother pair, children of first generation immi-
grant mothers have 0.54 less children than their mothers. This difference decreases
to a non significant 0.17 for children of second generation immigrant mothers, while
it is 0.3 for children of third generation immigrant mothers. Adding controls reduce
a bit the magnitude of the estimates, but it does not affect the significance of the
results for children of first and third generation immigrant mothers. A candidate
explanation for this findings is that, as the immigrants assimilate and accumulate
human capital specific to the U.S. economy, the relative cost of raising a baby in-
creases. In terms of age at first birth and propensity of becoming a teenage mother,
we do not generally find important differences across different immigration status.
For example, while the increase in age at first birth for a female child of a first gener-
ation immigrant mother, relative to her mother, is twice as large as the increase for
a native child-mother counterpart, the coefficient is not significantly different. We
only find some significant results on the probability of becoming a teenage mother,
when we look at female children of third generation immigrant mothers. While for
a female child the probability of giving birth before the age of 18 is 4% less than the
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probability of her native mother, the decrease reaches 8% to 10% when the mother
is a third generation immigrant.
We conclude this section emphasizing that one should be cautious with the in-
terpretation of the result on third generation immigrants and their children. We
recognize that our definition of third generation immigrants encompasses different
groups of individuals. In particular, mixing is an issue that one should keep in mind
in reading our results. For example, in this category there are individuals with only
one grandparent born abroad, but also individuals with all grandparents born in a
country different from the U.S.. In the NLSY79, unfortunately, we do not observe
the country of origin of grandparents other than the paternal grandfather. The ef-
fect on assimilation between third generation immigrants and their children - close
to zero for most variables - is thus an average effect between the intergenerational
assimilation effects of individuals with different number of ancestors born abroad.
Heterogeneity
Our definitions of immigrant generations are quite coarse and each category probably
encompasses rather heterogeneous individuals. In the analysis described in the fol-
lowing paragraphs we redefine our immigrant categories along two dimensions. We
first differentiate first generation immigrant mothers based on their age at arrival,
as well as second generation ones based on the number of parents born abroad. We
then split immigrants arrived from Mexico from those arrived from other countries6.
Let us start with age at arrival and with number of foreign parents. Individuals
arrived in the U.S. when they were five years old or younger only attended American
schools. Furthermore, among those that started their formal education outside the
U.S., those arrived before their teenage years are more likely to cope better with
the problems associated to the assimilation into the host country. Similarly, second
generation immigrant mothers with only one parent abroad are more likely to be
6More than 40% of first and second generation immigrants and about 20% of third generation
immigrants in the NLSY79 are from Mexico.
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integrated into the U.S. society. As expected, our exercise suggests that the earlier
a mother enters the U.S., the more similar the intergenerational dynamics of an
immigrant child-mother pair is to the dynamics in a native pair. Furthermore,
when a mother is second generation immigrant, with both parents born abroad,
the child-mother intergenerational dynamics looks more similar to the dynamics in
child-mother pairs with the mother being first generation immigrant. The results of
this analysis are shown in Tables 2.8 and 2.9.
We first consider child-mother pairs, with the mother being first generation im-
migrant. Two main findings emerge. First, child-mother pairs, with the mother
arrived in the U.S. when she was five years old or younger, have intergenerational
dynamics not distinguishable from the ones of their native counterparts. In a sense,
immigrants arrived before the age of six fully exhaust their potential to catch up
with the local population. Second, among the other two groups, children of first
generation immigrant mothers arrived later are those with the highest results in
both educational achievements and cognitive skills tests, relative to their mothers.
This is also reflected in the number of children, that is lower relative to the number
one generation back, compared to the estimate of a child-mother pair with the immi-
grant mother arrived earlier. Interestingly, for children of first generation immigrant
mothers arrived late, the result on problematic behaviour becomes significant. That
is, assimilation into the U.S. society seems to be associated to an increase in the
likelihood of showing anti-social attitudes.
Let us now look at child-mother pairs, with the mother being second generation
immigrant. At least for some outcomes, including educational achievements, English
proficiency, number of children and age at first birth, the intergenerational dynamics
of a child-mother pair, with the mother being second generation immigrant born in
a family with two immigrant parents, is more similar to the the dynamics of pairs
where the mother is first generation immigrant. For most of the coefficients, however,
the standard errors are large and the estimates turn out to be insignificant. The
only exceptions are the coefficients on high school degree and number of children.
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In the first case, children with a second generation immigrant mother and both
maternal grandparents born abroad have 7% higher probability of getting the high
school diploma relative to their mothers, compared to a native child-mother pair.
In the second, they have about 0.4 children less than their mothers, relative to their
native counterparts.
Now, instead, we consider immigrants arriving from Mexico separately from other
immigrants. The results are shown in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. In terms of schooling,
it seems that immigrants from Mexico drive much of the main results described
before. For example, children in child-mother pairs with the mother being born
in Mexico obtain more than 3 extra years of education, relative to their mothers,
compared to their native counterpart. The larger educational achievement is driven
by an increased likelihood in obtaining both high school and college degrees, by 44
percentage points and 13 percentage points, respectively. Interestingly, the assim-
ilation expressed in terms of likelihood of getting the high school degree continues
also in the following generation. That is, children of second generation immigrant
mothers with Mexican origin are 18 percentage points more likely to get the high
school diploma, relative to their mothers, compared to their native counterparts.
For immigrant child-mother pairs with the mother born in a country different from
Mexico, the schooling assimilation is close to zero. Children in child-mother pairs
with the mother being first generation immigrant from a country different than Mex-
ico are nonetheless 13 percentage points more likely to get the high school diploma
relative to their mothers, compared to their native counterparts. The strong result
in English assimilation between first and second generation immigrants, described
earlier, is similarly driven by the two immigrant groups. In terms of problematic
behaviours, being U.S. born individuals is worse for Mexicans than for immigrants
with different origins. Compared to their mothers, children of first generation immi-
grant mothers from Mexico show behaviours that are 0.44 of a standard deviation
worse, relative to a native counterfactual. In this respect, however, it is interesting
to notice that female children of first generation immigrant mothers from countries
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other than Mexico are 8% more likely to give birth as teenagers, compared to their
mothers, relative to the native benchmark.
2.5 Further considerations
In the previous section we observed that much of the dynamic assimilation of immi-
grants exhausts after the second generation. Children of first generation immigrant
mothers get levels of cognitive and social skills that look very different compared
to their mothers. Higher order generation immigrant families, instead, have an
intergenerational dynamics much more similar to the dynamics in native families.
This holds for most of the outcome variables we are considering. Are these out-
come variables strongly related and thereby the immigrant assimilation the result
of a single-dimensional, simple rule? Can we use our analysis to make inference on
the evolution of immigrants’ selection? In this section we try to address these two
questions.
Principal component analysis
To study the interrelation of our different measures of individuals’ cognitive and
social traits, we use principal component analysis. The results of our analysis are
reported in Tables 2.12 and 2.13. As usual with this empirical strategy, we retain
the factors that have eigenvalues larger than 1. In Tables 2.12 we use the NLSY79.
In Tables 2.13, instead, we use the NLSY79 Children And Young Adults and we
express the different measures in terms of deviations from mothers’ outcomes.
The result using the NLSY79 indicates that individuals’ personality is a multi-
faceted and complex object. When we consider schooling outcomes, cognitive skills,
behavioural problems and presence of both parents in the household we observe
that the two relevant factors account for only about 60% of the whole variance.
Furthermore, educational achievements and cognitive skills might be represented by
a common factor, but the proxy for illicit behaviours and presence of both parents
85
would be different. When we also consider the parenting outcomes, a third relevant
factor emerges. Number of sons, age at first birth and probability of being a teenage
mother would be better proxied by this additional factor, rather than those related
to education, cognitive skills or problematic behaviours. Our results do not depend
on the sample selection. They are similar when we consider the whole NLSY79
sample in Table 2.12 or, as a robustness check, the immigrant sample in Table B.10.
When we use the NLSY79 Children And Young Adults in Tables 2.13, we notice
that the child-mother educational gap can be represented by a factor that is not
the one representing the cognitive skills gaps. The gaps in behavioural problems or
family structure do not share either of the two factors. When we consider female
respondents, and we look also at parenting outcomes, an additional factor becomes
relevant.
The evolution of immigrants’ selection
Our analysis suggests that the development and the success of individuals might
be related to several underlying factors. As a result, the catch up along several
dimensions that we observe between immigrants and natives is plausibly driven by
a multifaceted and complex phenomenon.
Our estimates on the intergenerational assimilation of immigrants in the U.S.
suggest that children of first generation immigrant mothers achieve the steady state.
In the following generations, no or little improvement occurs, relative to native child-
mother pairs. If the intergenerational assimilation dynamics is the same among the
different immigrant cohorts in our study, and the propensity to return migration
vanishes after the first generation, comparing the outcomes of second and higher
order immigrant generations could be a way to get the difference in potential out-
comes across the different immigrant cohorts. If so, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 point to a
deterioration in the selection of immigrants between the late 1800 / early 1900 and
1980, expressed in terms of potential educational and cognitive skills achievements.
This conclusion, however, does not hold once we keep the area of origin fixed.
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Consider Tables 2.14 and 2.15, where we represent the summary statistics of im-
migrants by area of origin, for the areas with a consistent number of individuals
in the NLSY79. In these two Tables, for example, it emerges that second genera-
tion immigrants from Mexico are not performing much worse than third generation
immigrants of Mexican origin. This is true also for Europeans. For immigrants
from Canada the difference across different cohorts is larger, but the sample is quite
small. Furthermore, immigrants of Mexican origin tend to underperform relative
to those arriving from other areas, irrespective of the immigrant generation. In the
Appendix we also look at the country of origin of the different immigrant cohorts
in the NLSY79. We find that Europeans account for a large portion of individuals
defined as third generation immigrants, but for a small portion of those defined as
first or second generation immigrants. In particular, the number of immigrants ar-
riving from Germany, Italy and the UK reduced substantially over time. Mexicans,
instead, are a much larger portion of those defined as first and second generation
immigrants. Taken together, these results suggest that the deterioration in immi-
grant potential outcomes is driven by the change in immigrants’ origin countries
over time.
2.6 Robustness checks
In this subsection we confirm the robustness of our results by performing several
tests. First, we repeat the analysis using a different empirical specification. Sec-
ond, we use different sampling strategies when the outcome variable is educational
achievement. Third, we use different measures of reading comprehension and word
knowledge.
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Different empirical specification: outcomes in levels and fam-
ily fixed effects
The model in differences that we estimated before would be algebraically equivalent
to the model expressed in terms of deviations from means if there were only two
individuals per family and one observation per individual. In turn, estimating the
model expressed in terms of deviations from means is equivalent to the estimation
of a model in levels, with the inclusion of family fixed effects7. Our sample consists
of mothers with one or more children. Furthermore, for some outcomes we observe
multiple observations for the same individual. In this case, therefore, the model in
differences and the model in levels with family fixed effects might deliver different
estimates. We repeat our analysis and estimate the following model:
Yit = β
child
0 +
∑
g>0
γg1{Git ≥ g}+ βXit + θi + it (2.4)
where θi is the family fixed effect. In this case, Xit only consists of a gender indicator.
By avoiding the inclusion of control variables that do not vary across individuals
in the same family, such as ethnicity, and that are non-missing for mothers in the
NLSY79 dataset, such as age of parents at birth, the results of this model are directly
comparable to those in the second columns for each outcome variable in Tables 2.3
to 2.7.
We report the results of this exercise, together with the corresponding ones of
Tables 2.3 to 2.7, in Tables B.3 to B.6. With the inclusion of family fixed effects,
the magnitude of the coefficients referring to second generation immigrants is a bit
smaller, but the significance is unaffected. In this case, the coefficient in the regres-
sion of high school graduation corresponding to the indicator for fourth generation
immigrants becomes significant. This suggests that reaching the educational steady
state of natives might take longer than three immigrant generations. Overall, how-
ever, the results are very similar to the ones obtained using the model in differences.
7See chapter 5.1 of Angrist and Pischke (2008).
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Educational achievements: different sampling strategy
When studying the schooling outcomes in the main section, we adopted some filters
to the NLSY79 Children And Young Adults sample, based on the individuals’ maxi-
mum age at the last interview. We did so to prevent the inclusion of individuals that
have not graduated because too young, and not because dropouts. One problem in
adopting these filters is that the sample size we obtain is quite small. Another prob-
lem is that we might induce some heterogeneity across individuals characterized by
different immigration status, along characteristics that correlate with educational
achievements.
In Table B.7 we report the results of the analysis using different sampling strate-
gies. The magnitude of the estimated coefficients varies little using different samples,
and the significance is unaffected. This exercise suggests that the results on edu-
cational achievements described in the main section are not due to the sampling
strategy we adopted.
Different measures of reading comprehension and word knowl-
edge
When studying the intergenerational dynamics of cognitive achievements and illicit
behaviours, we had to use different measures to capture the development of the same
personality trait for mothers and their children. For example, for mothers in the
NLSY79 we observe the outcomes in the ASVAB test, while for their children we
observe outcomes in the PIAT test. Although both tests measure the development
of similar skills, they are different. Similarly, the questions in the NLSY79 leading
to the illicit behaviour index are different from those captured in the BPI measure
in the NLSY79 Children And Young Adults.
For English ability, however, we observe two measures in both the ASVAB and
the PIAT. In the main section, to measure mothers’ English ability, we used the
combined result, provided by the NLS, in the two English sections of the ASVAB.
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Here, we use the fact that the PIAT reading recognition, that measures word recog-
nition and pronunciation ability, and the PIAT reading comprehension, that mea-
sures a child’s ability to derive meaning from sentences, reflect possibly more closely
the skills measured in the ASVAB word knowledge and in the ASVAB paragraph
comprehension, respectively. We thus re-estimate our model using the differences
between children’s and mothers’ outcomes in the corresponding sections of the PIAT
and ASVAB tests. We report the results in Table B.8. Both the magnitude and the
significance of our estimates are unaffected by this exercise.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we studied the intergenerational assimilation of immigrants in the U.S..
We measured assimilation along several dimensions of human capital, including ed-
ucational achievements, cognitive skills, as well as some social attitudes.
By linking the outcomes of mothers and their children, we made an attempt
to separate the treatment effect of intergenerational assimilation from the effect of
selection into migration and return migration. We indeed observed two immigrant
generations for each immigrant family. The result of our exercise suggests that
immigrants take two generations to fully exhaust the potential of educational and
cognitive assimilation in the U.S., while it might take longer for other sociability
traits. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that, in order to evaluate
the impact of migrants on economies and societies, looking at the outcome of first
generation immigrants is not enough. Our results also point to a deterioration
in immigrant educational and cognitive potential between the late 1800s / early
1900s and the 1970s, due to a change in origin countries. Individuals from Mexico,
indeed, account for a larger portion of the most recent immigrant cohorts, and they
systematically suffer in terms of educational and cognitive achievements relative to
the other groups.
We also found that not all first and second generation immigrant mothers are
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the same. We indeed showed that the intergenerational dynamics in child-mother
pairs where the mother is first generation immigrant, but with low age at arrival,
is similar to the dynamics in native child-mother pairs. Furthermore, the dynamics
in child-mother pairs where the mother is second generation immigrant with both
parents born abroad is similar to the dynamics in child-mother pairs where the
mother is first generation immigrant.
We concluded the paper with a closer look at the foundation of immigrant assim-
ilation. We provided suggestive evidence that the catch up along several dimensions
between immigrants and natives is plausibly governed by a multifaceted and com-
plex phenomenon. This implies, for example, that linguistic assimilation might not
necessarily lead to immigrant assimilation along all the other personality traits,
particularly those related to social skills.
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Tables and figures
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Figure 2-1: The analysis with cross sectional data
This Figure depicts the analysis that we could perform using the NLSY79 or any cross-sectional
dataset. We only observe the outcome of cohorts 1, 2 and 3 at one specific point in time and,
specifically, when individuals are first, second and third generation immigrants, respectively.
The light blue arrows represent the true dynamics of intergenerational assimilation from one
immigrant generation to the next, whereas the red arrows show the noise of the cross-sectional
estimates, which is the result of the different starting points of the various cohorts, the different
slopes in assimilation, and the selection of return migrants.
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Figure 2-2: The analysis with the NLSY79 and the NLSY79 Children and Young
Adults
This Figure depicts the analysis that we can perform using the combined NLSY79 and Children
of NLSY79. We observe the outcome of cohorts 1, 2 and 3 at two different points in time.
Specifically, we observe the outcomes of cohort 1 when individuals belonging to it are first
and second generation immigrants; the people in cohort 2 when they are second and third
generation immigrants; immigrants in cohort 3 when they are third and forth generation.
The light blue arrows represent the true dynamics of intergenerational assimilation from one
immigrant generation to the next.
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Figure 2-3: Estimates of intergenerational assimilation
This Figure depicts the estimated dynamics of assimilation from one immigrant generation to
the next. The light blue arrows represent the true dynamics of intergenerational assimilation
from one immigrant generation to the next, whereas the red arrows show the noise of the cross-
sectional estimates, which is the result of the different starting points of the various cohorts,
the different slopes in assimilation and the phenomenon of return migration.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics; NLSY79
Native 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation
Years of Schooling 13.5 13.06 13.93 14.13
Mathematics Knowledge -0.02 -0.41 0.06 0.34
English Knowledge -0.01 -0.66 0.08 0.35
Illicit Behavior 0.00 -0.35 0.00 0.08
Both Parents 0.73 0.77 0.75 0.84
Female 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.46
White 0.80 0.45 0.72 0.92
Black 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.01
Hispanic 0.03 0.49 0.26 0.07
Individuals 10059 537 756 973
96
Table 2.2: Summary statistics; NLSY79 Children and Young Adults
Child of Native Child of 1st Gen. Child of 2nd Gen. Child of 3rd Gen.
Years of Schooling 13.44 13.47 13.45 14.00
Mathematics Knowledge 0.24 0.03 0.36 0.47
Reading Comprehension 0.22 0.11 0.31 0.46
Reading Recognition 0.42 0.41 0.54 0.67
Behavioral Problems 0.31 0.15 0.20 0.12
Both Parents 0.58 0.67 0.62 0.70
Sons 1.18 1.06 1.00 0.85
Age at First Birth 21.38 21.89 20.47 22.17
Female 0.48 0.51 0.48 0.52
White 0.77 0.40 0.67 0.88
Black 0.19 0.06 0.04 0.02
Hispanic 0.04 0.53 0.30 0.10
Individuals 8341 522 635 725
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Table 2.3: ∆ child-mother education
∆ Years of Schooling ∆ P(High School) ∆P(College)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0.53∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07
(0.07) (0.08) (0.40) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
γ2 1.56
∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.06 0.06 0.08
(0.42) (0.41) (0.44) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
γ3 -0.17 -0.19 -0.23 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
γ4 -0.07 -0.09 -0.18 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Gender No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Other Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
N 4378 4378 4378 7103 7103 7103 5308 5308 5308
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The Table above reports results of OLS regressions of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s educational
achievement on immigration status. γ2 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are
first generation immigrants, that is born abroad with parents and paternal grandfather born abroad. γ3 refers to
the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are second generation immigrants, that is born in the
U.S. with at least one parent born abroad. γ4 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers
are third generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with parents also born in the U.S., but with the paternal
grandfather born abroad. Other Controls refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother at birth and number of
older siblings. The sample in the first three columns is restricted to children interviewed at least once at the age
of 25 or older. The sample in columns four to six is restricted to children interviewed at least once at the age of 18
or older. The sample in columns seven to nine is restricted to children interviewed at least once at the age of 23
or older. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and are shown in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.4: ∆ child-mother cognitive skills
∆ Maths Knowledge ∆ Reading Comprehension ∆ Word Recognition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant 0.37∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
γ2 0.29
∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.17 0.65∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
γ3 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
γ4 -0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.10
∗ 0.03 0.02 0.10
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Gender No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Other Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
N 31227 31227 31227 26534 26534 26534 31100 31100 31100
100
The Table above reports results of OLS regressions of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s cognitive
achievement on immigration status. γ2 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are
first generation immigrants, that is born abroad with parents and paternal grandfather born abroad. γ3 refers to
the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are second generation immigrants, that is born in the
U.S. with at least one parent born abroad. γ4 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers
are third generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with parents also born in the U.S., but with the paternal
grandfather born abroad. Other Controls refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother at birth, child’s age and
number of older siblings. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and are shown
in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.5: ∆ child-mother problematic behaviours
∆ Problematic Behaviours
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.58∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08)
γ2 0.15 0.15 0.14
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
γ3 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
γ4 -0.23
∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Gender No Yes Yes
Other Controls No No Yes
N 32787 32787 32787
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The Table above reports results of OLS regres-
sions of the difference between a child’s and his
mother’s attitude towards engaging in problematic
behaviours on immigration status. γ2 refers to
the coefficient on the indicator for children whose
mothers are first generation immigrants, that is
born abroad with parents and paternal grandfather
born abroad. γ3 refers to the coefficient on the in-
dicator for children whose mothers are second gen-
eration immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with at
least one parent born abroad. γ4 refers to the coef-
ficient on the indicator for children whose mothers
are third generation immigrants, that is born in
the U.S. with parents also born in the U.S., but
with the paternal grandfather born abroad. Other
Controls refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of
mother at birth and number of older siblings. Het-
eroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered
at the family level and are shown in parenthesis. ∗,
∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
level, respectively.
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Table 2.6: ∆ child-mother presence of both parents in household
∆ Two-Parents Family
(1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.05∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
γ2 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
γ3 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
γ4 0.04 0.04 0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Gender No Yes Yes
Other Controls No No Yes
N 51076 51076 51076
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The Table above reports results of OLS regressions
of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s
probability of living in two-parents families on im-
migration status. γ2 refers to the coefficient on
the indicator for children whose mothers are first
generation immigrants, that is born abroad with
parents and paternal grandfather born abroad. γ3
refers to the coefficient on the indicator for chil-
dren whose mothers are second generation immi-
grants, that is born in the U.S. with at least one
parent born abroad. γ4 refers to the coefficient on
the indicator for children whose mothers are third
generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S.
with parents also born in the U.S., but with the
paternal grandfather born abroad. Other Controls
refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother
at birth and number of older siblings. The sam-
ple is restricted to children aged 14 or younger.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clus-
tered at the family level and are shown in paren-
thesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the
10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.7: ∆ child-mother parenting
∆ Number of Kids ∆ Age at First Pregnancy ∆ P(Teenage Pregnancy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Constant -1.66∗∗∗ -1.80∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 14.98∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16) (0.80) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
γ2 -0.54
∗∗ -0.53∗∗ -0.39∗∗ 0.94 0.94 1.18 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.86) (0.86) (0.90) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
γ3 -0.17 -0.17 -0.13 -0.76 -0.76 -0.73 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.16) (0.16) (0.14) (0.69) (0.69) (0.60) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
γ4 -0.30
∗∗ -0.31∗∗ -0.22∗ -0.01 -0.01 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.78) (0.78) (0.72) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Gender No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Other Controls No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
N 5198 5198 5198 1955 1955 1955 3789 3789 3789
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The Table above reports results of OLS regressions of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s parenting
behaviour on immigration status. γ2 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are first
generation immigrants, that is born abroad with parents and paternal grandfather born abroad. γ3 refers to the
coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are second generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with
at least one parent born abroad. γ4 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are third
generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with parents also born in the U.S., but with the paternal grandfather
born abroad. Other Controls refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother at birth and number of older siblings.
The sample in the first three columns is restricted to children interviewed at least once at the age of 25 or older. The
sample in columns four to six is restricted to female children. The sample the columns seven to nine is restricted
to female children interviewed at least once at the age of 18 or older. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are
clustered at the family level and are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 2.8: Exploring the heterogeneity: different immigrant definitions
∆ Sch. ∆ P(HS) ∆P(Col.) ∆ Maths ∆ Read. Comp. ∆ Word Reco. ∆ Probl. Beh. ∆ Two-Par. Fam.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 1.38∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ 0.07 0.30∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)
γ2, A. E. 0-5 -1.10 0.14 0.05 -0.32 0.08 0.16 0.07 -0.08
(1.39) (0.13) (0.20) (0.22) (0.16) (0.19) (0.21) (0.10)
γ2, A. E. 6-12 0.93
∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.15 0.23∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ -0.00 0.06
(0.35) (0.04) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.07)
γ2, A. E. 13-17 2.88
∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.06 0.41∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.03∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.16
(0.57) (0.07) (0.06) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.10) (0.16)
γ3, Full 0.48 0.07
∗ 0.01 -0.04 0.15 0.17 -0.07 -0.09∗
(0.40) (0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.05)
γ3, Half -0.38 0.04 -0.03 0.12 -0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.01
(0.33) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.06)
γ4 -0.17 0.02 -0.03 0.05 0.10
∗ 0.10 -0.18∗∗ 0.03
(0.30) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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N 4378 7103 5308 31227 26534 31100 32787 51076
The Table above reports results of OLS regressions of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s outcome on immigration status. γ2 refers to the
coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are first generation immigrants, that is born abroad with parents and paternal grandfather born
abroad. A. E. refers to the mother’s age at entry in the U.S.. γ3 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are second generation
immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with at least one parent born abroad. Full is for mothers with both parents born abroad, Half for mothers with one
parent born in the U.S.. γ4 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are third generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S.
with parents also born in the U.S., but with the paternal grandfather born abroad. Other Controls refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother at
birth and number of older siblings, and, in case of columns four to six, child’s age. The sample of each column consists of the same individuals for the
corresponding outcomes in the previous tables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and are shown in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.9: Exploring the heterogeneity: different immigrant definitions
∆ Number of Kids ∆ Age at First Pregnancy ∆ P(Teenage Pregnancy)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.89∗∗∗ 14.98∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.80) (0.05)
γ2, A. E. 0-5 0.07 1.88 0.14
(0.22) (3.30) (0.10)
γ2, A. E. 6-12 -0.40
∗∗ 1.29 0.01
(0.19) (1.29) (0.04)
γ2, A. E. 13-17 -0.58
∗ 0.97 -0.03
(0.31) (0.76) (0.05)
γ3, Full -0.41
∗∗ 0.97 -0.05
(0.20) (0.74) (0.07)
γ3, Half -0.06 -1.10
∗ -0.01
(0.17) (0.66) (0.05)
γ4 -0.22
∗ 0.06 -0.06∗∗
(0.12) (0.72) (0.03)
Gender Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
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N 5198 1955 3789
The Table above reports results of OLS regressions of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s
outcome on immigration status. γ2 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are
first generation immigrants, that is born abroad with parents and paternal grandfather born abroad. A. E.
refers to the mother’s age of entry in the U.S.. γ3 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose
mothers are second generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with at least one parent born abroad.
Full is for mothers with both parents born abroad, Half for mothers with one parent born in the U.S.. γ4
refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are third generation immigrants, that
is born in the U.S. with parents also born in the U.S., but with the paternal grandfather born abroad.
Other Controls refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother at birth and number of older siblings. The
sample of each column consists of the same individuals for the corresponding outcomes in the previous tables.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and are shown in parenthesis. ∗,
∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.10: Exploring the heterogeneity: Mexican vs non-Mexican immigrants
∆ Sch. ∆ P(S) ∆P(Col.) ∆ Maths ∆ Read. Comp. ∆ Word Reco. ∆ Probl. Beh. ∆ Two-Par. Fam.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 1.35∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ 0.08 0.30∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 1.27∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗
(0.40) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04)
γME2 3.46
∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.17 0.49∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ -0.02
(0.59) (0.07) (0.05) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.12)
γME3 0.48 0.18
∗∗∗ -0.01 -0.10 0.02 0.01 0.09 -0.15∗∗
(0.41) (0.07) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.06)
γME4 -0.51 -0.02 -0.02 -0.16 -0.14 -0.19 -0.15 -0.15
∗
(0.37) (0.06) (0.04) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.08)
γNO−ME2 0.33 0.13
∗∗ 0.06 0.12 0.45∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.02 0.04
(0.47) (0.06) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.11) (0.07)
γNO−ME3 -0.47 0.01 -0.02 0.12 0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.01
(0.35) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
γNO−ME4 -0.10 0.03 -0.03 0.07 0.12
∗∗ 0.13∗ -0.18∗∗ 0.04
(0.33) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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N 4378 7103 5308 31227 26534 31100 32787 51076
The Table above reports results of OLS regressions of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s outcome on immigration status. γ2 refers to
the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are first generation immigrants, that is born abroad with parents and paternal grandfather
born abroad. γ3 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are second generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with at
least one parent born abroad. ME refers to Mexican, while NO-ME refers to non Mexican immigrants. γ4 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for
children whose mothers are third generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with parents also born in the U.S., but with the paternal grandfather
born abroad. Other Controls refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother at birth and number of older siblings, and, in case of columns four to six,
child’s age. The sample of each column consists of the same individuals for the corresponding outcomes in the previous tables. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are clustered at the family level and are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.11: Exploring the heterogeneity: Mexican vs non-Mexican immigrants
∆ Number of Kids ∆ Age at First Pregnancy ∆ P(Teenage Pregnancy)
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0.90∗∗∗ 14.96∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.80) (0.05)
γME2 -0.48 0.52 -0.03
(0.35) (0.71) (0.06)
γME3 -0.17 -1.16 0.11
(0.17) (0.92) (0.07)
γME4 0.41
∗∗ 0.31 0.01
(0.21) (1.11) (0.10)
γNO−ME2 -0.26 1.66 0.08
∗
(0.17) (1.40) (0.04)
γNO−ME3 -0.09 -0.47 -0.06
(0.18) (0.75) (0.05)
γNO−ME4 -0.30
∗∗ 0.00 -0.07∗∗
(0.13) (0.81) (0.03)
Gender Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes
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N 5198 1955 3789
The Table above reports results of OLS regressions of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s
outcome on immigration status. γ2 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are
first generation immigrants, that is born abroad with parents and paternal grandfather born abroad. γ3
refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are second generation immigrants, that
is born in the U.S. with at least one parent born abroad. ME refers to Mexican, while NO-ME refers to
non Mexican immigrants. γ4 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are third
generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with parents also born in the U.S., but with the paternal
grandfather born abroad. Other Controls refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother at birth and
number of older siblings. The sample of each column consists of the same individuals for the corresponding
outcomes in the previous tables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level
and are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table 2.12: Principal component analysis; all individuals in NLSY79
Whole Sample Mothers
Cumulative Proportion 0.60 0.59
Comp.1 Comp.2 Unexplained Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Unexplained
Years of Schooling 0.50 0.21 0.51 0.21
High-School 0.71 0.72
College 0.45 0.37 0.49 0.33
Mathematics 0.49 0.27 0.47 0.31
English 0.48 0.30 0.45 0.35
Illicit Behavior 0.87 0.20 0.80 0.30
Both Parents -0.41 0.76 -0.54 0.57
Sons X X X 0.60 0.44
Age at First Birth X X X -0.49 0.37
Teenage Mother X X X 0.55 0.48
Individuals 10234 3825
The Table above reports results of the principal component analysis using the whole sample of individuals in the NLSY79.
We retain factors whose corresponding eigenvalue is larger than 1, and we report factor loadings larger than 0.3.
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Table 2.13: Principal component analysis; ∆ child-mother in NLSY79 Children And Young Adults
Whole Sample Womens
Cumulative Proportion 0.54 0.64
Comp.1 Comp.2 Unexplained Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Comp.4 Unexplained
∆ Years of Schooling 0.65 0.17 0.64 0.17
∆ High-School 0.40 0.69 0.33 0.33 0.55
∆ College 0.60 0.33 0.64 0.26
∆ Mathematics 0.51 0.36 0.50 0.37
∆ Reading Comprehension 0.60 0.12 0.60 0.12
∆ Word Knowledge 0.61 0.11 0.60 0.12
∆ Problematic Behavior 0.93 0.76 0.37
∆ Both Parents 0.97 0.54 0.64
∆ Sons X X X 0.44 0.67
∆ Age at First Birth X X X -0.62 0.31
∆ Teenage Mother X X X 0.62 0.37
Individuals 4405 1476
The Table above reports results of the principal component analysis using the whole sample of individuals in the NLSY79 Children And
Young Adults. The various measures are expressed as the difference between a child’s and his mother’s outcomes. We retain factors
whose corresponding eigenvalue is larger than 1, and we report factor loadings larger than 0.3.
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Table 2.14: Summary statistics by area of origin; NLSY79
Native 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation
Area of Origin Mexico Canada Europe Mexico Canada Europe Mexico Canada Europe
Years of Schooling 13.5 10.9 15.4 13.9 13.0 13.1 14.3 13.1 14.0 14.2
Mathematics Knowledge -0.02 -0.96 0.38 -0.06 -0.54 -0.02 0.30 -0.41 0.50 0.38
English Knowledge -0.01 -1.14 0.70 -0.45 -0.52 0.09 0.29 -0.34 0.36 0.39
Illicit Behavior 0.00 -0.52 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 0.17 -0.00 0.03 -0.07 0.07
Individuals 10059 233 15 82 327 76 226 177 51 613
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Table 2.15: Summary statistics by area of origin; NLSY79 Children And Young Adults
Child of Native Child of 1st Gen. Child of 2nd Gen. Child of 3rd Gen.
Area of Origin Mexico Canada Europe Mexico Canada Europe Mexico Canada Europe
Years of Schooling 13.4 13.0 15.6 13.6 12.7 12.7 14.5 12.2 10.9 14.3
Mathematics Knowledge 0.24 -0.33 0.40 0.42 -0.17 0.31 0.68 -0.15 0.63 0.54
Reading Comprehension 0.22 -0.28 0.69 0.43 -0.06 0.18 0.53 -0.02 0.59 0.53
Reading Recognition 0.42 -0.04 0.66 0.78 0.14 0.31 0.85 0.11 0.66 0.75
Behavioral Problems 0.31 0.41 -0.32 0.16 0.23 0.41 0.06 0.31 0.36 0.08
Individuals 8341 269 15 60 332 54 132 194 30 429
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Chapter 3
A Model of Risk Taking with
Experimentation and Career
Concerns
3.1 Introduction
Investing in young and innovative firms involves large uncertainty.1 The Venture
Capital financing model offers a solution to deal with the uncertainty inherent to
the innovation process: venture capitalists (henceforth VCs) learn about firms over
time and hence can condition their financing on the information they acquire. There
is large evidence that they differ considerably in their ability to generate returns (see
Korteweg and Sorensen (2017)), and that positive past performance by VCs increases
their chances to raise a new fund (see the evidence in Kaplan and Schoar (2005)),
and the fees they receive from assets under management. Thus, when making their
choices they are arguably motivated by career concerns.
Do career concerns prevent VCs from efficiently using their ability to learn about
1It has been calculated that around 50% of investments in venture capital exit with zero value,
and only about 10% of total investments effectively make all the returns to venture capital vehicles
(see Hall and Woodward (2010) and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013)).
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the projects they finance? And which markets are more prone to this problem? In
this paper we show that career concerns generally lead to inefficient risk taking. In
particular, our novel contribution is to find that the type of experiments that agents
can undertake determines the direction of this inefficiency. Moreover, as the number
of agents financing projects that share the same idiosyncratic component increases,
the inefficiency reduces. In the limit, the equilibrium risk taking approaches the
first best.
In the pages that follow we develop a framework where managers can choose
between a safe task and a risky one that can be abandoned after an experimentation
phase. In our model, both the manager and the market do not know the state of the
world, that determines the return on the risky project, and the manager’s ability to
run the experiment. The manager, independently from his ability, privately receives
an initial signal on the state of the world and, based on this, he chooses whether to
select the safe or the risky project. If the risky task is chosen, both players observe
the binary result of the experimental phase and they abandon the project in case
the experiment conveys a bad signal. How informative the experiment is depends
on the manager’s ability. On average, a good manager extracts better information
and produces higher returns from the risky task. However, in some states of the
world the good manager might perform worse than a bad one. This happens when
the high ability manager receives too often the good signal from the experiment,
when it would be better to abandon the risky task, or when he receives too often
the bad signal, when the state of the world is positive and the continuation of the
risky project would yield high returns.
After characterizing the efficient risk taking rule, we turn the attention to the
equilibrium characterization. We first show that every equilibrium features a cutoff
strategy: the manager chooses to undertake the risky task if and only if the initial
private signal implies that the likelihood of being in the good state of the world is
high enough. Also the efficient risk taking rule prescribes a cutoff strategy. However,
when we study the welfare properties in our economy, we find that it is intrinsically
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plagued by inefficient risk taking. The marginal manager, rather than being purely
motivated by financial returns, bases his choice also on the wedge between his ex-
pected reputation and what the market would think if it knew the true realization
of the initial signal. Because sometimes good managers are biased towards aban-
doning risky projects by mistake, the market could perceive the abandonment of
the risky project as a good sign about the managerial ability. If so, in anticipation
of the reputational gain that will come from abandonment, also managers that are
not particularly optimistic about the state of the world might be induced to choose
the risky task. In other circumstances, when abandoning risky projects is perceived
by the market as a bad signal about manager’s ability, they are inclined to a more
prudent behaviour.
We show that our inefficiency result also holds when there are several managers
that, upon choosing the same risky task, run independent experiments. We then
show that the inefficiency is monotonically decreasing in the number of managers.
The intuition of this results builds on the fact that, by observing the outcome of
several experiments, the market figures out more often the true state of the world.
It becomes, indeed, less and less likely that all managers, correctly in the bad state
and by accident in the good one, abandon the risky project. When the market
is expected to observe more often the true state of the world, in turn, the wedge
between the agent’s expected reputation and what the market would think if it knew
the realization of the initial signal decreases. This is so because the initial signal is
independent on the manager’s ability and, thus, it offers no additional information
about this ability once the state of the world is observed. Knowing the initial signal,
indeed, would be useful to make better inference about the manager’s talent only
when the risky task is abandoned and the market never gets to know whether it
happened correctly or by mistake. We conclude by showing that in the limit the
inefficiency disappears.
122
Relation to the literature. We contribute to three different strands of the lit-
erature. First, our paper is related to the recent theoretical literature on the effects
of imperfect information about fund managers’ abilities. Hochberg et al. (2013)
model investors-managers bargaining in a sequential environment where incumbent
investors are more informed than outside investors about managers’ skills. Mar-
quez et al. (2014), instead, develop a signal-jamming model where fund managers
with differential ability to produce returns distorts the fund size decision in order
to affect entrepreneurs’ learning. Both papers can explain persistence in venture
capital funds’ returns. Similarly to these models, in our work there is uncertainty
about managers skills. However, we focus on how this problem distorts managers’
investment decisions once the fund has already been set.
Second, we contribute to the discussion on experimentation in entrepreneurial
finance. Recent works, such as and Kerr et al. (2014) and Ewens et al. (2016), empha-
size the role of experimentation in nurturing the innovative activity of young firms.
We provide a somewhat darker view on the amount of experimentation observed in
the venture capital industry. In our model, there can be too much investments in
experimental projects.
Third, on a more abstract level, our work is related to the literature on the ef-
fect of career concerns on managerial risk taking. In a seminal work, Holmstro¨m
(1999) shows that when managerial ability directly affects the project success rate
and managers care about their reputation, they underinvest in risky projects. A
recent paper by Chen (2015) breaks this result by introducing managers’ private in-
formation on their type and, hence, a signaling motive to take on risk. We maintain,
instead, the assumption that managers do not know their ability, but we change the
way in which managerial skills affect the returns from undertaking the risky activity.
In our modified setting we characterize necessary and sufficient conditions for either
type of inefficiency to emerge in equilibrium.
Finally, a setting where agents’ learning ability differs in quality improvement -
it is the same initially, but not in the intermediate stage - has been modeled by Li
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(2007). Unlike in our setting, agents are privately informed about their ability and -
unlike in our setting - strategically change their actions as new information arrives.
A signalling motive gives them an incentive to give inconsistent reports, similarly
to what discarding the project would mean in our setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the model with
one manager, characterizes the first best and the equilibria under career concerns,
and reports their efficiency properties. Section 3.3 extends the analysis to an econ-
omy with N managers. Section 3.4 concludes. The proofs that are not in the main
text are relegated to the Appendix.
3.2 Baseline model
Setup
Managers, projects, and experiments. An agent, called manager, can choose
whether to undertake a safe project (S) or a risky project (R). The safe project
costs 0, the risky one costs c. The safe one produces returns of vs - with vs > c -
in any state of the world, while the risky project pays returns vr - with vr > vs - in
the good state and nothing in the bad state. Let x denote the state, and the state
space be X = {g, b}. The principal, often referred to as the market in this paper,
assesses the capability of the manager to anticipate the state of the world.
When the manager chooses the risky task, he runs at no cost an informative
experiment to gather additional information about the likelihood of success and,
based on the information she gets from the experiment, can decide whether to pur-
sue or to abandon the investment. Let i index the manager’s type: a high type
(i = h) is a manager that is able to extract better information from the experi-
ment compared to a low type (i = l) in a sense that will become clear in the next
lines. We assume that the experiment produces two signals only, denoted s, with
s ∈ S = {g , b}. An experiment is then fully described by the precision parameters
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defining the probability of receiving the right signal in each of the two states of the
world, αi = P (s = g | x = g) and βi = P (s = b | x = b). Notice that superscript
i allows signals’ precision to differ depending on the manager’s type. We further
assume that αi, βi >
1
2
and that parameters are such that it is always optimal to
follow the signal. Moreover, the cost of choosing the risky project, c, is only paid
when the manager decides not to abandon the project, that is, after she observes a
“good” signal (s = g), in which case returns realize.2 Otherwise, in case of aban-
donment of the risky task because the signal from the experiment is “bad” (s = b),
the return is zero.
Information and timing. Prior to choosing which project to select, the manager
privately observes a signal ω ∈ R+ (which we will refer to as the project’s intrinsic
quality), generated from a density f defined over the support [ω, ω], which is inde-
pendent of his type. The manager then updates his prior probability of success of
the risky project to p (ω). Through the analysis we assume that p′ (ω) > 0. The
signal ω is the only dimension where the manager’s and the market’s information
doesn’t coincide.
Players share a common prior belief, ρ, on the probability that the manager
is high type. This probability, together with the precision parameters for the two
types of agents, ultimately determines the average probabilities of receiving the
right signal from the experiment in the two states of the world, that are defined as
α ≡ ραh + (1 − ρ)αl and β ≡ ρβh + (1 − ρ)βl. We denote instead γ the market
posterior belief about the manager’s type. If the safe project is chosen, returns vs
are realized and the market does not learn anything about the manager’s ability. If
the risky project is chosen, both the manager and the market observe the realization
of the experiment, s. The result of the experiment depends both on the state of
the world and on the manager’s type; however, conditional on these two pieces of
information, it is independent of the realization of the signal ω. The final realization
2The net returns are then vr − c in case of success or −c in case of failure.
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of the risky project is also common knowledge and it is the outcome through which
the market can update his prior on the manager’s ability.3 We denote γl, γr the
market’s posterior when the risky project is pursued and the state of the world
is revealed to be good and bad, respectively, and γ0 the market’s posterior if the
manager abandons the risky task.
Payoffs. The manager’s utility is increasing in profits from the project - which we
will call pi - and in the market’s belief about the probability he is the high type. We
will refer to the latter as the career concern motive. We assume the manager is risk-
neutral, and that the career concern motive enters linearly in his utility. Specifically,
we call the manager’s utility U (pi, γ). We assume the following form:
U (pi, γ) = (1− λ)κpi + λγ
with λ ∈ [0, 1]. Under this specification, the parameter λ measures the extent to
which the manager is motivated by career concerns, as opposed to maximizing the
payoff from the project. κ, the fraction of profits that the manager receives, is an
exogenous parameter.
Parameter assumptions. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that parameters
are such that it is always optimal to follow the signal, that is, to continue the risky
project if and only if the experiment delivers the good signal. Specifically, for this
to be true we assume the following:4
αip (ω)
αip (ω) + (1− βi) (1− p (ω))vr − c > 0 ∀i, ω
3vr−c or −c when the risky project is not abandoned and the state is good or bad, respectively,
or 0 if the signal from the experiment is bad and the risky project is abandoned.
4Notice that, as the manager and market do not know the manager’s type, this assumption is
only a sufficient condition. That is, we might assume as well that for the average manager in the
economy would be optimal to follow the result of the experiment, but not for one of the two types
of agents.
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(1− αi) p (ω)
(1− αi) p (ω) + βi (1− p (ω))vr − c < 0 ∀i, ω
It is evident that the higher α and β are, the more informative the experiment is.
However, it might be the case that in a specific environment, detecting a succesfull
project is relatively more beneficial than avoiding the loss associated to running a
bad one, or viceversa. This will depend on the primitives of the model. We define
the high type manager as the one that ensures higher expected profits.
Definition 1 The manager is high type if for any ω:
p (ω)αhvr − [(αh + βh) p (ω)− βh] c ≥ p (ω)αlvr − [(αl + βl) p (ω)− βl] c
This condition tells that, for a given ω, the expected return from the risky invest-
ment, obtained through the sum of the gain when the manager receives the right
signal in the good state, p (ω)αi(vr − c), and the loss in case the manager gets the
wrong signal in the bad state, − (1− βi) (1− p(ω)) c, is larger for the high type
manager. Notice that the condition holds when αh > αl and βh > βl, but could also
be satisfied in some cases where the high type receives a more precise signal in one
state, but a less precise one in the other state.
Efficient benchmark and equilibrium
In order to make welfare considerations about the equilibrium outcome, we first
characterize the efficient project choice, absent any career concerns motive. We then
show that, under certain parameter restrictions, every equilibrium is characterized
by a cutoff strategy: the manager chooses the risky project if and only if the first
period signal, ω, is higher than come cutoff, denoted ω∗.
Through the analysis we call σ : [ω ; ω] → [0 ; 1] the manager’s mixed strategy;
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σ(ω) denotes the probability that the manager chooses the risky project conditional
on observing the signal ω.
Efficient benchmark
We define ωFB the signal at which that expected payoffs from the risky and the safe
project are equalized. That is, ωFB solves
p(ωFB)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ωFB))(1− β)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(risk | ωFB)
= vs︸︷︷︸
pi(safe | ωFB)
(3.1)
It is easy to see that, due to the assumption that p′(ω) > 0, the expected returns
of the risky project are monotonically increasing in ω. Therefore, efficient project
choice prescribes to undertake the risky project if and only if ω ≥ ωFB. Rearranging
equation 1, we can characterize the efficient project selection rule as follows.
Remark 2. The efficient project selection rule is described by:
σ(ω) =
 1 if ω ≥ ωFB ≡ p−1
(
vs+(1−β)c
α(vr−c)+(1−β)c
)
0 otherwise
(3.2)
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is a pair specifying the manager’s strategy and
the principal’s posterior about managerial ability, (σ(ω), γ). Through the text, we
consider (Weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. As there might be cases where beliefs
are not well defined, we further impose the restriction that players’ beliefs are the
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limiting beliefs computed using totally mixed strategies.5
Let us first define and characterize the posteriors on manager’s ability that a
given strategy profile, σ(ω), would induce. The relevant events, as explained in the
previous section, are that a risky project succeeds, fails or is abandoned following
the experiment.
Call γr, γ0 and γl the posteriors on manager’s type when he chooses the risky
project, conditional on the project being successful, discarded, or failing, respec-
tively. These are derived in the Appendix and their expressions are given by:
γr ≡ P(θ = h |x = g, s = g) =
= ρ
∫
ω
P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = h) p(ω)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫
ω
P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = i) p(ω)σ(ω) dF (ω)
γ0 ≡ P(θ = h | s = b) =
= ρ
∫
ω
P(s = b |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫
ω
P(s = b |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
γl ≡ P(θ = h |x = b, s = g) =
= ρ
∫
ω
P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = h) (1− p(ω))σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫
ω
P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = i) (1− p(ω))σ(ω) dF (ω)
The posteriors computed above are clearly affected by the equilibrium strategy pro-
file, since they depend on the set of individuals that choose to undertake the risky
5The (Weak) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept would not discipline beliefs in case the risky
project is never chosen in equilibrium.
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project. The analysis simplifies once we observe that, under some conditions, these
sets take a simple interval representation. Notice infact, that since the expected pay-
off when choosing the risky project is an increasing function of the the realization
of the signal ω, as long as career concern motives are not too strong, it is optimal
from the manager’s perspective to choose the risky project for high values of ω. The
following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium strategy.
Proposition 1. There exists λ˜ ∈ (0 ; 1) such that, ∀λ < λ˜, the equilibrium σ(ω)
takes the form :
σ(ω) =
{
0 if ω < ω∗
1 if ω ≥ ω∗
(3.3)
for some ω∗ ∈ [ω; ω].
In words, Proposition 1 states that when career concerns are not too strong, every
equilibrium will exhibit cutoff strategies. In this case, being optimistic enough about
the probability of facing a good state of the world (ω ≥ ω∗) is a necessary and
sufficient condition for undertaking the risky project (σ(ω) = 1). We will refer to
the manager receiving the signal ω∗ as the marginal manager.
Let us now restrict attention to cases where λ < λ˜. Let now p˜ be defined
as the perceived probability of facing the good state of the world, according to
the market, once the market observes that a risky project has been chosen. We
rewrite the beliefs following the choice of a risky project using the cutoff strategy
that agents follow in equilibrium. Moreover, in evaluating γ0, we use the fact that
P(s = b |ω, θ = i) = P(s = b |x = g, ω, θ = i)P(x = g |ω, θ = i) + P(s = b |x =
b, ω, θ = i)P(x = b |ω, θ = i) and the definition ∫ ω
ω∗ P(x = g |ω) dF (ω)1−F (ω∗) ≡ p˜. We
can then rewrite the posterior beliefs on managerial ability as follows:
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γr ≡ P(θ = h |x = g, s = g) =
= ρ
∫
ω
ω∗ P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = h) p(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫ ω
ω∗ P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = i) p(ω) dF (ω)
= ρ
αh
α
γ0 ≡ P(θ = h | s = b) =
= ρ
∫ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |ω, θ = h) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |ω, θ = i) dF (ω)
= ρ
(1− αh)p˜+ βh(1− p˜)
(1− α)p˜+ β(1− p˜)
γl ≡ P(θ = h |x = b, s = g) =
= ρ
∫ ω
ω∗ P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = h) (1− p(ω)) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫ ω
ω∗ P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = i) (1− p(ω)) dF (ω)
= ρ
1− βh
1− β
In general, while every equilibrium features a cutoff strategy, the cutoff is not nec-
essarily unique. This happens because, while the expected payoff from choosing the
risky project is increasing with ω, the expected reputation might be a decreasing
function of it. In some situations, summarized in the following result, however, we
can find sufficient conditions that guarantee a unique equilibrium cutoff.
Corollary 1. If 1−αh
βh
> 1−αl
βl
and ∀λ < λ˜, the equilibrium cutoff is unique.
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Efficiency
In this section we show that our economy is intrinsically plagued by inefficient man-
agerial investment decisions. We start with a simple example to show where the
inefficient risk taking behaviour comes from. We then formalize this example within
the more general setting of the model.
A motivating example of preference for risk
Consider a simplified economy where ω ∈ {0, 1}, with associated probabilities of
good state of the world given by p0 and p1. We also assume that parameters are such
that if ω is 0 and there were no career concerns, the managers would be indifferent
between the safe and the risky project.
In the economy with career concerns, however, the manager with ω equal to
0 strictly prefers the risky project whenever discarding the risky task after the
experiment is perceived by the market as a good sign about managerial ability. The
manager prefers the risky task whenever
(1− λ)κpi(risk | ω = 0) + λE(γ | ω = 0)
>
(1− λ)κpi(safe | ω = 0) + λρ
where E(γ | ω = 0) is the expected reputation from choosing the risky task for
the manager observing ω equal to 0. As pi(risk | ω = 0) = pi(safe | ω = 0), the
only thing that matters is the reputational gain or loss from choosing the risky
task. Notice that E(γ | ω0) = p0αραhα + (1 − p0)(1 − β)ρ1−βh1−β + (p0(1 − α) + (1 −
p0)β)ρ
(1−αh)p˜+βh(1−p˜)
(1−α)p˜+β(1−p˜) and that we can rewrite ρ as p0αρ
αh
α
+ (1− p0)(1− β)ρ1−βh1−β +
(p0(1−α)+(1−p0)β)ρ (1−αh)p0+βh(1−p0)(1−α)p0+β(1−p0) . Simple algebra shows that E(γ | ω = 0) > ρ,
that is the manager is better off choosing the risky task, whenever 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
.
When it is so, indeed, it becomes relatively more typical of the best manager to
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discard, by mistake, the risky task after the experiment in the good state of the
world. This creates an incentive to choose the risky task for the manager that is
less optimistic than the market (p0 < p˜). He expects to discard the risky project
with higher probability, and he knows that this behaviour will be perceived by the
market as the mistake of the high ability manager. This creates a career concern
motive for the manager that would be otherwise indifferent between the safe and
the risky task.
As long as λ is low enough, every manager in the economy will then choose the
risky task. The manager observing ω equal to 0 will do so for reputational reasons,
while the manager receiving ω equal to 1 will do so because pi(risk | ω = 1) >
pi(safe | ω = 1).
Main results
To start with the formalization of our inefficiency results, first recall the expression
(3.2), stating that the first best project selection rule requires to undertake the risky
project if and only if ω ≥ ωFB. Since in the previous pages we proved that equilibria
are characterized by cutoffs, making welfare considerations about the level of risk
taking in the economy boils down to comparing the initial signal of the marginal
manager in equilibrium, ω∗, to the optimal ωFB. The marginal manager takes on too
much or not enough risk depending on the possibility of exploiting a reputational
gain or avoiding a reputational loss, by undertaking the risky task. What matters is
the wedge between what he and the market will think about his ability in running
experiments. If his expected self-assessment is higher than the expectations of the
market, the manager will be more cautious and choose the safe project. If, instead,
he is less optimistic than the market about the probability of being perceived as
high type, he chooses the risky task, even if efficiency requires the safe one. The
second possibility arises when discarding risky projects is perceived by the market
as a good signal about the managerial ability.
We start with a technical result, that helps to understand how different equilibria
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induce different market posteriors upon abandoning a risky project. It establishes
conditions so that reputation following abandonment is higher, the higher is the
market belief on the good state of the world.
Lemma 1. γ0(ω∗) is increasing (decreasing) in ω∗ if and only if 1−αh
βh
> (<)1−α
β
This result holds because while the threshold ω∗ at which the VC is indifferent
between the safe and risky project increases, the market becomes more and more
optimistic about the state of the world. In this circumstance, a suspension of a
risky task is increasingly associated to an error in the good state - which happens,
on average, with probability 1−α - rather than to a correct forecast when the state
of the world is bad - which happens with probability β. The market is thus willing to
believe that the manager is a high type when incorrectly discarding is a more salient
behaviour of high types rather than low types managers, relative to how often the
two correctly abandon the risky project.
As there is a one-to-one correspondence between ω and p(ω), in the previous
Lemma we could have used the probability p(ω∗) rather than the initial signal on
the state of the world, ω∗. Since the marginal manager (the one whose ω = ω∗)
is less optimistic than the market about the state of the world (as p(ω∗) < p˜) the
previous Lemma also suggests that the self-assessment of the marginal manager,
upon discarding the risky task, ρ (1−αh)p(ω
∗)+βh(1−p(ω∗))
(1−α)p(ω∗)+β(1−p(ω∗)) , is lower than the market
posterior, ρ (1−αh)p˜+βh(1−p˜)
(1−α)p˜+β(1−p˜) , if and only if
1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
. Viceversa the manager and
the market would share the same posteriors in the events of success and failure of
the risky project, as these beliefs are independent on the initial signal on the state
of the world. The next result, thus, follows:
Lemma 2. The marginal manager’s expectation of his reputation induced by risk
taking is higher than the prior if and only if 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
.
The proof of this Lemma is straightforward. Assume 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
. For the marginal
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manager,
E(γ | ω∗) ≡ p(ω∗)αραh
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− βh)
(1− β) +
+(p(ω∗)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗))β)ρ(1− αh)p˜+ βh(1− p˜)
(1− α)p˜+ β(1− p˜)
>
p(ω∗)αρ
αh
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− βh)
(1− β) +
+(p(ω∗)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗))β)ρ(1− αh)p(ω
∗) + βh(1− p(ω∗))
(1− α)p(ω∗) + β(1− p(ω∗)) = ρ
On the left hand side of the inequality we have the expected reputation of the
marginal individual, upon observing ω∗ and choosing the risky project. On the
right hand side we have his expected self-assessment.6 When the uncertainty about
the state of the world is resolved by the manager’s action, that is, when the manager
gets a good signal in the experiment and pursues the risky project till the end, the
manager and the market share the posterior beliefs on the manager’s type. In case of
success the posterior is ραh
α
, while it is ρ (1−βh)
(1−β) if the project fails. When the manager
discards the risky task after observing the outcome of the experiment, however, the
players do not know if the project has been interrupted correctly or not. In this
scenario, the manager and the market use their different beliefs on the state of the
6Notice that since the signal ω is independent of the manager’s type, his expected self-assessment
- at any ω - equals, of course, the prior, ρ. This is an immediate consequence of the law of iterated
expectations.
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world, p(ω∗) and p˜ respectively, to draw a conclusion about the manager’s type.
The direction of disagreement in this event is disciplined by the condition provided
in Lemma 2. When 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
holds, γ0 grows with p (ω), because getting the bad
signal by mistake is more typical of an high type. Hence the expected reputation
is higher, giving the marginal agent a strict additional gain from taking risk. This
means that, in order for him to be indifferent, the project must be worse than the
one equalizing monetary payoffs.
With the last Lemma at hand, we are now ready to state our main result providing
conditions on the direction of the distortions associated to career concerns.
Proposition 2. There is over(under) risk-taking in the economy if and only if
1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
(1−αh
βh
< 1−α
β
).
To prove this result, we argue that the marginal individual chooses the risky project
when the first best would require the safe one. Then we use the fact that any
manager receiving the signal ω, where ω > ω∗, is also taking the risky project.
By definition of first best, a manager should choose the risky project if and only if
ω > ωFB. At the cutoff ωFB, the expected profit from choosing the safe project is
identical to the expected profit when choosing the risky one, that is
(1− λ)κvs = (1− λ)κ(p(ωFB)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ωFB))(1− β)c)
By definition, the marginal manager is indifferent between the safe and the risky
projects when also the expected reputation is taken into account, that is:
(1− λ)κvs + λρ = (1− λ)κ(p(ω∗)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ω∗))(1− β)c) + λE(γ | ω∗)
We put the two conditions together to get:
(1− λ)κ
pi(risk | ωFB)︷ ︸︸ ︷
(p(ωFB)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ωFB))(1− β)c) +λρ
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=(1− λ)κvs + λρ
=
(1− λ)κ (p(ω∗)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ω∗))(1− β)c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(risk | ω∗)
+λE(γ | ω∗)
As E(γ | ω∗) > ρ, it must be the case that pi(risk | ωFB) > pi(risk | ω∗). pi(risk | ω)
is an increasing function of ω because p(ω) is increasing in ω. This is equivalent to
ωFB > ω∗.
Our inefficiency result derives from the wedge between what the manager and
the market think about the managerial capability in running experiments, that
arises when the risky project is abandoned. Career concerns, in turn, have a bite
in the managerial decision problem, because of the expected reputational gains or
losses from choosing the risky task. Technically, this gains or losses emerge because
the players cannot condition on the state of the world, x = {g, b}, in evaluating
γ0 ≡ P(θ = h | s = b). In particular, the market conditions this inference on the
equilibrium strategy profile, whereas the VC bases it on his observed signal ω. If
the counterfactual state of the world in case of a bad draw in the experiment was
observed, that is, if players observed what would have happened if the manager
continued with the risky task, the expected reputation would coincide with the
expected self-assessment, equal to the prior.7 Similarly, if the VC did not have any
7To see this, we just need to compute the posteriors in case players know that the manager
was wrong in discarding the risky project, ρ 1−αh1−α , and when the manager was right in doing that,
ρβhβ . As none of the posterior would now depend on p(ω) and p˜, the expected reputation and the
expected self-assessment would coincide and be equal to p(ω)αραhα + (1 − p(ω)(1 − β)ρ (1−βh)(1−β) +
p(ω)(1 − α)ρ 1−αh1−α + (1 − p(ω))βρβhβ = ρ, ∀ω. This would also be true, in particular, for the
137
private information on ω, no disagreement on γ0 would result. In both these cases,
no inefficiency would emerge.
Notice that if the good manager is better in running experiments in both states
of the world, that is αh > αl and βh > βl, then
1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
never holds. In this
scenario, as the following result states, the agents do not take enough risk.
Corollary 2. If αh > αl and βh > βl there is underinvestment in the risky activity.
To get, contrary to standard literature, the result of over-investment it must be
the case that the high type manager receives a more accurate signal s in bad state
of the world, but less accurate one in good state, relative to low type managers.
Although Venture Capital is an industry known for some examples of extremely
successful investments, it might be characterized by this condition. Some of the
most prominent funds, for example, release stories about their failures in detecting
successful businesses. This implies that avoiding losses might indeed be as important
as detecting successful deals. The most well-known list of failures is the Anti-
Portfolio by Bessemer Venture Partners, one of the longest-standing venture capital
firms. Their list of missed opportunities includes Airbnb, Apple, eBay, Facebook,
FedEx, Google and Intel.
Robustness check 1: how robust is it to signalling at the experimentation
stage?
In the analysis so far, we have assumed that the outcome of the experiment is public
information. This makes it compelling that a manager would follow the informative
experiment and continue with the risky project if and only if the signal turns out to
be good. However, one might argue that the action at the experimentation stage -
whether or not to abandon the project - could be itself a signalling device, in case
the experiment outcome is the manager’s private information. In this paragraph we
argue that, as long as the career concerns motive is not too strong, our main results
are robust to adding this additional channel. That is, the unique equilibrium would
marginal manager.
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be a separating equilibrium where managers follow the signal.
To see this, let us analyze the subgame where the manager has chosen the risky
project, and he has (privately) observed the signal s. If we can show that the equi-
librium in this signalling game is one where managers follow the signal, conditional
on any ω, then we can conclude that our main results on risk taking behavior still
hold. The reason is that in such equilibrium managers would play exactly as they
are constrained to do by assumption in our original model.
Let us start focusing on the two possible pooling equilibria. First, consider
the case where all managers - independently on s - abandon a project after the
experiment. A manager that received s = g, would not deviate if and only if:
(1− λ) ∗ 0 + λρ ≥ (1− λ)
[
αp (ω)
αp (ω) + (1− β) (1− p (ω))vr − c
]
+ λγ˜
for some induced posterior - γ˜ - that is computed by specifying arbitrary off-
equilibrium beliefs on s. By the parameters restrictions as in section 2.1, it is
easy to observe that the condition can not be satisfied as long as λ is small enough,
for any γ˜ ∈ [0, 1].
Similarly, consider the case where all managers - independently on s - continue
with the project after the experiment. In this case a manager with s = b would not
deviate if and only if:
(1− λ)
[
(1− α) p (ω)
(1− α) p (ω) + β (1− p (ω))vr − c
]
+ λρ ≥ (1− λ) ∗ 0 + λγ˜
for some γ˜ ∈ [0, 1]. Again, this is impossible due to the same restrictions, when λ is
small enough.
Finally, consider instead a candidate separating equilibrium where the manager
continues with the risky project if and only if s = g. Here - due to our restrictions
- a manager that is solely interested in the material payoffs would want to continue
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when s = g and abandon when s = b. Therefore, since the expected reputation is
bounded above by one and below by zero, such equilibrium must exist for some λ
small enough.
Robustness check 2: assumption on conditional independence between
signals ω and s
In the following lines we show that the assumption on independence between signals
ω and s, conditionally on the state of the world, can be optimal from the players’
perspective. However, this result does not generalize.
For this exercise, we use a simplified economy where ω ∈ {0, 1} and we assume
that the parameters are such that the manager undertakes the risky task only if ω
equals 1. We define P(x = g | ω = 1) ≡ p1, P(s = g | x = g, ω = 1) = α + , and
P(s = b | x = b, ω = 1) = β − , where  captures the degree of positive correlation
between signals.
In this case the utility of an agent that, absent career concerns, chooses the risky
task upon observing ω equal to 1 is given by
U(ω = 1) = p1
[
(α + )(vr − c)
]
+ (1− p1)
[
(1− β + )(−c)
]
As the correlation between signals increases,  increases, and the payoff decreases
whenever c > p1vr. In this simplified economy, indeed, the independence between
signals is better from the players’ perspective when the cost of pursuing the risky
project after the experiment, c, is high enough relative to the return vr, or when
the probability of success p1 is low. Put differently, the positive correlation between
the signals ω and s becomes detrimental when detecting failing projects during the
experimental phase is relatively more important than detecting successful ones.
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3.3 An extension: N agents
In this section, we generalize the model by increasing the number of managers toN >
1. The structure of the economy is the same of the one analyzed above, although we
need some extra assumptions about the timing of the managerial investments, the
initial signals ω and the experiments in case of risky project. As for the timing of the
economy, we assume that each player observe the final outcome of each investment
simultaneously.8 We also assume that the managers share the same signal ω. With
this assumption it follows that either all managers choose the safe project, or they
all choose the risky one. As for the experiments, we assume that the realizations
are independent across managers, conditionally on the state of the world and their
types.
It is easy to observe that, also in the extended model, the efficient rule is the same
of the simple model with one manager and also the cutoff strategy in equilibrium,
when λ < λ˜, holds as before. Once again, we focus on this case.
Note that, with N managers, the following three facts become relevant. First,
the market and a manager discarding the risky project after the experiment get
to know that the state of the world is bad if at least an other manager pursues
the investment and this fails. Similarly, they realize that the state of the world is
good after suspending the project if there is at least a manager that continues and
succeeds. In these two cases their assessment about the managerial ability coincide,
as they now condition on the state of the world, rather than on their (different)
perceived probabilities of being in either state, pinned down by p(ω∗) and p˜. Third,
even when all managers abandon the risky project after the experiment, and hence
there is still uncertainty about the true state of the world, the posterior that market
forms is a function of the number of managers in the economy. Indeed, the odds
that all managers are right or wrong in receiving a bad signal from the experiment
differ to the chance that only one of them receives the bad signal in either state of
8The fact that other managers observe the various outcomes is irrelevant. What matters is that
the market observes simultaneously the realizations of the various projects.
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the world.
As the manager’s type is independent on the signal ω, conditionally on the
realization of the experiment and the state of the world, if a manager pursues the
risky investment and succeeds the posterior of the market coincides with γr; if he fails
the posterior equals γl. Through this section we rename the posteriors that coincide
with the previous analysis as γrN and γ
l
N , respectively. There are other three sets
of events inducing different posteriors to the market on a manager’s ability. One
corresponds to the situation in which the manager abandoned the risky project, but
at least another manager pursued it and failed. The second one happens when the
manager abandoned the risky project, but at least another manager pursued it and
succeeded. Finally, the third refers to the case in which all managers abandoned
the risky project. We denote γnlN , γ
nr
N and γ
0
N the market posteriors associated to
each of these three sets of events. The market’s posteriors about the quality of the
N th manager, taking as given the performance of the other N − 1 managers are,
therefore, given by:
γnlN ≡ P(θN = h |x = b, sN = b) = ρ
βh
β
γnrN ≡ P(θN = h |x = g, sN = b) = ρ
1− αh
1− α
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γ0N ≡ P(θN = h | sN = b, s1,...,N−1 = b) = ρ
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
γrN ≡ P(θN = h |x = g, sN = g) = ρ
αh
α
γlN ≡ P(θN = h |x = b, sN = g) = ρ
1− βh
1− β
We first establish a result that mirrors the one in Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. For any finite number of managers, N, the marginal manager takes
too much risk if and only if 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
.
Also in the new economy, there are circumstances in which the market cannot condi-
tion the analysis on whether the project was to deliver returns or not, upon observing
that the manager got a bad signal from the experiment. Once again, the posterior
on manager’s ability in this event is the only one where two observers with different
opinions on the state of the world would disagree on. As the market is more opti-
mistic on the state of the world compared to the marginal manager, the latter enjoys
a reputational benefit or suffers a cost when choosing the risky project, depending
on whether the abandonment of it is perceived as a good signal for the market about
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his quality.
We are interested in comparing economies that differ in N - the number of
managers running projects that are linked to the same state of the world. In partic-
ular, we want to assess which economies are more plagued by the inefficiency that
inevitably results from the pressure of career concerns. To do this, one first obser-
vation to be made is that, provided the direction of the inefficiency is the same,
it is possible to measure how “strong” is the inefficiency by only looking at how
distant is the cutoff associated to the equilibrium marginal manager from the first
best value - ωFB. This is stated formally in the next Lemma and further explained
in the following lines.
Lemma 3. Take two economies - denoted 1 and 2 - and associated equilibrium
cutoffs ω∗1 and ω
∗
2. (i) If,
1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
the expected monetary payoff from economy
1 is higher than in economy 2 whenever ω∗1 > ω
∗
2. (ii) If,
1−αh
βh
< 1−α
β
the expected
monetary payoff from economy 1 is higher than in economy 2 whenever ω∗1 < ω
∗
2.
To prove this result, consider the case when 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
. We know in this case
equilibria will exhibit excessive risk taking, therefore the cutoffs ω∗1 and ω
∗
2 would
be both lower than ωFB. Assume now ω∗1 > ω
∗
2. We can compare the equilibrium
monetary payoffs for each realization of the initial signal ω . To do this, we identify
three regions. When ω < ω∗2, managers in both economies follow the efficient deci-
sion, that is, select the safe project. When ω > ω∗1, managers in the two economies
take the risky project. When ω∗2 ≤ ω ≤ ω∗1, managers in economy 2 are selecting
the risky project, whereas those in economy 1 choose the safe alternative. Since the
first best solution prescribes to select the safe project in these cases, it follows that
returns are lower in economy 2 for any realization of ω within this region. Therefore,
when taking expectations over all possible values of ω, the monetary payoff is higher
in economy 1. The same logic applies to the case when 1−αh
βh
< 1−α
β
.
The result is useful because it provides us with a simple way to compare differ-
ent economies in terms of how inefficient is project selection in equilibrium: it is
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sufficient to establish in which economy the marginal managers departs less from
the indifferent one in the first best - absent the career concerns motive. In the fol-
lowing, main result of this section, we show that the inefficiency decreases as the
number of managers increases. Economies where N is larger induce equilibria in
which expected returns are higher.
Proposition 4. The inefficiency is monotonically decreasing in the number of
managers, N.
In the proof of this Proposition, we show that E(γN+1 | ω∗) < E(γN | ω∗) if 1−αhβh >
1−αl
βl
, while E(γN+1 | ω∗) > E(γN | ω∗) whenever 1−αhβh <
1−αl
βl
. That is, the marginal
manager in the economy with N + 1 managers finds less appealing to invest in the
risky activity from a career perspective, compared to the same individual in the
economy with N managers, exactly when there is a reputational gain by choosing
it. Instead, the risky task is now becoming more appealing when it is associated to
a reputational disadvantage. This clearly implies that the bite of career concerns is
more loose and that the marginal individual is characterized by a signal ω∗ closer
to the first best cutoff, ωFB.
The following Proposition states that in the limit the inefficiency disappears.
Proposition 5. As the number of managers, N, goes to infinity, the inefficiency
disappears. That is, ω∗ approaches ωFB.
The proof of this result is very simple. Consider the expected reputation of the
marginal manager, that we now denote E(γN | ω∗):
E(γN | ω∗) ≡ p(ω∗)αραh
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− βh)
(1− β) +
+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)ρ1− αh
1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)ρβh
β
+
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+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
As 1− α and β are numbers in the interval [0, 1], (1− α− (1− α)N) and (1− (1−
β)−βN) tend to (1−α) and β, respectively. Furthermore, since the posterior belief
associated to the event in which all managers suspend the investment in the risky
project, (1−αh)(1−α)
N−1p˜+βhβN−1(1−p˜)
(1−α)N p˜+βN (1−p˜) , is also in the interval [0, 1], and the weight on
this posterior approaches 0, we have that the following result:
lim
N→∞
E(γN | ω∗) = p(ω∗)αραh
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− βh)
(1− β) +
+ p(ω∗)(1− α)ρ1− αh
1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))βρ
βh
β
= ρ
This implies that the marginal manager has no reputational gain in expectations by
choosing the risky task. Therefore ω∗ and ωFB must coincide and the inefficiency
disappears.
The intuition behind this Proposition is straightforward. When the number of
managers tends to infinity, the chance for the market not to observe the counterfac-
tual state of the world, that occurs when all managers abandon the risky project,
approaches zero. This is so because, when the state of the world is good, it is very
unlikely that every manager has, incorrectly, a bad draw in the experiment. In con-
trast, when the state of the world is bad, it is very likely that at least one agent
receives by mistake the signal to pursue the investment. In the limit, therefore,
the wedge between the managers’ self assessments and their expected reputations
vanishes.
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Robustness check: N agents with conditionally independent signals ω
In this section, we generalize the model by increasing the number of managers to
N > 1, relaxing the assumption of commonality of signals ω for all managers. We
now assume that signals ω are independent across managers, conditionally on the
state of the world. As for the experiments, we retain the assumption of the simplest
extension, that is we assume that the realizations are independent across managers,
conditionally on the state of the world and their types.
The details on the results of this extension are in the Appendix. Once again, the
efficient rule requires the selection of the risky project if and only if the signal ω is
high enough. With conditionally independent ω, however, it is possible that some
managers choose the risky project, while others select the safe one. Relative to the
original extension, there are now several events in which the market cannot observe
the counterfactual state of the world. As before, this happens when no manager
pursues the risky project after observing the outcome of the experiment. However,
in this economy the number of experiments does not necessarily equal the number
of managers, since some managers might choose the safe project, while the others
opt for the risky one. In assessing the counterfactual state of the world, the market
makes use of the information on how many managers received a signal ω inducing
the choice of the risky project.
In this economy we need to define N+4 posteriors. One relates to the scenario
in which the N th manager pursues the risky investment and succeeds. In this case
the posterior of the market coincides with γrN . One in which the manager pursues
the risky investment and fails. In this case the posterior of the market coincides
with γlN . One corresponds to the situation in which the manager abandons the
risky project, but at least another manager pursues it and fails. In this scenario
the posterior is given by γnlN . One is relevant when the manager abandons the risky
project, but at least another manager pursues it and succeeds. In this scenario the
posterior is given by γnrN . Then, there are N cases in which the manager abandons
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the risky project following the experiment and the market cannot be certain about
the state of the world. This happens when the other N-1 managers choose the safe
project, or when the other N-1 abandons the risky project after the experiment, or
in the other N-2 possible cases in which some but not all managers choose the safe
project while all the others discard the risky one after the experiment.
As we show in details in the Appendix, the economy is characterized by the same sort
of inefficiency described in the simplest extension. Furthermore, as the number of
managers tends to infinity the inefficiency disappears. As in the simplest extension,
when the number of managers tends to infinity, the chance for the market not to
understand the underlying state of the world approaches zero, when evaluating a
manager discarding the risky task following the experiment. Here, this happens
despite the possibility that most of the managers undertake the safe project. In the
limit, indeed, the set of managers choosing the risky task becomes large. This makes
very unlikely that, incorrectly when the state of the world is good, each manager in
this set receives a bad signal from the experiment. In contrast, when the state of
the world is bad, it becomes very likely that at least one manager in this set receives
by mistake the signal to pursue the investment. As in our simplest extension, in the
limit, the wedge between the manager’s self assessment and his expected reputation
vanishes. Thus each manager chooses the project according to the first best rule.
3.4 Conclusion
In this Chapter we proposed a setting where information about a manager’s ability
is imperfect and managers are interested in their reputation. Motivated by the
application to investments in young firms, we modeled managers as agents that
create value because they can experiment and learn about a projects potential.
As it is greatly emphasized by, among others, Kerr et al. (2014), the ability to
learn about a project’s profitability at relatively early stages is a skill that venture
capitalists must have in order to succeed in the industry. Infact, experimentation
148
is desirable to the extent that it provides the incentive to finance innovative and
young firms. However, it is reasonable to think that some venture capitalists are
better at extracting information from early experiments than others. If this skill is
so important, then naturally venture capitalists would benefit from making investors
and entrepreneurs believe that they are good in this dimension. It would increase
their bargaining power, and help them find better deals at the fundraising stage.
In light of this observation, we studied venture capitalists’ incentive to take on
risk when career concerns are at play, that is, outside observers are learning about
their ability to experiment. Contrary to Holmstro¨m (1999), where managers add
value because they directly increase a project’s success rate and in equilibrium they
become too risk-averse, agents in this model might take inefficiently high risk. The
reason is that the abandonment of a promising project at an intermediate stage
might be good news about the agent’s ability. In particular, this is the case when
a good venture capitalist is typically one whose experimenting technology is biased
towards receiving negative outcomes. In this situation a venture capitalist would
tend to opt excessively for risky, experimental business strategies, in anticipation of
the reputational gain that comes from cutting off the investment at an intermediate
stage. This result provides a somewhat darker point of view on the amount of
experimentation and risk observed in the industry. We studied one solution to this
problem in one extension of the model, where we show that when the observer
gets information about the outcome of similar projects, the inefficiency is reduced.
The reason is that what drives the inefficiency is the fact that the observer can’t
distinguish whether a project was abandoned because doomed to fail or due to a
false negative in the experiment. The information from similar projects provides
the observer with an imperfect signal about the counterfactual. It is usually argued
that when agents interact less frequently, career concerns are more severe. In this
context, one would expect younger VC firms’ decision to be particularly distorted.
The novel empirical implication of our model is that the markets more plagued by
career concerns distortions are those where agents engage in more unique and less
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correlated activities.
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter 1: Do not
Put Off Until Tomorrow What
You Can Do Today: Age at
Arrival and Immigrants’ Human
Capital
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The model
I assume that the world is a two-period economy: in the first period parents choose
the timing of migration to the U.S., in the second one immigrant children select
their investment in human capital. Parents are indexed with i, whereas immigrant
children with t.
I start from the parental problem. To simplify the analysis, I assume that the
only variable that parents can choose is the timing of migration to the U.S., ti, while
all the other parameters are treated as exogenous. Parents’ utility is governed by the
function Ui, which is affected by the educational achievement of their Ni children,
et(ti), as well as by the timing of migration to the U.S.. In solving for the optimal
timing of migration, parents also take into account the extra cost of raising their
children in the U.S.. The parental problem is described by
max
ti
Ui
(
y1(ti), ..., yNi(ti), ti
)− Ni∑
t=1
(
Ai − (ti − bit)
)
(A.1)
where Ai is the children’ age at which they stop being dependent from their parents,
whereas bit is the year of birth of child t in family i.
It is then easy to derive the optimal condition. The optimal timing of migration is
implicitly defined by
Ni∑
t=1
δUi
δyt
δyt
δti
(t∗i ) +
δUi
δti
(t∗i ) +Ni = 0 (A.2)
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Conditionally on the exogenous year of birth of individual t, there is a function
between parents i and the age at arrival in the U.S. of their children, a∗it ≡ t∗i − bit.
In the rest of the analysis I will call this function Φ : i 7→ a. To simplify the
characterization for the relation between investment in human capital and age at
arrival, I will assume that the function Φ is one-to-one.
In the second period, immigrant children observe their age at arrival in the U.S.
and they choose their investment in human capital. I define v(y) the utility they get
from a stock y of human capital, while I assume that its cost has two components:
the first depends on the age at arrival, c(y, a), and the second is linear in a family
specific component, µ(i). The problem of child t in family i is described by
max
y
v(y, a)− c(y, a)− µ(i)y (A.3)
Using the function linking families to age at arrival in the U.S., Φ(i), I can rewrite
the problem as
max
y
v(y, a)− c(y, a)− µ(Φ−1(a))y (A.4)
The optimal investment in human capital satisfies the following equation:
vy(y
∗, a) = cy(y∗, a) + µ
(
Φ−1(a)
)
(A.5)
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where vy and cy are the marginal utility and the part of marginal cost, that, condi-
tionally on a, is independent on the family component. Using total differentiation I
can then easily get the change in human capital associated to a unit change in age
of arrival in the U.S.. This is given by
dy
da
=
cya − vea
vyy − cyy +
δµ
δi
1
δΦ
δi
(
Φ−1(a)
)
vyy − cyy
(A.6)
where cya, cyy and vyy are, respectively, the cross derivative of the part of the ed-
ucational cost which is independent on family characteristics, its second derivative
with respect to human capital and the second derivative of the utility with respect
to human capital. The first part of the equation represents what I refer to as the
causal effect of age at arrival on skill accumulation, while the second one is the
selection term.
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Robustness checks
Presence of both parents in households
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Table A.1: The effect of age at arrival on years of education; family fixed effects regressions
controlling for presence of both parents
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.14∗∗ -0.14 -0.16∗ -0.20
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13)
Age At Arrival 6-8 0.11 0.12 -0.32 -0.39
(0.45) (0.50) (0.47) (0.53)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.92∗ -0.91∗ -1.40∗∗ -1.50∗∗
(0.49) (0.54) (0.64) (0.72)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -1.32∗∗ -1.29 -1.74∗∗ -1.95∗∗
(0.58) (0.78) (0.71) (0.97)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -1.66∗∗ -1.62 -2.05∗∗ -2.32∗
(0.72) (0.98) (0.83) (1.18)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Both Parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 256 256 256 256 213 213 213 213
The Table above reports the results of regressions of years of education on immigrants’ age at arrival
in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns
display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In
each specification I control for a sex indicator, a dummy indicator for the presence of both parents in the
household, family fixed effects and, when specified, a birth order control. In the first four columns the
sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one
sibling in the sample. In columns five to eight the sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the
U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement
that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.2: The effect of age at arrival on word knowledge; family fixed effects regressions
controlling for presence of both parents
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.06∗∗∗ -0.05∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05
(0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.15)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.18 -0.15 -0.15 -0.13
(0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.16)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.51∗∗∗ -0.48∗ -0.49∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗
(0.19) (0.25) (0.18) (0.24)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.63∗∗ -0.57∗ -0.54∗∗ -0.54
(0.25) (0.33) (0.25) (0.35)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Both Parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476
The Table above reports the results of regressions of word knowledge on immigrants’ age at arrival in the
U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the
results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I
control for a sex indicator, a dummy indicator for the presence of both parents in the household, family fixed
effects and, when specified, a birth order control. All these controls are interacted with a dummy variable
indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column consists of native and immigrant siblings.
In the immigrant sample of the first four columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17
or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns five to eight the immigrant sample consists
of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the
sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.3: The effect of age at arrival on paragraph comprehension; family fixed effects
regressions controlling for presence of both parents
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.07∗∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.07∗∗ -0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Age At Arrival 6-8 0.15 0.05 0.08 -0.05
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.18 -0.30 -0.18 -0.39
(0.17) (0.19) (0.21) (0.25)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.69∗∗∗ -1.02∗∗∗ -0.70∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.28) (0.26) (0.34)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.85∗∗∗ -1.27∗∗∗ -0.90∗∗∗ -1.50∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.37) (0.32) (0.42)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Both Parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476
The Table above reports the results of regressions of paragraph comprehension on immigrants’ age at arrival in
the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the
results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I
control for a sex indicator, a dummy indicator for the presence of both parents in the household, family fixed
effects and, when specified, a birth order control. All these controls are interacted with a dummy variable
indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the
immigrant sample of the first four columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger,
with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns five to eight the immigrant sample consists of immigrant
individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the
additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.4: The effect of age at arrival on arithmetic reasoning; family fixed effects regressions
controlling for presence of both parents
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.06
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.10 -0.19 -0.04 -0.16
(0.12) (0.15) (0.13) (0.18)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.12 -0.22 -0.04 -0.21
(0.16) (0.22) (0.20) (0.29)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.21 -0.53∗∗ -0.14 -0.58∗
(0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.33)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.20 -0.60 -0.16 -0.71
(0.29) (0.40) (0.31) (0.49)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Both Parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of arithmetic reasoning on immigrants’ age at arrival
in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns
display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In
each specification I control for a sex indicator, a dummy indicator for the presence of both parents
in the household, family fixed effects and, when specified, a birth order control. All these controls
are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column
consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first four columns I keep
individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In
columns five to eight the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at
the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that
each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.5: The effect of age at arrival on numerical operations; family fixed effects regressions
controlling for presence of both parents
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.02 -0.03 -0.15 -0.19
(0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.31)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.07 -0.08 -0.22 -0.27
(0.31) (0.33) (0.37) (0.40)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.52 -0.55 -0.72∗ -0.85
(0.36) (0.42) (0.42) (0.52)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.41 -0.45 -0.49 -0.65
(0.54) (0.62) (0.58) (0.71)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Both Parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of numerical operations ability on immigrants’ age
at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even
columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in
the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator, a dummy indicator for the presence of
both parents in the household, family fixed effects and, when specified, a birth order control. All
these controls are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample
in each column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first four
columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in
the sample. In columns five to eight the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived
in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional
requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.6: The effect of age at arrival on mathematics knowledge; family fixed effects
regressions controlling for presence of both parents
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.04∗ -0.03 -0.03 -0.01
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.23 -0.23 -0.27 -0.25
(0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.20)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.28 -0.25 -0.20 -0.14
(0.19) (0.21) (0.24) (0.27)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.50∗∗ -0.50∗ -0.43 -0.40
(0.23) (0.30) (0.27) (0.35)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.44 -0.41 -0.38 -0.31
(0.27) (0.36) (0.30) (0.42)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Both Parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4511 4511 4476 4476 4476 4476
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of mathematics knowledge on immigrants’ age at
arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even
columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the
U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator, a dummy indicator for the presence of both
parents in the household, family fixed effects and, when specified, a birth order control. All these
controls are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in each
column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first four columns I
keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample.
In columns five to eight the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at
the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that
each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.7: The effect of age at arrival on illicit activities; family fixed effects regressions
controlling for presence of both parents
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 -0.16
(0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.50 -0.55 -0.56 -0.66
(0.37) (0.38) (0.47) (0.48)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.74 -0.84∗ -0.98 -1.23∗
(0.48) (0.50) (0.62) (0.66)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.56 -0.75 -0.91 -1.33∗∗
(0.46) (0.51) (0.56) (0.64)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.66 -0.93∗ -1.00∗ -1.59∗∗
(0.47) (0.55) (0.57) (0.70)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Both Parents Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 4158 4158 4158 4158 4126 4126 4126 4126
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of illicit behaviours on immigrants’ age at arrival
in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns
display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In
each specification I control for a sex indicator, a dummy indicator for the presence of both parents
in the household, family fixed effects and, when specified, a birth order control. All these controls
are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample in each column
consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first four columns I keep
individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In
columns five to eight the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at
the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that
each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance
at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Excluding immigrants arriving as dropouts
167
Table A.8: The effect of age at arrival on years of education; family fixed effects regressions
excluding dropout immigrants
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.13∗ -0.13 -0.15∗ -0.18
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14)
Age At Arrival 6-8 0.10 0.12 -0.34 -0.38
(0.45) (0.50) (0.47) (0.53)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.90∗ -0.87 -1.38∗∗ -1.45∗
(0.50) (0.55) (0.65) (0.74)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -1.40∗∗ -1.32 -1.82∗∗ -1.98∗
(0.59) (0.81) (0.73) (1.02)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -1.26∗ -1.15 -1.59∗ -1.80
(0.70) (1.01) (0.83) (1.23)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 232 232 232 232 191 191 191 191
The Table above reports the results of regressions of years of education on immigrants’ age at arrival in
the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display
the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each
specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and, when specified, a birth order control.
In the first four columns the sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of
17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns five to eight the sample consists of
immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the
sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year.
I exclude from the sample immigrant individuals that do not attend U.S. schools. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and
∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Controlling for time trends in educational system
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Table A.9: The effect of age at arrival on years of education; controlling for time trends
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.16∗∗ -0.13 -0.18∗∗ -0.19
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.13)
Age At Arrival 6-8 0.05 0.11 -0.38 -0.38
(0.44) (0.48) (0.45) (0.51)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.98∗∗ -0.88∗ -1.47∗∗ -1.46∗∗
(0.47) (0.52) (0.61) (0.70)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -1.48∗∗ -1.29∗ -1.91∗∗∗ -1.94∗∗
(0.58) (0.77) (0.71) (0.96)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -1.84∗∗ -1.56 -2.25∗∗∗ -2.26∗
(0.73) (0.97) (0.83) (1.17)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
N 4747 4747 4747 4747 4704 4704 4704 4704
The Table above reports the results of regressions of years of education on immigrants’ age at arrival in the
U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the
results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification
I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and, when specified, a birth order control, each interacted
with immigration status. In the first four columns the immigrant sample consists of individuals arrived in
the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns five to eight the
immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with
at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S.
in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and
they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Excluding immigrants arrived after the age of 14
171
Table A.10: The Effect of Age at Arrival on Years of Education; Family Fixed
Effects Regressions on Small Sample
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age At Arrival -0.16∗ -0.16 -0.21∗∗ -0.28
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.17)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No Yes No Yes
N 186 186 152 152
The Table above reports the results of regressions of years of
education on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In each
specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects
and, when specified, a birth order control. In the first two
columns the sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in
the U.S. at the age of 13 or younger, with at least one sibling
in the sample. In columns three and four the sample consists
of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 13 or
younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the addi-
tional requirement that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the
same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are clustered at the family level and they are shown in paren-
thesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%
level, respectively.
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Table A.11: The Effect of age at arrival on various English outcomes; family fixed effects regressions on small sample
Outcome Word Knowledge Paragraph Comprehension
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.06∗∗ -0.05 -0.06∗ -0.04 -0.06∗ -0.09∗ -0.07∗ -0.13
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 4447 4447 4417 4417 4447 4447 4417 4417
The Table above reports the results of regressions of English knowledge on immigrants’ age at arrival in the
U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and, when specified, a birth order
control. All these controls are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. The sample
in each column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first two columns
I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 13 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In
columns three and four the immigrant sample consists of immigrant individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age
of 13 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling
arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the
family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level,
respectively.
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Table A.12: The effect of age at arrival on various mathematics outcomes; family fixed effects regressions on small sample
Outcome Arithmetic Knowledge Numerical Operations Mathematics Knowledge
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival Full Same Year of Arrival Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age At Arrival -0.01 -0.07∗ 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.04 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 4447 4447 4417 4417 4447 4447 4417 4417 4447 4447 4417 4417
The Table above reports the results of regressions of mathematics knowledge on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex
indicator, family fixed effects and, when specified, a birth order control. All these controls are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration
status. The sample in each column consists of native and immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first two columns I keep individuals arrived
in the U.S. at the age of 13 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns three and four the immigrant sample consists of immigrant
individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 13 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement that each sibling arrived
in the U.S. in the same calendar year. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ ,
and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.13: The effect of age at arrival on illicit behaviours; family fixed effects
regressions on small sample
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age At Arrival -0.08 -0.12 -0.12 -0.23
(0.09) (0.12) (0.10) (0.15)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order No Yes No Yes
N 4102 4102 4075 4075
The Table above reports the results of regressions of illicit be-
haviours on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In each
specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects
and, when specified, a birth order control. All these controls
are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigra-
tion status. The sample in each column consists of native and
immigrant siblings. In the immigrant sample of the first two
columns I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 13
or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. In columns
three and four the immigrant sample consists of immigrant in-
dividuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 13 or younger, with at
least one sibling in the sample, with the additional requirement
that each sibling arrived in the U.S. in the same calendar year.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the
family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Heterogeneity
176
Table A.14: The effect of age at arrival on schooling; heterogeneity based on Mexican origin
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age At Arrival -0.12 -0.17
(0.11) (0.15)
Age At Arrival*Mexican -0.08 -0.09
(0.15) (0.19)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.23 -0.75
(0.47) (0.50)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.93 -1.45∗
(0.63) (0.79)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -1.36 -2.04∗
(0.90) (1.08)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -1.21 -1.87
(1.12) (1.32)
Age At Arrival 6-8*Mexican 1.60 1.74
(1.22) (1.09)
Age At Arrival 9-11*Mexican 0.51 0.40
(0.77) (1.08)
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Age At Arrival 12-14*Mexican 0.70 0.98
(1.02) (1.37)
Age At Arrival 15-17*Mexican -0.56 -0.47
(1.31) (1.49)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 256 256 213 213
The Table above reports the results of regressions of schooling on immigrants’ age
at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression
model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical
variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control
for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order control. All these controls
are interacted with a dummy variable indicating the immigration status. In the
immigrant sample I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger,
with at least one sibling in the sample. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.15: The effect of age at arrival on English knowledge; heterogeneity based on Mexican origin
Outcome Word Knowledge Paragraph Comprehension
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.12∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07)
Age At Arrival*Mexican -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Age At Arrival 6-8 0.19 0.04 0.02 -0.15
(0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.20)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.07 -0.15 -0.32 -0.42
(0.13) (0.14) (0.22) (0.28)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.36 -0.54∗∗ -1.03∗∗∗ -1.25∗∗∗
(0.26) (0.25) (0.31) (0.37)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.37 -0.45 -1.23∗∗∗ -1.53∗∗∗
(0.33) (0.34) (0.45) (0.49)
Age At Arrival 6-8*Mexican -1.11∗∗∗ -0.40 0.16 0.67∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.37) (0.37) (0.25)
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Age At Arrival 9-11*Mexican -0.65 -0.03 0.16 0.51∗
(0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.30)
Age At Arrival 12-14*Mexican -0.70 0.14 0.18 0.72
(0.52) (0.53) (0.47) (0.48)
Age At Arrival 15-17*Mexican -0.77 -0.12 0.06 0.60
(0.61) (0.58) (0.58) (0.55)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4476 4476 4511 4511 4476 4476
The Table above reports the results of regressions of several outcomes on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I
report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for
intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order control.
In the immigrant sample I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.16: The effect of age at arrival on mathematics knowledge; heterogeneity based on Mexican origin
Outcome Arithmetic Num. Operations Maths Knowledge
Sample Full Same Year of A. Full Same Year of A. Full Same Year of A.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. At A. -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05)
A. At A.*Mex. -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.04)
A. At A. 6-8 -0.28∗ -0.29∗ 0.00 -0.25 -0.16 -0.24
(0.15) (0.17) (0.33) (0.34) (0.19) (0.21)
A. At A. 9-11 -0.13 -0.11 0.01 -0.27 -0.20 -0.09
(0.23) (0.29) (0.37) (0.44) (0.24) (0.29)
A. At A. 12-14 -0.41 -0.47 -0.43 -0.82 -0.47 -0.40
(0.27) (0.32) (0.48) (0.58) (0.35) (0.39)
A. At A. 15-17 -0.19 -0.31 0.08 -0.10 -0.17 -0.08
(0.38) (0.45) (0.75) (0.82) (0.42) (0.47)
A. At A. 6-8*Mex. 0.14 0.19 -0.47 0.26 -0.51∗ -0.26
(0.25) (0.24) (0.63) (0.73) (0.29) (0.32)
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A. At A. 9-11*Mex. -0.40 -0.47 -0.50 0.30 -0.38 -0.36
(0.29) (0.31) (0.69) (0.83) (0.27) (0.35)
A. At A. 12-14*Mex. -0.45 -0.50 -0.48 0.24 -0.23 -0.09
(0.37) (0.46) (0.75) (0.91) (0.41) (0.49)
A. At A. 15-17*Mex. -1.05∗∗ -1.07∗∗ -1.39 -0.91 -0.68∗ -0.59
(0.42) (0.48) (0.94) (1.08) (0.40) (0.47)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4476 4476 4511 4511 4476 4476 4511 4511 4476 4476
The Table above reports the results of regressions of several outcomes on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results
of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S..
In each specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order control. In the immigrant sample I keep individuals arrived
in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family
level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.17: The effect of age at arrival on illicit behaviors; heterogeneity based on Mexican origin
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age At Arrival -0.11 -0.18
(0.11) (0.13)
Age At Arrival*Mexican 0.06 0.10
(0.08) (0.09)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.65 -0.74
(0.44) (0.53)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.96 -1.40∗∗
(0.60) (0.70)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.82 -1.47∗∗
(0.58) (0.66)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.93 -1.65∗∗
(0.63) (0.73)
Age At Arrival 6-8*Mexican 0.56 0.95∗
(0.49) (0.54)
Age At Arrival 9-11*Mexican 0.62 1.36∗∗
(0.61) (0.68)
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Age At Arrival 12-14*Mexican 0.44 1.26∗∗
(0.57) (0.61)
Age At Arrival 15-17*Mexican 0.23 1.03∗
(0.58) (0.63)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4158 4158 4126 4126
The Table above reports the results of regressions of illicit behaviors outcomes on
immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a
linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using
categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification
I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order control. In the
immigrant sample I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger,
with at least one sibling in the sample. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.18: The effect of age at arrival on schooling; heterogeneity based on arrival from English speaking country
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age At Arrival -0.11 -0.14
(0.08) (0.11)
Age At Arrival*English -0.17 -0.28
(0.19) (0.18)
Age At Arrival 6-8 0.41 0.05
(0.50) (0.51)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.57 -0.97
(0.49) (0.70)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.78 -1.23
(0.66) (0.91)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -1.30 -1.78
(0.89) (1.12)
Age At Arrival 6-8*English -1.00 -1.86
(1.22) (1.19)
Age At Arrival 9-11*English -0.71 -1.41
(1.00) (0.87)
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Age At Arrival 12-14*English -1.86∗∗ -2.24∗∗∗
(0.83) (0.82)
Age At Arrival 15-17*English 0.52 0.03
(0.99) (0.96)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 256 256 213 213
The Table above reports the results of regressions of schooling on immigrants’ age
at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of a linear regression
model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical
variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control
for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order control. In the immigrant
sample I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with
at least one sibling in the sample. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are
clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.19: The effect of age at arrival on English knowledge; heterogeneity based on arrival from English speaking country
Outcome Word Knowledge Paragraph Comprehension
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age At Arrival -0.06∗ -0.03 -0.08∗ -0.11∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Age At Arrival*English 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.09 -0.02 0.01 -0.03
(0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.22)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -0.22 -0.10 -0.18 -0.28
(0.19) (0.19) (0.28) (0.34)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -0.54∗ -0.44 -0.82∗∗ -0.97∗∗
(0.30) (0.30) (0.35) (0.43)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -0.61 -0.45 -1.08∗∗ -1.30∗∗∗
(0.37) (0.39) (0.43) (0.50)
Age At Arrival 6-8*English 0.37 -0.12 0.37 0.12
(0.37) (0.32) (0.38) (0.37)
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Age At Arrival 9-11*English 0.25 -0.03 -0.08 -0.02
(0.20) (0.16) (0.28) (0.36)
Age At Arrival 12-14*English 0.12 -0.17 -0.62∗∗ -0.61∗
(0.27) (0.25) (0.30) (0.37)
Age At Arrival 15-17*English 0.19 -0.17 -0.06 0.01
(0.31) (0.31) (0.35) (0.43)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4476 4476 4511 4511 4476 4476
The Table above reports the results of regressions of several outcomes on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns
I report the results of a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables
for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order
control. In the immigrant sample I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in
the sample. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗
, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.20: The effect of age at arrival on mathematics knowledge; heterogeneity based on arrival from English speaking
country
Outcome Arithmetic Num. Operations Maths Knowledge
Sample Full Same Year of A. Full Same Year of A. Full Same Year of A.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
A. At A. -0.06 -0.07 -0.08∗ -0.09 -0.04 -0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
A. At A.*Eng. 0.04 0.04 0.18∗∗∗ 0.13∗ 0.04 0.06
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
A. At A. 6-8 -0.16 -0.14 -0.50∗∗ -0.61∗∗ -0.35∗ -0.31
(0.15) (0.18) (0.24) (0.25) (0.19) (0.20)
A. At A. 9-11 -0.42∗ -0.39 -0.51∗ -0.60∗ -0.42∗∗ -0.35
(0.25) (0.30) (0.28) (0.32) (0.18) (0.22)
A. At A. 12-14 -0.61∗ -0.64 -1.12∗∗∗ -1.37∗∗∗ -0.74∗∗∗ -0.66∗∗
(0.32) (0.39) (0.36) (0.41) (0.27) (0.31)
A. At A. 15-17 -0.68 -0.78 -1.02∗ -1.18∗∗ -0.62∗ -0.53
(0.43) (0.53) (0.57) (0.60) (0.34) (0.38)
A. At A. 6-8*Eng. -0.05 0.19 1.91∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 0.38 0.08
(0.46) (0.61) (0.51) (0.61) (0.51) (0.52)
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A. At A. 9-11*Eng. 0.54 0.74 1.15∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗ 0.34 0.41
(0.48) (0.64) (0.32) (0.41) (0.36) (0.55)
A. At A. 12-14*Eng. -0.21 -0.11 1.63∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗
(0.31) (0.38) (0.33) (0.39) (0.26) (0.34)
A. At A. 15-17*Eng. 0.35 0.54 1.80∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 0.41 0.42
(0.73) (0.84) (0.48) (0.50) (0.35) (0.50)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4511 4511 4476 4476 4511 4511 4476 4476 4511 4511 4476 4476
The Table above reports the results of regressions of several outcomes on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of
a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In
each specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order control. In the immigrant sample I keep individuals arrived in the
U.S. at the age of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and
they are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Table A.21: The effect of age at arrival on illicit behaviors; heterogeneity based on arrival from English speaking country
Sample Full Same Year of Arrival
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age At Arrival -0.09 -0.16
(0.10) (0.13)
Age At Arrival*English -0.00 0.00
(0.09) (0.10)
Age At Arrival 6-8 -0.59 -0.71
(0.49) (0.58)
Age At Arrival 9-11 -1.19 -1.62∗
(0.77) (0.88)
Age At Arrival 12-14 -1.00 -1.67∗
(0.78) (0.89)
Age At Arrival 15-17 -1.20 -1.94∗∗
(0.81) (0.94)
Age At Arrival 6-8*English 0.13 0.12
(0.54) (0.67)
Age At Arrival 9-11*English 0.81 1.03
(0.76) (0.86)
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Age At Arrival 12-14*English 0.17 0.58
(0.74) (0.84)
Age At Arrival 15-17*English 0.52 0.90
(0.85) (0.93)
Family F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth Order Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 4158 4158 4126 4126
The Table above reports the results of regressions of illicit behaviors outcomes
on immigrants’ age at arrival in the U.S.. In odd columns I report the results of
a linear regression model, whereas even columns display the results of a model
using categorical variables for intervals of age at arrival in the U.S.. In each
specification I control for a sex indicator, family fixed effects and a birth order
control. In the immigrant sample I keep individuals arrived in the U.S. at the age
of 17 or younger, with at least one sibling in the sample. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are clustered at the family level and they are shown in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Accounting exercise
193
Table A.22: The mincerian regressions
Sample Immigrants Natives
Dependent Variable P(Working) P(Full Time) H. Wage Log Earn P(Working) P(Full Time) H. Wage Log Earn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Education 0.01∗∗ 0.00 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.00∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Word. Know. -0.03∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ -0.01∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Par. Compreh. 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.01∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Arit. Reason. 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Num. Oper. 0.03∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Math. Know. -0.07∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗ -0.00 -0.09 -0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Illicit -0.01∗∗ -0.01 -0.03∗ -0.03 -0.01∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
N 6177 5374 4357 4479 116148 100772 83048 84999
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The Table above reports the results of regressions of several labor market outcomes on education, different cognitive skills and the measure
of illicit behaviours. In each column I also control for two ethnicity indicators, gender, year fixed effects, potential experience and its square.
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Samples and countries of origin
197
Table B.1: Sample selection; NLSY79 and NLSY79 Children And Young Adults
Number of Individuals
NLSY79
Original Dataset 12,686
Discard Individuals Arrived Before 18 12,548
Discard Individuals With Unknown Age At Arrival 12,548
Discard 1st Gen. Immigrants With Father or Mother or Paternal Grandfather Born in U.S. 12,354
Discard 2nd Gen. Immigrants From Father’s Side, With Paternal Grandfather Born in U.S. 12,325
NLSY79 Children And Young Adults
Original Dataset 11,521
Discard Children Never Interviewed 10,503
Discard Children Born Abroad 10,499
Discard Children of 1st Gen. Mother Arrived Before 18 10,402
Discard Children of 1st Gen. Mother With Unknown Age At Arrival 10,402
Discard Children of 1st Gen. Mother With Father or Mother or Paternal Grandfather Born in U.S. 10,244
Discard Children of 2nd Gen. Mother From Father’s Side, With Paternal Grandfather Born in U.S. 10,223
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Table B.2: Countries of origin; NLSY79
Country of Birth 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation
Mother Father
Mexico 231 256 214 177
Cuba 64 27 36 4
Dominican Republic 22 3 5
Ecuador 16 2 1
Canada 15 52 34 51
Jamaica 15 4 9 5
Portugal 15 7 8 16
Hong Kong 11
Italy 10 13 29 190
Philippines 10 5 16 6
Colombia 7 4 1
Guatemala 7 1 1
Poland 6 10 10 68
El Salvador 5
Haiti 5 2
India 5 3 1
Iran 5
Chile 4 2
Netherlands 4 3 5 12
Peru 4
Venezuela 4 1 1
Yugoslavia 4 8 9 11
Argentina 3 3 1
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Barbados 3 1 1
England 3 15 7 26
Greece 3 3 5 6
Honduras 3 1
Nicaragua 3 1
Nigeria 3
Panama 3
Costa Rica 2
Germany 2 31 17 121
Guyana 2
Iraq 2
Japan 2 14 1 3
South Korea 2 1
Trinidad & Tobago 2 2 2 1
Bahamas 1 3
Belgium 1 1 3
Brazil 1 2 1
Cambodia 1
French Guiana 1
Guinea-Bisseau 1
Israel 1 3
Libya 1
Switzerland 1 4
Thailand 1
Togo 1
Turkey 1 2
Uruguay 1
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Vietnam 1
Virgin Islands 1
France 7 3 7
Ireland 7 3 36
Scotland 7 5 15
Denmark 6 1 6
Hungary 4 7 12
China 3 4 2
Panama 3
Czechoslovakia 2 5 18
Finland 2 8
Norway 2 1 13
Africa, n.s. 1 1
Austria 1 1 16
Cyprus 1 1
Egypt 1
Jordan 1 1
Iceland 1 1
Liechtenstein 1 1 2
Libya 1 2
Malta 1
New Zealand 1
Romania 1 3
South Africa 1 1 1
Spain 1 3 14
Wales 1 2
Australia 2 2
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Lebanon 2 3
Luxembourg 1
Peru 1
Caribbean 2
Europe, n.s. 4
Luxembourg 1
Saudi Arabi 3
U.S.S.R. 4
Not U.S., n.s. 15 25 27 87
U.S. 197 263
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Robustness checks
Different empirical specification: outcomes in levels and fam-
ily fixed effects
203
Table B.3: Different empirical specification: outcomes in levels and family fixed effects
Y. of Sch. P(High School) P(College) Maths Read. Comp. Word Reco.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (9) (7) (10) (11) (12)
Constant 0.21∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
γ2 1.57
∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.06 0.29∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
γ3 -0.19 0.05 -0.02 0.10 0.04 0.08
(0.28) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
γ4 -0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02
(0.30) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Child 0.22∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
γFE2 1.19
∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.08 0.23∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.04) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
γFE3 -0.23 0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.02
(0.28) (0.03) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
γFE4 0.03 0.04
∗∗ 0.01 -0.02 -0.00 -0.02
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(0.25) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
N 4378 6818 7103 10363 5308 8062 31227 34921 26534 30139 31100 34790
The Table above reports results of OLS and family-F.E. regressions of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s educational and
cognitive achievements on immigration status. In the first column of each outcome variable we use the model in difference, while in the
second one we pool children and mothers observations and we include family fixed effects. γ2 refers to second generation immigrants. γ3
refers to third generation immigrants. γ4 refers to fourth generation immigrants. In each column we control for gender of the individual.
The sample of each column consists of the same individuals for the corresponding outcomes in the previous tables. Heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors are clustered at the family level and are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%,
1% level, respectively.
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Table B.4: Different empirical specification: outcomes in levels and family fixed
effects
Behavioural Problems
(1) (2)
Constant 0.54∗∗∗
(0.02)
γ2 0.15
(0.10)
γ3 -0.10
(0.08)
γ4 -0.24
∗∗∗
(0.08)
Child 0.55∗∗∗
(0.02)
γFE2 0.08
(0.10)
γFE3 -0.11
(0.07)
γFE4 -0.24
∗∗∗
(0.07)
N 32787 36571
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The Table above reports results of
OLS and family-F.E. regressions of the
difference between a child’s and his
mother’s attitude towards being in-
volved in problematic behaviors on im-
migration status. In the first column
of each outcome variable we use the
model in difference, while in the sec-
ond one we pool children and moth-
ers observations and we include family
fixed effects. γ2 refers to second gen-
eration immigrants. γ3 refers to third
generation immigrants. γ4 refers to
fourth generation immigrants. In each
column we control for gender of the in-
dividual. The sample of each column
consists of the same individuals for the
corresponding outcomes in the previ-
ous tables. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are clustered at the
family level and are shown in paren-
thesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, re-
spectively.
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Table B.5: Different empirical specification: outcomes in levels and family fixed
effects
Both Parents
(1) (2)
Constant -0.03∗∗
(0.01)
γ2 0.05
(0.06)
γ3 -0.02
(0.04)
γ4 0.04
(0.03)
Child -0.06∗∗∗
(0.01)
γFE2 0.05
(0.05)
γFE3 -0.01
(0.04)
γFE4 0.04
(0.03)
N 51076 55412
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The Table above reports results
of OLS and family-F.E. regres-
sions of the difference between
a child’s and his mother’s like-
lihood of living in two-parents
families on immigration status.
In the first column of each out-
come variable we use the model
in difference, while in the sec-
ond one we pool children and
mothers observations and we in-
clude family fixed effects. γ2
refers to second generation im-
migrants. γ3 refers to third gen-
eration immigrants. γ4 refers to
fourth generation immigrants.
In each column we control for
gender of the individual. The
sample of each column consists
of the same individuals for the
corresponding outcomes in the
previous tables. Heteroskedas-
ticity robust standard errors are
clustered at the family level and
are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗
, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respec-
tively.
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Table B.6: Different empirical specification: outcomes in levels and family fixed effects
Number Of Children Age At First Birth P(Teenage Mother)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -1.80∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.16) (0.01)
γ2 -0.53
∗∗ 0.94 0.01
(0.21) (0.86) (0.03)
γ3 -0.17 -0.76 -0.01
(0.16) (0.69) (0.04)
γ4 -0.31
∗∗ -0.01 -0.04
(0.14) (0.78) (0.03)
Child -1.69∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.16) (0.01)
γFE2 -0.51
∗∗∗ 1.29 0.02
(0.14) (1.05) (0.03)
γFE3 -0.16 -0.75 -0.01
(0.15) (0.76) (0.03)
γFE4 -0.31
∗∗ -0.51 -0.02
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(0.13) (0.80) (0.02)
N 5198 7923 1955 3378 3789 6314
The Table above reports results of OLS and family-F.E. regressions of the difference be-
tween a child’s and his mother’s parenting outcome on immigration status. In the first
column of each outcome variable we use the model in difference, while in the second one
we pool chidlren and mothers observations and we include family fixed effects. γ2 refers
to second generation immigrants. γ3 refers to third generation immigrants. γ4 refers to
fourth generation immigrants. In each column we control for gender of the individual.
The sample of each column consists of the same individuals for the corresponding out-
comes in the previous tables. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at
the family level and are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the
10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Educational achievements: different sampling strategy
212
Table B.7: Educational achievements: different sampling strategy
∆ Y. of Sch. ∆ P(High School) ∆P(College)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sample Max Age ≥ 23 Max A. ≥ 25 Max A. ≥ 30 Max A. ≥ 18 Max A. ≥ 23 Max A. ≥ 23 Max A. ≥ 25
Constant 1.68∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗ 0.07 0.02
(0.34) (0.40) (0.81) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
γ2 1.64
∗∗∗ 1.60∗∗∗ 1.92∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.08 0.05
(0.38) (0.44) (0.69) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
γ3 -0.34 -0.23 -0.26 0.05 0.06 -0.02 -0.01
(0.26) (0.29) (0.41) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
γ4 -0.27 -0.18 -0.51 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00
(0.26) (0.30) (0.48) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5288 4378 1724 7103 4386 5308 4386
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The Table above reports results of OLS regressions of the difference between a child’s and his mother’s educational achievement on immigration
status. γ2 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are first generation immigrants, that is born abroad with parents
and paternal grandfather born abroad. γ3 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are second generation immigrants,
that is born in the U.S. with at least one parent born abroad. γ4 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are third
generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with parents also born in the U.S., but with the paternal grandfather born abroad. Other Controls
refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother at birth and number of older siblings. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are clustered at
the family level and are shown in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Different measures of reading comprehension and word knowl-
edge
215
Table B.8: Different measures of reading comprehension and word knowledge
∆ Reading Comprehension ∆ Word Knowledge
Measure Usual Alternative Usual Alternative
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.53∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08)
γ2 0.48
∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
γ3 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.01
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
γ4 0.10
∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.10 0.08
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Gender Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 26534 26534 31100 31148
The Table above reports results of OLS regressions of the difference between a
child’s and his mother’s English achievement on immigration status. γ2 refers
to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose mothers are first gener-
ation immigrants, that is born abroad with parents and paternal grandfather
born abroad. γ3 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for children whose
mothers are second generation immigrants, that is born in the U.S. with at
least one parent born abroad. γ4 refers to the coefficient on the indicator for
children whose mothers are third generation immigrants, that is born in the
U.S. with parents also born in the U.S., but with the paternal grandfather born
abroad. Other Controls refer to three ethnicity indicators, age of mother at
birth and child’s age and number of older siblings. Heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors are clustered at the family level and are shown in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
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Additional tables
217
Table B.9: Summary statistics; mothers in NLSY79 Children And Young Adults
Native 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation
Years of Schooling 13.47 12.95 14.03 14.05
Mathematics Knowledge -0.16 -0.55 -0.02 0.08
English Knowledge -0.04 -0.66 0.07 0.20
Illicit Behavior -0.25 -0.54 -0.28 -0.22
Both Parents 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.80
Sons 2.34 2.55 2.27 2.26
Age at First Birth 24.22 24.70 26.27 26.21
White 0.79 0.45 0.71 0.89
Black 0.17 0.07 0.04 0.02
Hispanic 0.04 0.48 0.26 0.10
Individuals 3600 202 268 325
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Table B.10: Principal component analysis; immigrants in NLSY79
Whole Sample Mothers
Cumulative Proportion 0.73 0.60
Comp.1 Comp.2 Unexplained Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Unexplained
Years of Schooling 0.50 0.19 0.50 0.21
High-School 0.30 0.72 0.71
College 0.44 0.35 0.47 0.36
Mathematics 0.49 0.27 0.49 0.29
English 0.47 0.31 0.47 0.35
Illicit Behavior 0.85 0.23 -0.68 0.43
Both Parents -0.43 0.78 0.63 0.45
Sons X X X 0.56 0.43
Age at First Birth X X X -0.55 0.34
Teenage Mother X X X 0.53 0.46
Individuals 2083 684
The Table above reports results of the principal component analysis using the sample of immigrant individuals in the
NLSY79. We retain factors whose corresponding eigenvalue is larger than 1, and we report factor loadings larger than
0.3.
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Table B.11: Principal component analysis; ∆ child-mother immigrants in Children of NLSY79
Whole Sample Womens
Cumulative Proportion 0.68 0.66
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Unexplained Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Comp.4 Unexplained
∆ Years of Schooling 0.64 0.16 0.60 0.17
∆ High-School 0.35 0.42 0.50 0.51 0.45
∆ College 0.64 0.23 0.38 -0.55 0.22
∆ Mathematics 0.51 0.34 0.46 0.44
∆ English 0.60 0.12 0.60 0.14
∆ English 0.60 0.11 0.58 0.16
∆ Illicit Behavior 0.46 0.68 0.71 0.38
∆ Both Parents 0.75 0.41 0.48 0.37 0.48
∆ Sons X X X X 0.37 0.73
∆ Age at First Birth X X X X -0.68 0.22
∆ Teenage Mother X X X X 0.61 0.37
Individuals 722 232
The Table above reports results of the principal component analysis using the sample of immigrant individuals in the NLSY79 Children And
Young Adults. The various measures are expressed as the difference between a child’s and his mother’s outcomes. We retain factors whose
corresponding eigenvalue is larger than 1, and we report factor loadings larger than 0.3.
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Appendix C
Appendix to chapter 3: A Model
of Risk Taking with
Experimentation and Career
Concerns
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Graphical game representation
222
Nature: State and Manager’s Type
ω
ω
(1− λ)vs + λρ
Principal: Assess After Safe
Safe
λγ0
Principal: Assess After Abandon
Abandon
(1− λ)(−c) + λγl
Principal: Assess After Continue
Continue
Risky
ω
Nature: Signal ω
Bad State, l-type
Manager: Project Choice
Nature: Experiment
Bad State, h-type
ω
ω
(1− λ)vs + λρ
Safe
λγ0
Abandon
(1− λ)(−c) + λγl
Continue
Risky
ω ω
ω
(1− λ)vs + λρ
Safe
λγ0
Abandon
(1− λ)(vr − c) + λγr
Continue
Risky
ω
Good State, l-type
ω
ω
(1− λ)vs + λρ
Safe
λγ0
Abandon
(1− λ)(vr − c) + λγr
Continue
Risky
ω
Good State, h-type
Notes: The Figure above reports the timing of the economy, the information structure and the manager’s payoff in every possible
scenario. Dashed lines means that the Nature, the Manager or the Principal do not know what happened before. The only strategic
move is the agent’s project choice, denoted with a solid circle. The principal assessments follow Bayes rule.
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Proofs
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Beliefs
γr ≡ P(θ = h |x = g, s = g) = P(θ = h, x = g, s = g)
P(x = g, s = g)
=
=
∫ =P(θ=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θ = h |ω) P(x = g, s = g |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
∫
P(θ = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θ=i)
P(x = g, s = g |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω) =
= ρ
∫
P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = h)
=P(x=g |ω)=p(ω)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(x = g |ω, θ = h) σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫
P(s = g |x = g, ω, θ = i) P(x = g |ω, θ = i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(x=g |ω)=p(ω)
σ(ω) dF (ω)
γ0 ≡ P(θ = h | s = b) = P(θ = h, s = b)
P(s = b)
=
∫ =P(θ=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θ = h |ω) P(s = b |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
∫
P(θ = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θ=i)
P(s = b |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω) =
= ρ
∫
P(s = b |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫
P(s = b |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
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γl ≡ P(θ = h |x = b, s = g) = P(θ = h, x = b, s = g)
P(x = b, s = g)
=
=
∫ =P(θ=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θ = h |ω) P(x = b, s = g |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
∫
P(θ = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θ=i)
P(x = b, s = g |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω) =
= ρ
∫
P(x = b, s = g |ω, θ = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫
P(x = b, s = g |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω) =
= ρ
∫
P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = h)
P(x=b |ω)=1−p(ω)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(x = b |ω, θ = h) σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θ = i)
∫
P(s = g |x = b, ω, θ = i) P(x = b |ω, θ = i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(x=b |ω)=1−p(ω)
σ(ω) dF (ω)
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Proof of Proposition 1
The expected utility of the agent with signal ω when choosing the risky project is
(1− λ)κ (p(ω)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ω))(1− β)c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(risk | ω)
+λE(γ | ω)
We define ω∗ as the signal that equalizes the managerial expected utilities when
choosing the safe or the risky project
(1− λ)κvs + λρ = (1− λ)κ (p(ω∗)α(vr − c)− (1− p(ω∗))(1− β)c)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pi(risk | ω∗)
+λE(γ | ω∗)
It is sufficient to prove that the expected utility when choosing the risky project is
an increasing function of ω. Notice that as p(ω) is increasing, the expected payoff
pi(risk | ω) is also growing with ω. For the whole utility to be increasing in ω, either
E(γ | ω) must be an increasing function of ω or the positive effect on pi(risk | ω)
must be larger than the negative one on E(γ | ω). We study separately the sufficient
conditions for these two cases.
Case 1 : We can rewrite the expected reputation of a generic agent whose signal is
ω, when choosing the risky project, as
E(γ | ω) ≡ p(ω)ραh + (1− p(ω))ρ(1− βh)+
+(p(ω)(1− α) + (1− p(ω))β)
∫
σ(l)=1
ρ((1− αh)p(l) + βh(1− p(l)))dF (l)∫
σ(l)=1
(1− α)p(l) + β(1− p(l))dF (l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡γ0(risky)
We can thus rewrite the expected reputation as the sum of two components: one
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independent on ω, the other one dependent on it
independent of ω︷ ︸︸ ︷
ρ(1− βh) + βγ0(risky) +p(ω)(ρ (αh + βh − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+γ0(risky) (1− α− β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
)
As p(ω), is increasing, the expected reputation is increasing in ω if and only if
ρ(αh + βh − 1) + γ0(w∗)(1− α− β) > 0
Using the definition of γ0(w∗), we can express this condition as:
ρ(αh + βh − 1) +
∫
σ(l)=1
ρ((1− αh)p(l) + βh(1− p(l))dF (l)∫
σ(l)=1
(1− α)p(l) + β(1− p(l))dF (l) (1− α− β) > 0
This is equivalent to
ρ∫
σ(l)=1
(1− α)p(l) + β(1− p(l))dF (l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
×
×
(∫
σ(l)=1
(αh + βh − 1)((1− α)p(l) + β(1− p(l)))dF (l)+
+
∫
σ(l)=1
(1− α− β)((1− αh)p(l) + βh(1− p(l)))dF (l)
)
> 0
This is true if and only if
1− αh
βh
<
1− α
β
.
Case 2 : When the expected reputation is decreasing in ω, we can nonetheless look
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for conditions that guarantee that the positive derivative of the expected payoff with
respect to ω, when choosing the risky project, dominates.
In a similar way to what we did before, we express the portion of the managerial
utility depending on his expected reputation as
λ
( independent of ω︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− βh)ρ+ βγ0(ω∗) +p(ω)(ρ
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(αh + βh − 1) +γ0(ω∗)
<0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− α− β)))
When ρ(αh + βh − 1) + γ0(w∗)(1 − α − β) < 0, the derivative of this expression
with respect to ω cannot be lower than λp′(ω)(ρ(αh + βh − 1) + (1 − α − β)), as
γ0(w∗) ∈ [ 0, 1] .
The derivative of the part of the utility function related to the return on the risky
project is, instead,
(1− λ)κ(p′(ω)α(vr − c) + p′(ω)(1− β)c) > 0.
For the whole managerial utility to be an increasing function of ω it is then sufficient
that
(1− λ)κ(p′(ω)α(vr − c) + p′(ω)(1− β)c > −λp′(ω) (ρ(αh + βh − 1) + (1− α− β))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ραh+ρβh−ρ+1−ραh−(1−ρ)αl−ρβh−(1−ρ)βl
that is, whenever:
λ
1− λ <
κ(α(vr − c) + (1− β)c)
(1− ρ)(αl + βl − 1) .
To sum up, whenever 1−αh
βh
< 1−α
β
the manager is better off choosing the risky project
if and only if his signal ω is bigger than the equilibrium ω∗. When 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
, this
is also true if career concerns are not too strong, that is λ is small enough.

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Proof of Lemma 1
Consider two cutoff equilibria characterized by thresholds w∗1 and w
∗
2, with w
∗
1 > w
∗
2.
Let us consider the conditions that guarantee that γ0(w∗1) > γ
0(w∗2). These are the
beliefs in case a risky project is abandoned, under the two equilibria. We study in
which circumstances the following holds:
γ0(w∗1) ≡
∫ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(w) + βh(1− p(w)))dF (w)∫ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(w) + β(1− p(w)))dF (w)
>
∫ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(w) + βh(1− p(w)))dF (w)∫ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(w) + β(1− p(w)))dF (w)
≡ γ0(w∗2)
As the two denominators are non negative, this is equivalent to:
(
∫ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(w) + β(1− p(w)))dF (w))(
∫ w
w∗1
((1− αh)p(w) + βh(1− p(w)))dF (w))
>
(
∫ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(w) + β(1− p(w)))dF (w))(
∫ w
w∗2
((1− αh)p(w) + βh(1− p(w)))dF (w))
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Using the definitions of α and β, that is, α ≡ ραh+(1−ρ)αl and β ≡ ρβh+(1−ρ)βl,
we can rewrite this expression as:
((1− α)βh − β(1− αh))
∫ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
∫ w
w∗1
(1− p(w))dF (w)
>
((1− α)βh − β(1− αh))
∫ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
∫ w
w∗2
(1− p(w))dF (w)
Suppose now that (1 − α)βh ≤ β(1 − αh) - which is equivalent to (1 − αl)βh ≤
βl(1− αh)). Then the inequality holds if and only if:∫ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
∫ w
w∗1
(1− p(w))dF (w) <
∫ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
∫ w
w∗2
(1− p(w))dF (w)
that is, if and only if
∫ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
∫ w
w∗1
dF (w)−
∫ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
∫ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
<
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∫ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
∫ w
w∗2
dF (w)−
∫ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)
∫ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w)
As the second terms on each side of the inequality are the same, this simplifies to:
(1− F (w∗1))
∫ w
w∗2
p(w)dF (w) < (1− F (w∗2))
∫ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w).
Because p(w) < p(w∗1) for any w < w
∗
1, notice that the left hand side of this inequality
is at most:
(1− F (w∗1))(F (w∗1)− F (w∗2))p(w∗1) + (1− F (w∗1))
∫ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w)− 1
for some 1 > 0. Therefore, the inequality necessarily holds if the following holds:
(1− F (w∗1))(F (w∗1)− F (w∗2))p(w∗1)− 1 < (F (w∗1)− F (w∗2))
∫ w
w∗1
p(w)dF (w).
The right hand side of this equation cannot be lower than (F (w∗1) − F (w∗2))(1 −
F (w∗1))p(w
∗
1) + 2 for some 2 > 0. Therefore this condition always holds and
γ0(w∗1) > γ
0(w∗2) when (1− αl)βh ≤ βl(1− αh).
With a similar argument we could show that the opposite is true when (1−αl)βh ≥
βl(1− αh). 
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Proof of Corollary 1
Let ω∗1 and ω
∗
2 be two equilibrium cutoffs, such that ω
∗
1 > ω
∗
2. By definition it must
be the case that the expected utilities of the two marginal individuals choosing the
risky project equals the utility when choosing the safe one
(1− λ)κ(vs − c) + λρ
=
(1− λ)κ((p(ω∗1)α(vr − c) + (1− p(ω1))(1− β)(−c) + λ(p(ω∗1)ραh + (1− p(ω∗1))ρ(1− βh)+
+(p(ω∗1)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗1))β)
∫ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)∫ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
)
=
(1− λ)κ((p(ω∗2)α(vr − c) + (1− p(ω∗2))(1− β)(−c) + λ(p(ω∗2)ραh + (1− p(ω∗2))ρ(1− βh)+
+(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β)
∫ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)∫ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
)
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For this to hold, it must be the case that:
(1− λ)
λ
κ((p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))α(vr − c) + (p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))(1− β)c)+
+(p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))ραh − (p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))ρ(1− βh)
=
(p(ω∗1)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗1))β)
∫ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (w)∫ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
+
−(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β)
∫ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)∫ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
(C.1)
Notice that the left hand side of equation (C.1) is negative, as p(ω∗2) < p(ω
∗
1) and
αh + βh − 1 > 0.
As p(ω∗1) ≡ p(ω∗2) + (p(ω∗1)− p(ω∗2)) > p(ω∗2), we can now rewrite the right hand side
of (C.1) as:
(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β + (p(ω∗1)− p(ω∗2))(1− α− β)))×
×
∫ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)∫ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
+
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−(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β)
∫ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)∫ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
and then as:
(p(ω∗1)− p(ω∗2))(1− α− β))
∫ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)∫ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
+
+(p(ω∗2)(1− α) + (1− p(ω∗2))β)×
×(
∫ w
w∗1
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)∫ w
w∗1
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
−
∫ w
w∗2
ρ((1− αh)p(ω) + βh(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)∫ w
w∗2
((1− α)p(ω) + β(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
)
The first part of this term is negative as α + β > 1 and it is bounded below by
(p(ω∗1)− p(ω∗2))(1− α− β), as γ0(ω∗1) ∈ [0, 1].
By the previous Lemma the second part is positive if and only if (1 − αl)βh ≤
βl(1 − αh). In this scenario, the right hand side of equation (4) has a negative
component and a positive one. Thus, if (1 − αl)βh ≤ βl(1 − αh), (4) cannot hold
whenever:
(1− λ)κ((p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))α(vr − c) + (p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1)(1− β)c)+
+λ((p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))ραh − (p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))ρ(1− βh))
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<λ(p(ω∗2)− p(ω∗1))(α + β − 1).
This is equivalent to:
(1− λ)κ(α(vr − c) + (1− β)c) + λρ(αh + βh − 1)) > λ(α + β − 1)
and, after simplification, to:
λ
1− λ <
κ(α(vr − c) + (1− β)c)
(1− ρ)(αl + βl − 1) .

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Additional beliefs with N agents
γnlN ≡ P(θN = h |x = b, s = b) =
∫ ω
ω∗ P(θN = h, x = b, s = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)∫ ω
ω∗ P(x = b, s = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)
=
=
∫ ω
ω∗
=P(θ=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θN = h |ω) P(x = b, s = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
∫ ω
ω∗ P(θN = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θN=i)
P(x = b, s = b |ω, θN = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
= ρ
∫ ω
ω∗ P(x = b, s = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θN = i)
∫ ω
ω∗ P(x = b, s = b |ω, θN = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
= ρ
∫ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |x = b, ω, θ = h)
=P(x=b |ω)=p(ω)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(x = b |ω, θN = h) σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θN = i)
∫ ω
ω∗(s = b |x = b, ω, θN = i) P(x = b |ω, θN = i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(x=b |ω)=p(ω)
σ(ω) dF (ω)
= ρ
βh
β
γ0N ≡ P(θN = h | sN = b, s1 = b, ..., sN−1 = b) =
P(θN = h, s1 = b, ..., sN = b)
P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b)
=
=
∫ ω
ω∗ P(θN = h, s1 = b, ..., sN = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)∫ ω
ω∗ P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)
=
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=∫ ω
ω∗
=P(θN=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θN = h |ω) P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
∫ ω
ω∗ P(θN = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θN=i)
P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |ω, θN = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
Notice that P(s1 = b, .., sN = b |ω, θ = i) can be computed as:
P(s1 = b, .., sN = b |x = g, ω, θ = i)P(x = g|ω, θN = i) +
+P(s1 = b, .., sN = b|x = b, ω, θ = i)P(x = b|ω, θN = i) .
(C.2)
Now, the first term of equation (5) - P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |x = g, ω, θN = i) - is:
P(sN = b |s1 = b, ..., sN−1 = b, x = g, ω, θN = i)P(s1 = b, ..., sN−1 = b |x = g, ω, θN = i)×
×P(sN = b |x = g, θN = i)P(sN−1 = b |x = g)...P(s1 = b |x = g) =
= (1− αi)(1− α)N−1.
Similarly, the second term of (5) can be computed as P(s1 = b, ..., sN = b |x =
b, ω, θN = i) = βiβ
N−1. Thus, we have:
γ0N = ρ
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
γnrN ≡ P(θN = h |x = g, s = b) =
∫ ω
ω∗ P(θN = h, x = g, s = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)∫ ω
ω∗ P(x = g, s = b |ω)σ(ω)dF (ω)
=
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=∫ ω
ω∗
=P(θN=h)=ρ︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(θN = h |ω) P(x = g, s = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h}
∫ ω
ω∗ P(θN = i |ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=P(θN=i)
P(x = g, s = b |ω, θ = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
= ρ
∫ ω
ω∗ P(x = g, s = b |ω, θN = h)σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θN = i)
∫ ω
ω∗ P(x = g, s = b |ω, θN = i)σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
= ρ
∫ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |x = g, ω, θ = h)
P(x=g |ω)=p(ω)︷ ︸︸ ︷
P(x = g |ω, θN = h) σ(ω) dF (ω)∑
i∈{l, h} P(θN = i)
∫ ω
ω∗ P(s = b |x = g, ω, θN = i) P(x = g |ω, θN = i)︸ ︷︷ ︸
P(x=g |ω)=p(ω)
σ(ω) dF (ω)
=
= ρ
1− αh
1− α .
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Proof of Proposition 3
We start showing that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 also hold in the generalized version
of the model.
Consider, again, two cutoff equilibria characterized by thresholds ω∗1 and ω
∗
2,
with ω∗1 > ω
∗
2. We want to show that γ
0(ω∗1) > γ
0(ω∗2) if and only if
1−αH
βH
> 1−α
β
.
In doing this, we use the new definition of belief in case of termination of the risky
project. γ0(ω∗1) > γ
0(ω∗2) when:
ρ
∫ ω
ω∗1
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1p(ω) + βhβN−1(1− p(ω))dF (ω)∫ ω
ω∗1
((1− α)Np(ω) + βN(1− p(ω)))dF (ω)
>
ρ
∫ ω
ω∗2
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1p(ω) + βhβN−1(1− p(ω))dF (ω)∫ ω
ω∗2
(1− α)Np(ω) + βN(1− p(ω))dF (ω)
This is equivalent to:
(1− αh)(1− α)N−1βN
∫ ω
ω∗1
p(ω)dF (ω)
∫ ω
ω∗2
(1− p(ω))dF (ω) +
+ (1− α)NβhβN−1
∫ ω
ω∗1
(1− p(ω))dF (ω)
∫ ω
ω∗2
p(ω)dF (ω)
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>(1− αh)(1− α)N−1βN
∫ ω
ω∗1
p(ω)dF (ω)
∫ ω
ω∗2
(1− p(w))dF (ω) +
+ (1− α)NβhβN−1
∫ ω
ω∗1
(1− p(ω))dF (ω)
∫ ω
ω∗2
p(ω)dF (ω)
We now divide everything by (1− α)N−1βN−1 and rearrange, to get:
((1− α)βh − β(1− αh))
∫ ω
ω∗2
p(ω)dF (ω)
∫ ω
w∗1
(1− p(ω))dF (ω)
>
((1− α)βh − β(1− αh))
∫ ω
w∗1
p(ω)dF (ω)
∫ ω
ω∗2
(1− p(ω))dF (ω)
This is equivalent to what we had in the proof of Lemma 1. Therefore for ω∗1 and
ω∗2, with w
∗
1 > w
∗
2, we have that γ
0(w∗1) > γ
0(w∗2) if and only if
1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
.
Now we need to show that, as in Lemma 2, upon observing ω∗ the marginal
agent is less optimistic than the principal in evaluating his own ability if and only
if 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
. The proof of this claim is straightforward. Suppose 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
.
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Notice that, for the marginal agent:
E(γ | ω∗) ≡ p(ω∗)αραh
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− βh)
(1− β) +
+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)ρ1− αh
1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)ρβh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
>
p(ω∗)αρ
αh
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− βh)
(1− β) +
+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)ρ1− αh
1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)ρβh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p(ω∗) + βhβN−1(1− p(ω∗))
(1− α)Np(ω∗) + βN(1− p(ω∗)) = ρ
Hence, the marginal agent takes too much risk if and only if 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
We start from the definition of E(γN | ω∗) and E(γN+1 | ω∗). These are, respec-
tively:
E(γN | ω∗) ≡ p(ω∗)αραh
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− βh)
(1− β) +
+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)ρ1− αh
1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)ρβh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
and:
E(γN+1 | ω∗) ≡ p(ω∗)αραh
α
+ ((1− p(ω∗)(1− β))ρ(1− βh)
(1− β) +
+p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N+1)ρ1− αh
1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN+1)ρβh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N+1 + (1− p(ω∗))βN+1)ρ (1− αh)(1− α)
N p˜+ βhβ
N(1− p˜)
(1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜)
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We want to show that E(γN | ω∗) > E(γN+1 | ω∗) if and only if 1−αhβh >
1−αl
βl
.
Noticing that the first two addends in the definitions of E(γN | ω∗) and E(γN+1 | ω∗)
coincide and dividing everything by ρ, E(γN | ω∗) > E(γN+1 | ω∗) if and only if
p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N)1− αh
1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN)βh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N + (1− p(ω∗))βN) (1− αh)(1− α)
N−1p˜+ βhβN−1(1− p˜)
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)
>
p(ω∗)(1− α− (1− α)N+1)1− αh
1− α + (1− p(ω
∗))(1− (1− β)− βN+1)βh
β
+
+(p(ω∗)(1− α)N+1 + (1− p(ω∗))βN+1) (1− αh)(1− α)
N p˜+ βhβ
N(1− p˜)
(1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜)
Now we multiply everything by
(
(1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)) ((1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜))
and adjust terms to get
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(1− αh)
{
−p(ω∗)(1− α)N−1α ((1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)) ((1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜))+
+(1− α)N−1p˜ ((1− α)Np(ω∗) + βN(1− p(ω∗))) ((1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜))+
−(1− α)N p˜ ((1− α)N+1p(ω∗) + βN+1(1− p(ω∗))) ((1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜))}
>
βh
{
(1− p(ω∗))βN−1(1− β) ((1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜)) ((1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜))+
+βN(1− p˜) ((1− α)N+1p(ω∗) + βN+1(1− p(ω∗))) ((1− α)N p˜+ βN(1− p˜))
−βN−1(1− p˜) ((1− α)Np(ω∗) + βN(1− p(ω∗))) ((1− α)N+1p˜+ βN+1(1− p˜))}
We focus separately on the two sides of the inequality. From the left hand side we
obtain:
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(1− αh)
{
−p(ω∗)(1− α)N−1α
(
(1− α)2N+1p˜2 + (1− α)NβN+1p˜(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N+1βN p˜(1− p˜) + β2N+1(1− p˜)2
)
+
+p˜(1− α)N−1
(
(1− α)2N+1p(ω∗)p˜+ (1− α)NβN+1p(ω∗)(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N+1βN p˜(1− p(ω∗)) + β2N+1(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)
+
−p˜(1− α)N
(
(1− α)2N+1p(ω∗)p˜+ (1− α)N+1βNp(ω∗)(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)NβN+1p˜(1− p(ω∗)) + β2N+1(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)}
=
= (1− αh)
{
−α(1− α)2N−1βN+1p(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)+
−α(1− α)2NβNp(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)− α(1− α)N−1β2N+1p(ω∗)(1− p˜)2+
(1− α)2N−1βN+1
(
p(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)− (1− α)(1− p(ω∗))p˜2
)
+
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+(1− α)2NβN
(
p˜2(1− p(ω∗))− (1− α)p(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)
)
+
+(1− α)N−1β2N+1
(
p˜(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)− (1− α)p˜(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)}
=
= (1− αh)
{
(1− α)2N−1βN+1p˜
(
p(ω∗)(1− p˜)− (1− α)(1− p(ω∗))p˜− αp(ω∗)(1− p˜)
)
+
+(1− α)2NβN p˜
(
p˜(1− p(ω∗)− (1− α)p(ω∗)(1− p˜)− αp(ω∗)(1− p˜)
)
+
+(1− α)N−1β2N+1
(
p˜(1− p(ω∗))− (1− α)p˜(1− p(ω∗))− αp(ω∗)(1− p˜)
)}
=
= (1− αh)
{
(1− α)2N−1βN+1p˜
(
(1− α)(p(ω∗)− p˜)
)
+ (1− α)2NβN p˜
(
p˜− p(ω∗)
)
+
+(1− α)N−1β2N+1
(
α(p˜− p(ω∗))
)}
=
= (1− αh)β(p˜− p(ω∗))
{
(1− α)2NβN−1(1− β)p˜+ (1− α)N−1βN(1− p˜)α
}
.
From the hand side, instead, we obtain
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βh
{
(1− p(ω∗)(1− β)βN−1
(
(1− α)2N+1p˜2 + (1− α)NβN+1p˜(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N−1βN p˜(1− p˜) + β2N+1(1− p˜)2
)
+
+(1− p˜)βN
(
(1− α)2N+1p(ω∗)p˜+ (1− α)N+1βNp(ω∗)(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)NβN+1p˜(1− p(ω∗)) + β2N+1(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)
+
−(1− p˜)βN−1
(
(1− α)2N+1p(ω∗)p˜+ (1− α)NβN+1p(ω∗)(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N+1βN p˜(1− p(ω∗)) + β2N+1(1− p(ω∗))(1− p˜)
)}
=
= βh
{
(1− α)2N+1(1− β)βN−1(1− p(ω∗))p˜2 + (1− α)N(1− β)β2N(1− p(ω∗))p˜(1− p˜)+
+(1− α)N+1(1− β)β2N−1(1− p(ω∗))p˜(1− p˜)+
−(1− α)2N+1(1− β)βN−1p(ω∗)p˜(1− p˜)+
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−(1− α)Nβ2N(1− p˜)
(
p(ω∗)(1− p˜)− βp˜(1− p(ω∗))
)
+
−(1− α)N+1β2N−1(1− p˜)
(
(1− p(ω∗))p˜− βp(ω∗)(1− p˜)
)}
=
= βh(1− α)
{
(1− α)2N(1− β)βN−1
(
p˜2 − p(ω∗)p˜2 − p(ω∗)p˜+ p(ω∗)p˜2
)
+
+(1− α)N−1β2N(1− p˜)
(
(1− β)(p˜− p(ω∗)p˜)− p(ω∗) + p(ω∗)p˜+ βp˜− βp(ω∗)p˜
)
+
+(1− α)Nβ2N−1(1− p˜)
(
(1− β)(p˜− p(ω∗)p˜)− p˜+ p(ω∗)p˜+ βp(ω∗)− βp(ω∗)p˜
)}
=
= βh(1− α)
{
(1− α)2N(1− β)βN−1p˜(p˜− p(ω∗))+
+(1− α)N−1β2N(1− p˜)(p˜− p(ω∗))+
+(1− α)Nβ2N(1− p˜)(p(ω∗)− p˜)
}
=
= βh(1− α)(p˜− p(ω∗))
{
(1− α)2NβN−1(1− β)p˜+ (1− α)N−1β2N(1− p˜)α
}
.
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As (p˜ − p(ω∗)) and the term in braces are non negative and common between the
left and the right hand side of the original inequality, E(γN | ω∗) > E(γN+1 | ω∗) if
and only if (1 − αh)βl > (1 − αl)βh. In this case, E(γN | ω∗) > E(γN+1 | ω∗) > ρ,
meaning that the expected reputation of the marginal individual, higher than the
prior, lowers as the number of agents, N, increases. The opposite holds whenever
(1− αh)βl < (1− αl)βh. 
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Additional beliefs with N agents with conditionally indepen-
dent signals ω
Before starting with the analysis, we need to introduce some additional notation.
First, we define ˜˜p ≡ ∫ ω∗
ω
P(x = g |ω)dF (ω)
F (ω∗) , that is the market belief on the state of
the world being good after observing a manager choosing a safe project. We also
use the definition µ ≡ P(x = g), that is the unconditional probability of the state of
the world being good.
We report below the steps to calculate the belief about the ability of the N th
manager, following the abandonment of the risky project after the experiment, when
the market cannot assess the state of the world. There are N such beliefs and we
only report the one where all the other t − 1 managers choosing the risky project
discard it following the experiment, while the remaining N − t choose the safe one.
γ0tN ≡ P(θN = h | sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗) =
=
P(θN = h, sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗)
P(sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗)
In evaluating P(sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗), notice that it
equals
P(sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗, x = g)+
+P(sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗, x = b)
Furthermore, we can compute P(sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t <
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ω∗, x = g) as
P(sN = b | sN−1,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗, x = g)×
×P(sN−1,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗, x = g)
Since the realizations of the experiment are conditionally independent, P(sN =
b | sN−1,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗, x = g) = P(sN = b | x =
g) = (1 − α). Thus, reiterating the procedure, and then using the conditionally
independence of signals ω, the last expression becomes
(1− α)tP(ωN,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗, x = g) =
= (1− α)tP(ωN > ω∗ | ωN−1,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗, x = g)×
×P(ωN−1,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗, x = g) =
(1− α)t p˜
t ˜˜pN−t
µN−1
(1− F (ω∗))tF (ω∗)N−t
Computing each component of the belief in a similar way and simplifying the term
(1− F (ω∗))tF (ω∗)N−t, we get that
γ0tN = ρ
(1− αh)(1− α)t−1 p˜t ˜˜pN−tµN−1 + βhβt−1 (1−p˜)
t(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
(1− α)t p˜t ˜˜pN−t
µN−1 + β
t (1−p˜)t(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
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Results with N agents with conditionally independent signals
ω
Notice first that Lemma 1 holds also in this economy. With some abuse of notation,
we define
γ0tN (ω
∗
1) = ρ
(1− αh)(1− α)t−1 p(ω
∗
1)p˜
t−1 ˜˜pN−t
µN−1 + βhβ
t−1 (1−p(ω∗1))(1−p˜)t−1(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
(1− α)t p(ω∗1)p˜t−1 ˜˜pN−t
µN−1 + β
t (1−p(ω∗1))(1−p˜)t−1(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
and
γ0tN (ω
∗
2) = ρ
(1− αh)(1− α)t−1 p(ω
∗
2)p˜
t−1 ˜˜pN−t
µN−1 + βhβ
t−1 (1−p(ω∗2))(1−p˜)t−1(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
(1− α)t p(ω∗2)p˜t−1 ˜˜pN−t
µN−1 + β
t (1−p(ω∗2))(1−p˜)t−1(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
where ω∗1 > ω
∗
2. Following the same procedure that we applied in the proof of
Proposition 3 it is easy to see that γ0tN (ω
∗
1) > γ
0t
N (ω
∗
2) if and only if
1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
.
As when observing a manager choosing the risky project, the market is more
optimistic than the marginal manager about the state of the world (p˜ > p(ω∗)), this
implies that
γ0tN (ω˜) = ρ
(1− αh)(1− α)t−1 p˜t ˜˜pN−tµN−1 + βhβt−1 (1−p˜)
t(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
(1− α)t p˜t ˜˜pN−t
µN−1 + β
t (1−p˜)t(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
>
ρ
(1− αh)(1− α)t−1 p(ω∗)p˜t−1 ˜˜pN−tµN−1 + βhβt−1 (1−p(ω
∗))(1−p˜)t−1(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
(1− α)t p(ω∗)p˜t−1 ˜˜pN−t
µN−1 + β
t (1−p(ω∗))(1−p˜)t−1(1− ˜˜p)N−t
(1−µ)N−1
= γ0tN (ω
∗)
for any t whenever 1−αh
βh
> 1−α
β
. This, in turn, implies that Lemma 2 holds as well
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as before, and therefore that Proposition 3 applies also to this economy.
In order to obtain the expected reputation of the marginal individual from choos-
ing the risky project, we need to calculate the weight he assigns to the posterior γ0tN
for any t. We then show that such weights goes to zero as the number of managers
tends to infinity. This implies that the difference between the expected reputation,
obtained weighting the market’s posteriors, and the expected self-assessment of the
manager, obtained using the same weights but different posteriors, vanishes in the
limit. Indeed, the only posteriors in which the market and the manager would
disagree upon has weights approaching zero.
Consider the Nth manager, that receives the signal ω = ω∗. In his expected
reputation, the weight associated to the event in which some specific N−t managers
choose the safe project, while the other t−1 managers and himself discard the risky
one after the experiment is given by
P(sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN−1,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗ | ωN = ω∗) =
P(sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN−1,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗ | ωN = ω∗, x = g)×
×P(x = g | ωN = ω∗)+
P(sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN−1,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗ | ωN = ω∗, x = b)×
×P(x = b | ωN = ω∗)
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Notice that
P(sN,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN−1,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗ | ωN = ω∗, x = g) =
= P(sN | sN−1,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN−1,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗, ωN = ω∗, x = g)×
×P(sN−1,...,N−(t−1) = b, ωN−1,...,N−(t−1) > ω∗, ω1,...,N−t < ω∗ | ωN = ω∗, x = g)
Using conditionally independence of the signals ω and the signals from the experi-
ment, this equals
(1− α)t p˜
t−1 ˜˜pN−t
µN−1
(1− F (ω∗))t−1F (ω∗)N−t
Notice now that there are
(
N−1
t−1
)
possible ways in which some specific N−t managers
choose the safe project, while the other t−1 managers and the N th manager discard
the risky one after the experiment. Indeed these are the ways in which one could
select t − 1 managers out of N − 1 (or, that is equivalent, N − t managers out of
N − 1). So the weight associated to the posterior γ0tN is given by(
N − 1
t− 1
)
F (ω∗)N−t(1− F (ω∗))t−1×
×
[
(1− α)t
(
p˜
µ
)t−1( ˜˜p
µ
)N−t
p(ω) + βt
(
1− p˜
1− µ
)t−1(
1− ˜˜p
1− µ
)N−t
(1− p(ω))
]
=
255
= (N − 1)...(N − t+ 1)
[
F (ω∗)
˜˜p
µ
]N−t
1
(t− 1)!(1− F (ω
∗))t−1
[
(1− α)t
(
p˜
µ
)t−1
p(ω∗)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡At
+
+(N − 1)...(N − t+ 1)
[
F (ω∗)
1− ˜˜p
1− µ
]N−t
1
(t− 1)!(1− F (ω
∗))t−1
[
βt
(
1− p˜
1− µ
)t−1
(1− p(ω∗))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡Bt
Consider aN ≡ (N − 1)...(N − t + 1)
[
F (ω∗)
˜˜p
µ
]N−t
At, first. As N goes to infin-
ity, this expression approaches (N − 1)t−1
[
F (ω∗)
˜˜p
µ
]N−t
At. Consider now
aN+1
aN
=(
N
N−1
)t−1
F (ω∗)
˜˜p
µ
. Using the definitions ˜˜p ≡ ∫ ω∗
ω
P(x = g |ω)dF (ω)
F (ω∗) and µ ≡ P(x =
g), it follows that F (ω∗)
˜˜p
µ
=
∫ ω∗
ω P(x=g |ω)dF (ω)∫ ω
ω P(x=g |ω)dF (ω)
< 1 since ω > ω∗. Thus, for N large
enough
aN+1
aN
=
(
N
N − 1
)t−1
F (ω∗)
˜˜p
µ
< 1
Using the ratio test, this implies that
∞∑
N=t
(N − 1)t−1
[
F (ω∗)
˜˜p
µ
]N−t
At
converges absolutely and, thus, that
lim
N→∞
(N − 1)t−1
[
F (ω∗)
˜˜p
µ
]N−t
At = lim
N→∞
(N − 1)...(N − t+ 1)
[
F (ω∗)
˜˜p
µ
]N−t
At = 0
.
Applying the same reasoning to the expression (N−1)...(N−t+1)
[
F (ω∗) 1−
˜˜p
1−µ
]N−t
Bt,
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we obtain that bN+1
bN
=
(
N
N−1
)t−1
F (ω∗) 1−
˜˜p
1−µ =
(
N
N−1
)t−1 ∫ ω∗
ω P(x=b |ω)dF (ω)∫ ω
ω P(x=b |ω)dF (ω)
< 1, as
ω > ω∗. Using again the ratio test, we thus conclude that the weights associated to
each posterior γ0tN are zero in the limit, for any t. 
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